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Abstract 
It is argued in Chapters 1 to 4 that in cognitive psychology in general, and 
in the disciplines of language acquisition and cognitive development in 
particular, there is substantial benefit to be derived from distinguishing 
between two representational systems, one system being deployed in long-
established or highly-practiced functions, and the second deployed in novel 
tasks, or where difficulties interrupt the first system. It is also argued that 
the proper subject of cognitive development is the second of these systems. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned in different ways with the origins of 
language in the individual, in particular with the question of what innate 
knowledge of language might be justified. It is concluded that many 
questions regarding innate knowledge remain open, and that a source in 
human evolution for knowledge of language is no more likely than sources in 
individual or social development. In Chapter 7 it is argued that 
representational drawing emerges late in the 4th year of life, and some new 
techniques are described for studying early representational drawing. 
Following these treatments of external systems of representation, Chapter 
8 offers a general developmental theory of forms of representation, extending 
Piaget's insight that mental representation is co-extensive with thought, and 
that the main axis of cognitive development is the content of thought and 
representation. Chapters 9 to 12 apply this theory to the representation of 
belief and desire, and of extrinsic and intrinsic qualities of objects, by 11/2 to 4 
year-old children. Chapter 13 introduces a new method for analyzing the free 
classification task, a task sometimes used to assess children's ability to think 
about intrinsic qualities, and applies this method to various data sets. 
Chapter 14 applies these insights and results to the problem of 
characterizing concepts and concept development and favourably discusses 
the idea that more precise knowledge of this aspect of development may help 
to explain certain features of early language acquisition. 
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Foreword 
This dissertation is submitted under the provisions of regulations A 7.4 and 
A7.5 of University Ordinance 23. Regulation A7.4 states that 'Work published, 
in press, or submitted for publication, may be included in the thesis, provided 
the status of such work is stated in the candidate's thesis'. Regulation A7.5 
states that 'Work carried out in collaboration with others may be included in 
the thesis, provided that the nature and extent of such collaboration are 
specifically acknowledged in the candidate's thesis'. 
Chapters 1 through 6, and Chapter 8 are based closely on published 
papers, and the details of publication are specified in each case in a footnote. 
I have made alterations to the text of these chapters only where it seemed 
necessary because of passage of time since the original time of writing, or in 
order to make connections with other chapters within this dissertation. 
Chapters 1 and 6 contain closing postscripts in which I attempt to identify 
developments subsequent to the publication of the original papers which 
affect, or appear to affect, the conclusions drawn. 
Chapters 9 and 10 are based closely on papers Which have been submitted 
for publication, and Chapter 14 is based on a paper in press; again, the 
details are given in footnotes. DepeD-ding on the time interval between 
submission of this dissertation and its examination, papers based on 
Chapters 7, 11, 12 and 13 may be submitted for publication in the intervening 
period. I undertake to advise the examiners of any such submissions. 
So far as regulation A 7.5 is concerned, my Acknowledgements recognise 
collaborators, and specify the extent of collaboration, in respect of Chapters 
5,7,8,10,11 and 12. In addition, I affirm that (except for quoted texts) the text of 
the dissertation is entirely my own work. In the case of Chapters 5 and 8, 
where some assistance with writing is acknowledged, this assistance took 
the form of revision of the original draft papers, which I had produced. 
Regulation A1.1 of Ordinance 23 requires a Ph.D. candidate to demonstrate 
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the ability 'to conduct original investigations, to assess ideas critically, and to 
relate his (sic) investigations to a wider field of knowledge'. I believe that 
most of the chapters demonstrate ability to assess ideas critically; Chapters 7 
and 13 present methods of investigation (of early drawing and object sorting 
respectively) which I believe to be novel; Chapters 10 to 12 present novel 
findings relating to the representational capacities of two and three year-old 
children. Chapters 1 and 5 were included with the third requirement of Al.1 -
construed as one of scholarship - particularly in mind; their inclusion 
perhaps merits this explanation, since Chapter 1 is to some extent dated, and 
Chapter 5 is somewhat peripheral to the main drift of the dissertation. 
In a dissertation based on published work, and completed on a part-time 
basis, punctuated by leaves of absence, as this one has been, it is difficult to 
achieve the level of coherence, singleness of purpose and economy of 
expression normal in a Ph. D. dissertation. During the period of registration, 
the focus of my research has shifted from the area of language and language 
acquisition to the more general, and possibly more fundamental, area of 
early cognitive development as it relates to representational systems; the 
contents of my dissertation plainly reflect this shift of focus; they also reflect 
my enthusiasm for a multi-disciplinary approach. I hope, nevertheless, that 
the residue of continuity and coherence is sufficient to satisfy the reader that 
this product of my middle years is 'a coat of many colours' rather than 'a 
thing of shreds and patches'. 
Mfidavit 
Finally, in accordance with Regulation A 7.2 of Ordinance 23, I affirm that, 
subject to the exceptions noted above and in my Acknowledgements, the 
dissertation is entirely my own work, and has not been included in any other 
thesis. 
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Introduction and Overview 
Introduction 
This introduction will be very brief, since many of the ensuing chapters 
(particularly Chapters 1 and 8) contain lengthy introductions. 
In one of the oldest and best developed branches of psychology - the study of 
memory - it is now a commonplace that different memory systems must be 
distinguished (e.g. Tulving, 1985a), and clever methods have been developed 
to demonstrate the dissociations between memory functions that are implied 
by these distinctions, for instance those drawn by fulving between 
procedural, semantic and episodic memory systems. fulving (1985b) perhaps 
goes further than others would go in associating the different memory 
systems with different types or levels of consciousness, but this willingness to 
face up to the problem of consciousness has since spread to neighbouring 
fields of research, such as neuropsychology (Milner and Rugg, 1991). 
The common purpose of the reviews, essays, experiments and 
methodological proposals which compose this dissertation is to make the case 
for drawing analogous distinctions within developmental psychology, and to 
argue that the proper subject of cognitive development is the developing 
system (or systems) of mental representation which allows the consciousness 
of the child to reach out from the here and the now to the past, the future, the 
remote and the possible; and to reach in from the goals of actions and the 
individual function of objects to the inner structures of actions and objects. 
There is little that is genuinely original in the theoretical claims that I 
shall make: many of my proposals find their origins in Piaget's voluminous 
writings. The same disclaimer might be made, however, by those who have 
tried to introduce distinctions linked to consciousness into the study of 
memory or brain injury, and especially by those, such as Byrne and Whiten 
(1988), who have tried to introduce such distinctions into the comparative 
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psychology of intelligence. In these other fields, for Piaget we may substitute 
Bartlett, Luria, Kohler, etc. Perhaps there are cracks in the latest of the 
succession of monistic monoliths - behaviourism, information-processing, 
and now 'cognitive science' - but to be sure of this, someone must try to drive 
in a wedge! 
Representation in the broadest sense of the word is found wherever we look 
in psychology. The residue of experience entailed by memory, imitation, 
learning or perceptual recognition may be counted as a kind of 
representation of that experience; computational analyses of perceptual, 
linguistic and cognitive processes seem to entail representations of the 
various constructs involved in the computations (in the words of Fodor (1975) -
'no computation without representation'); in traditional areas of cognition -
recollecting, planning, reasoning, imagining - the mind is always focussed 
on some remote entity, and must therefore represent it. 
However, - obeying Lloyd Morgan's Canon (1894) - just as we should be 
wary of extending the last-mentioned model of cognition to animal 
intelligence, so we should be cautious in extending it from its natural domain 
of application in human psychology to other psychological functions (cf. the 
caution of J.J Gibson with respect to perception and of B.F. Skinner with 
respect to learning and language), and also cautious of extending it to the 
earliest signs of intelligence in the child (cf. the caution of Piaget). 
Accordingly, if the notions of representation and representational system 
are to have distinct and useful meanings, then criteria must be sought to 
distinguish cases of genuine representation (where something in the mind 
stands for something external) from cases where it is true only that matters 
may be described as if that were true. 
I will make no attempt to define an appropriate concept of representation 
or representational system here, since these concepts will undergo 
development in the course of the dissertation. However, it is worth observing 
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that in the various attempts by philosophers to identify criteria needed to 
define such concepts for the domain of external representations (e.g., 
Goodman, 1969) only one criterion is at all plausible for the case of mental 
representation, namely causation (mental representations are caused by the 
thing represented). Resemblance ( mental representations resemble the 
thing represented) was tried and found wanting by the Gestalt school of 
perception, and in any case such resemblances could hardly be examined. 
Intention (mental representations are intended to stand for the thing 
represented) fails because it begs the question of who intends them to be 
representations (Perner, 1991, p. 21). Of course, although causation certainly 
might be satisfied by representations needed to account for memory, imitation 
and learning, it could hardly be satisfied by those needed to account for 
imagining. Because of these obvious difficulties, more recent philosophy has 
explored other possible criteria, e.g. proper function (Millikan, 1984) and/or 
capacity for misrepresentation (Dretske, 1988). A modest discussion of these 
suggestions in relation to my own will be offered in the Afterword. 
Overviewl 
It is argued in Chapter 1 that in cognitive psychology in general, and in the 
special disciplines of language acquisition and cognitive development in 
particular, there is substantial benefit to be derived from distinguishing 
between two different systems of representation, one system being deployed in 
long-established or highly-practiced functions, and the second system being 
deployed in novel tasks, or in other situations where special difficulties 
interrupt the smooth operation of the first system. Chapters 3 and 4 explore 
this argument in different contexts, identifying difficulties that are 
encountered if such a distinction between representational systems is not 
drawn, and problems that can be solved with the help of two such systems. 
Chapter 2 is included to support the sketch of an important argument against 
1 Included since my Abstract is restricted to 300 words by Regulation. 
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over-interpretation of early speech which is offered in Section 3 of Chapter 1. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned in different ways with the origins of 
language in the individual, in particular with the question of what innate 
knowledge of language might be justified, either on the basis of linguistic 
research, comparisons with other species, or psychological investigations. It 
is concluded that many questions regarding innate knowledge remain open, 
and that seeking a source in anthropoid evolution for knowledge of language 
is likely to be no easier than seeking sources in individual or social learning. 
In Chapter 7 it is argued that representational drawing emerges late in 
the fourth year of life, and some new techniques are described for identifying 
the earliest representational drawings. 
Following these discussions of external systems of representation, 
Chapters 8 to 13 address the origins of systems of mental representation in 
the early pre-school years, such systems being systems of the second type 
identified in Chapters 1 to 4. 
It is argued in Chapter 8 that it is such systems of mental representation 
that enable us to think about entities of various kinds, and that attribution of 
systems of mental representation of this or that kind (i.e., having this or that 
content) can be done safely only on the basis of evidence of deployment under 
difficult circumstances; for example, that attributing the ability to think 
about an individual object (and hence ascribing to the subject a mental 
representation of it) should wait upon evidence that the child can think about 
an absent individual object; that attributing the ability to think about a 
property of an individual object (and hence ascribing to the subject a mental 
representation of that property) should wait upon evidence that the child can 
think about such a property when it is not presently manifested by any object, 
or at least not salient in any present object; that attributing the ability to think 
about a proposition (and hence ascribing to the subject a mental 
representation of that proposition) should wait upon evidence that the child 
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can think about a proposition which she believes to be false. 
Chapters 9 to 13 apply the ideas developed in Chapter 8 to different aspects 
of early cognitive development. Chapter 9 discusses recent work on the 
representation of beliefs and desires in terms of the content of the beliefs and 
desires. Chapters 10 and 11 report experimental studies of word knowledge in 
which the salience of the properties which these words denote is 
manipulated. Chapter 12 examines the ability of two year-old subjects to 
match objects while manipulating the manifestness and salience of 
properties. Chapter 13 reports an attempt to improve a traditional method for 
investigating representation of properties, the free classification task. 
Finally, Chapter 14 returns to the themes of Chapter 1 (particularly to the 
developmental puzzles identified in Section 4 of Chapter 1) and attempts to 
apply some of the insights and findings of Chapters 8 through 13 to these 
themes. 
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Chapter 1: Language Acquisition and Cognitive Developmene 
1. Introduction 
To explore the relationships between cognitive development and language 
development is to enter a very dark forest indeed! It is not so much a question 
of not being able to see the wood for the trees: one cannot even see the trees. 
Accordingly, the best advice one might offer to, say, a graduate student would 
be 'Danger, keep off'. For those with more leisure and securer positions it is 
perhaps possible to make an occasional foray without becoming entirely lost, 
but it should be emphasized that what is both desirable and possible in the 
study of language development at the present time is more facts, more flower-
picking natural history. However, it is sometimes useful to make the attempt 
at a larger enterprise, if only as a source of ideas about where to look for new 
flowers. 
The large mass of research with a bearing on this relationship has been 
reviewed by Bowerman (1976) and in a number of publications by Cromer 
(e.g. 1974, 1976a,b). I think it can fairly be said that one thing missing from 
these reviews is any sign that a coherent theoretical framework informs 
current work on the relationship. Indeed, the same might be said of 
psycholinguistics in general. There is a coherent framework on offer, 
exposed in Chomsky's (1975, 1980a,b) and Fodor's (1975, 1983) writings and in 
their various contributions to Piattelli-Palmarini (1980). Whatever the virtues 
of this framework, it has become increasingly nativist with the passing years 
and has won few hearts and minds amongst those actively engaged in the 
study of language acquisition or cognitive development. Why then has so little 
progress been made towards an alternative framework? It is my firm view 
that a principal reason has been the failure all round to square up to the task 
of allocating a distinct role to consciousness, as it is involved in speaking, 
understanding, thinking and learning. Conscious mental processes are 
1 Published as Campbell (1986), being a revision of Campbell (1979). 
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typically not distinguished from other cognitive processes either structurally 
(e.g. in terms of their temporal properties or the information that they 
manipulate) or functionally (e.g. in terms of what kinds of purposes of the 
organism they serve). While the role of consciousness in these activities was 
a feature of European psychology until the mid-1930s (as may be readily seen 
in the work of Brunswik, Buhler, Piaget, Stern, Vygotsky and Werner), it 
failed to survive the flight across the Atlantic. In 1934 Vygotsky wrote in the 
opening paragraphs of his Thought and Language: 
'All that is known about psychic development indicates that its very 
essence lies in the change of the interfunctional structure of 
consciousness. Psychology must make these relationships and 
their developmental changes the main problem, the focus of study, 
instead of merely postulating the general interrelation of all 
functions. This shift in emphasis is imperative for the study of 
language and thought.' 
In this chapter I have chosen to explore some of the reasons why we find it 
difficult to satisfy Vygotsky's imperative and to attempt to persuade the 
reader that the effort is nonetheless worthwhile, in the hope that some genius 
will come forward to pick up the intellectual burden laid down fifty years ago 
by Vygotsky and ten years ago by that great European stay-at-home Piaget. 
2. Cognitive Development 
What is cognitive development and how should it be studied? There is 
widespread disagreement about this. One can discern two clear positions, 
one represented in mainstream American psychology, the other in the 
genetic epistemology of Jean Piaget. In the first approach, cognitive 
structures and processes are identified with symbolic structures and 
processes (often called information structures and processes), which mediate 
the connection of outputs from sensory mechanisms with inputs to motor 
mechanisms. Thus every action of the organism beyond the simplest reflex is 
said to involve cognitive processes. In Piaget's system, cognitive structures 
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and processes are identified with representations and operations upon 
representations that are tied in an intimate way to explicit knowledge and 
awareness; thus, only certain functions in certain organisms are said to 
involve cognitive processes. The use of the qualifier 'explicit' in the previous 
sentence will seem strange to those who are not accustomed to the 
peculiarities of the information-processing idiom. In that idiom it is 
commonplace to speak of 'tacit' knowledge in circumstances where the 
justification for calling something a cognitive event is noticeably lacking. 
Thus, Chomsky often speaks of tacit knowledge of rules of language. What is 
meant by this is of course that the rules in question are not known but merely 
observed. There are several possibilities here. It might be that the rules of 
language are represented in the mind of the speaker in a fairly direct way, 
but are inaccessible to consciousness. This is what Chomsky means by 'tacit 
knowledge'. On the other hand, although falling apples observe the law of 
falling bodies they are not accused of having tacit knowledge of that law - but 
then, apples (falling or not) know nothing explicitly either. More to the point, 
apples are not capable of independent action; they contribute nothing to their 
fall beyond certain physical properties. Put another way, it is not necessary 
for them to know anything, tacit or not, about the laws of motion, in order to 
fall in the way that they do: they merely have to be. Most organisms, on the 
other hand, are capable of independent action. They are driven by motives the 
origins of which are remote and complex. The ape's controlled descent of a 
tree is mediated by something more than its physical properties. It seems to 
be necessary that the ape should know something about the shape of the tree, 
the disposition of its branches, the shape of its own body and the pull of the 
earth in order to descend in the way that it does. It is conceivable that we 
could, by considering possible trees, possible apes and actual dynamics, 
devise a theory of tree descents amounting to a set of rules, which rules are 
followed by our ape in the course of his descent. Since common experience 
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and the study of language tell us that (a) there are rules of language and (b) 
in using language we adhere to them but are not aware of them, it is possible 
that the ape is similarly unaware of the structures and rules that guide his 
progress down the tree and hence knows them only tacitly. It is, however, 
more likely that just as we know something about the rules of our language 
and exercise this knowledge on some occasions2 , the ape, too, has as a back-
up some knowledge of the rules for descending trees and sometimes employs 
it, for example, when in fog, in unusual trees, broken limbs (ape) or broken 
limbs (tree) (see, remarkably enough, Chevalier-Skolnikoff, Galdikas and 
Skolnikoff, 1982). 
So we may think of our tree user (or language user) as exploiting two kinds 
of knowledge, explicit and tacit, and functioning in two modes. Where action 
is governed by explicit knowledge I shall describe the organism as 
functioning in a phenic3 mode (characterized by phenic structures and 
processes); when not functioning in this way I shall describe the organism as 
functioning in a cryptic mode (characterized by cryptic structures and 
processes). Thus, in the phenic mode action is regulated by structures and 
processes accessible to consciousness; in the cryptic mode it is regulated by 
structures and processes inaccessible to consciousness. While certain other 
symptoms are typically clustered with consciousness, such as mental effort 
(cf. Kahneman, 1973) and reportability (cf. Dennett, 1978: ch. 9), there are 
good grounds for introducing new terminology. Briefly, (1) the proposed terms 
have clear interpretations from the point of view of the experiencing subject -
what is evident to the subject is phenic, what is hidden is cryptic; (2) it is 
central to my proposal that the distinction drawn should be theoretical and 
potentially applicable to infants and to other organisms. Thus, effortfull 
2 See Chapter 4. 
:I This terminology is adapted from Whorfs phenotype and cryptotype.Whorf used these 
terms to denote grammatical categories which had an overt and covert formal basis, 
respectively (see e.g. Whorf, 1945). 
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effortless and conscious/unconscious fail, since these are simply the usual 
empirical marks of the distinction; reportable/unreportable is not only 
empirical but limited to language users; lastly, existing theoretical 
oppositions such as hi~her/lower and inner/outer have unfortunate 
anatomical implications. My strategy in employing this theoretical 
distinction will be to try to show that it solves problems for us, rather than to 
show that it has a direct empirical justification - since this latter route has 
been pursued long and hard without success. I should expect the distinction 
to turn out to be only conditionally associated with each of its usual empirical 
symptoms. 
It might be wondered why I do not simply use the terms 'explicit' and 
'tacit'. It seems to me best to reserve these for describing representations, 
since that has been their customary use. Moreover, mental acts which 
psychologists have described as governed by representations or involving 
computations in a representational system seem to be co-extensive with what 
philosophers, following Brentano (1874), have called intentional acts - acts 
directed on some object. For the notion of mental representation - qua 
semantic entity which is the staple medium of cognitive processes- see 
Fodor's writings (1975, 1980b, 1981) and for some problems with it see Dennett 
(1983b) . For Brentano, intentionality was 'the mark of the mental'. Dennett 
(1978, 1981a,b, 1983a) has pursued this line of attack with great patience and 
sophistication, seeking to characterize different sorts of intentional system 
and to explore the grounds for describing various organisms and devices as 
this or that sort of intentional system. Now, Chomsky's claim about tacit 
knowledge, echoed by many other psychologists and by Dennett, can be seen 
as a claim that many of our acts, though cryptic in my terms, are 
nevertheless intentional in the sense of Brentano, because they involve 
computations in a tacit system of representations. Chomsky describes such 
acts as involving 'cognizing' (1980a: 70) intending by that term to denote 
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processes that appeal to knowledge, whether explicit or tacit, and to exclude 
processes which do not. This claim of Chomsky's and my linking of it to the 
notion of intentionality are extremely controversial (see Stabler (1983) and the 
commentaries by Rosenthal, Searle and Sober on Chomsky (1980b) for 
discussion), and it may be that consciousness and intentionality will turn out 
to be more closely linked than they seem to be in the reading of the 
Chomskyan position just offered. For the moment, however, it seems best to 
allow that consciousness (my suggestion) and intentionality may define quite 
different conceptions of 'the mental'. 
We have arrived at a point where it is possible to frame what, for me at any 
rate, is the fundamental question of cognitive psychology. The question is 
'What criteria determine the attribution of explicit knowledge?' Or, in the 
terms of the preceding paragraph, 'How can we know that we are dealing 
with a phenic process or structure?' For adherents of the information-
processing approach to cognitive psychology this question is not 
fundamental: an answer will be provided, if at all, only when a theory is 
completed. For what an organism knows explicitly is regarded as 
epiphenomenal (i.e. devoid of causal significance).4 However, for Piagetians 
and their like, the question is fundamental since it affects description of 
psychological events. Theory cannot begin until a way is found of deciding 
when to attribute explicit knowledge and what knowledge to attribute. It 
should be evident that there are no easy answers to this fundamental 
question. There is available neither a convincing refutation of 
epiphenomenalism nor a general method for determining criteria for 
explicitness; on the other hand, information-processing analyses are 
bedevilled by paradoxes and absurdities. For example, perceptual and 
inferential processes often receive identical treatments and manipulate 
4With respect to the modified position attributed to Chomsky, there is a different 
fundamental question, i.e. what criteria determine the attribution of 'cognizing'? 
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structures with identical descriptions.5 Again, no formal distinction (there is 
often some lip-service paid) is or can be made between an automatic routine 
process which carries out a certain function and a deliberate, conscious 
process which is 'called in' to carry out the same function when the routine 
process fails. The experimental! statistical requirements of reliability, 
replicability and low mean variance have led to widespread adoption of 
techniques which involve either lengthy periods of practice or many 
experimental trials per subject, with the result that the functions which are 
studied, though normally functions carried out - if at all - by phenic 
processes, are in fact observed only as cryptic routines. 
This has had several disastrous consequences: (a) 'cognitive psychology' _ 
which once had a clear meaning, denoting the psychology of phenic 
structures and processes - has slid through a period of ambivalence into its 
present appalling state6 , being now almost exclusively concerned with 
cryptic processes; (b) success in modelling these cryptic processes has given 
rise to the illusion that we have achieved some understanding of the 
(normally phenic) functions that they carry out; (c) valid work carried out 
within older or more peripheral traditions has been mistakenly called in 
question by robust mountains of data which in fact pertain to quite different 
processes. The most striking and unfortunate case of this is the persistent 
and breathtakingly insensitive impeachment of Genevan results in the field 
of cognitive development by American and, lately, British psychologists;7 (d) 
onlookers from neighbouring disciplines encounter insurmountable 
difficulties in evaluating psychological research. Philosophers of mind, for 
5 Escape from this paradox is not easy. The suggestion is sometimes offered (see, e.g., 
Brunswik, 1956) that whereas errors of perception - illusions - are incorrigible, mistakes of 
reasoning can be corrected. But this is fallacious, since mistakes of reasoning are corrected 
only by further reasoning. 
6 What is 'appalling' is of course not the content of modern cognitive psychology - which is 
perfectly sound and scientifically respectable, but the fact that it has lost its connection to 
remembering, imagining, thinking, planning and so forth. 
7 This is discussed in Chapter 8. 
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example, who - to my mind correctly - often tend to discount the usefulness of 
'images', 'concepts' and 'meanings' in epistemological contexts, are repelled 
and bewildered by the welter of such notions employed in cognitive psychology 
In fact, of course, the notions (sometimes just the labels) have usually been 
misappropriated and applied to cryptic structures which have only some (at 
best) of the properties of the phenic structures to which these terms were 
originally applied. 
In the case of models of the adult we are constantly reminded by our own 
nature of the need to be clear about which mode we are describing, and can 
often determine independently of any empirical criteria what sort of process 
or structure is being described. Thus, for example, in Forster's (1976) 
analysis of the lexical decision task as a massive search process we are sure 
that any such search is a cryptic process and that the role of the phenic mode 
in such a task (once initial orientation has been achieved) is simply to hold 
constant the ad hoc links established between perception, memory and 
action. Hence we learn nothing from such work about cognitive structures 
and processes (if the term cognitive is restricted to its traditional referential 
domain, as I am urging that it should)8. However, in studying cognitive 
development we lack such empathetic guidance and are often at a loss. We 
thus encounter difficulties and paradoxes which, I believe, can only be 
resolved by adopting a framework of the kind that I am advocating and, 
ultimately, by discovering methods of investigation and descriptions which 
acknowledge such a framework. I will describe in detail only one such 
troublesome phenomenon - space perception in infancy - but similar 
difficulties arise in many disparate aspects of cognitive development, for 
example in perception of weight (Mounoud and Bower, 1974) and 
classification (Campbell, Donaldson and Young, 1976): for relevant reviews 
8 Henceforth, unless otherwise indicated, the term 'cognitive' will be used in this 
restricted sense. 
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see Donaldson (1971) and Bower (1974b). 
Brunswik (1956) elucidated a crucial distinction, originally due to Koflka 
(1935) and later elaborated by Heider (1939), between distal and proximal 
stimulus variables. To illustrate: the distance of an object from the eye (a 
distal variable - i.e. a goal of description) is partially specified by the values -
strictly speaking, simple functions of these - of various proximal variables: 
retinal expansion, motion parallax, ocular convergence, lenticular 
accommodation, etc. Successful discrimination of variation in distance is 
thus achievable on the basis of sensitivity to variation of these proximal 
variables. Which proximal variable will vary in the appropriate way will 
depend upon the circumstances. However, successful discrimination does 
not tell us anything about how such proximal variation is interpreted by the 
infant; still less does it tell us that it is interpreted as variation in the distal 
variable - in this example, distance. Various remedies have been proposed 
(see Bower, 1974a: 79ff; Yonas and Pick, 1975: passim). Bower makes two 
suggestions. First of all, it is known that infants habituate to any constant 
and regular stimulation. If their discriminations are based upon variation in 
distance rather than on proximal variation, then a slight change in the task 
which shifts the basis of discrimination from one proximal variable to 
another should not interrupt habituation. Otherwise, it should. Bower claims 
that methodological difficulties get in the way of attempting this ingenious 
experiment. His second suggestion is not accompanied by any argument: he 
states baldly (1974a: 80) that 
'faced with problems of this sort, one feels that natural response 
methods are a refuge. If an infant reaches out for an object 
intentionally ... there can be no doubt that the infant sees the object 
in the third dimension. This kind of simple certainty we just cannot 
get from discrimination experiments.' 
While one might well agree with this, the problem of determining whether 
or not a reaching movement is intentional (i.e. distally aimed) is not 
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conceptually different from the problem (to be solved) of whether a spatial 
discrimination is distally based. Yonas and Pick likewise offer two 
suggestions, that on the one hand distally invariant stimulus presentations 
which have variable proximal outcomes and which elicit a common reaction 
(stimulus convergence, in their terms) and, on the other hand, proximally 
diverse response movements with an invariant distal outcome and a common 
eliciting stimulus (response convergence, in their terms) each indicate that 
perception is distally oriented, since other explanations of such convergence 
are grossly unparsimonious. 
There are many things that remain unclear here. Is distal orientation a 
necessary or a sufficient condition for a claim about explicit knowledge? Do 
all or any of the suggested remedies constitute sufficient conditions for a 
distal claim? It seems to me that there is still room for doubt. Is there not in 
the behaviour of a butterfly landing on a flower a co-ordination and 
integration of sensory information and a flexibility of motor response that 
equally invites the inference that the butterfly has constructed a 
representation of space and objects in space with reference to which the 
sensory data and motor commands are interpreted? However, despite these 
uncertainties some things are clear. Able practitioners like Bower, Pick and 
Y onas evidently recognize the need to distinguish at least two qualitatively 
distinct levels of function of the organism, one which involves direct sensori-
motor connections and another which requires an intermediate 
interpretative structure which gives meanin~ to the sensory data and 
purpose to the motor commands. Moreover, there is a laudable reluctance in 
the field as a whole to fudge the issue by means of either of the two well-worn 
stratagems (a) 'It's a complicated internal process: that's cognitive enough 
for me' or (b) 'Any criterion will do, so long as we stick to it'. To return to the 
first point, a common reaction to the claim that levels or modes of function 
must be distinguished is simply to deny the possibility of doing so in an 
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empirically principled way. My retort to this is that for sixty years or so we 
have tried to create a valid psychology without making such distinctions and 
in most important human functions we have failed. Likewise, philosophers 
of mind have attempted for centuries to found epistemology on analyses of 
different sorts of judgement and varieties of reasoning - all phenic functions -
and have also failed. It is time to have a look at the foundations of this 
building which is always falling down. 
If we had some clear idea of the special value of this higher level of 
functioning then we would be in better shape to attempt empirical 
determinations. Not altogether surprisingly, we have to dig fairly deep to find 
suggestions about its value. One of the more illuminating discussions is by 
Claparede (1917, 1919),9 who argued that in microgenesis the higher level -
which he identified with awareness - functioned as a catch-all standby 
procedure. Low-level processes which ran smoothly did not involve 
awareness, but if some breakdown or exceptional input occurred, the data 
were 'handed up' to the higher level and the process continued there. But this 
is surely just one role for awareness: it suggests a normally dormant 
organism which occasionally 'lights up' when things go wrong. Surely our 
intuitions tend in exactly the opposite direction - we are normally switched-on 
organisms which, when things go easily, switch off! So Claparede's 'law of 
awareness' explains only the movements of what Polanyi (e.g. 1968) has 
called 'focal' awareness. For example, it does not explain, except by means of 
trivializing extensions, why we are, on the one hand, constantly aware of our 
physical surroundings when we move around and, on the other hand, only 
rarely aware of the muscular adjustments involved in thus moving around. 
The few modern attempts to describe the function of awareness (e.g. Shallice, 
1972) seem to suffer from the same limitation. Alternatively, we might 
9 See also Kirkpatrick (1908), which is acknowledged by Claparede as a source. 
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examine the empirical procedures of, say, Piagetians, to see what criteria are 
actually used in practice when phenic structures or processes are under 
investigation. If there is a single characteristic procedure, it is surely the 
employment of an interview method which has as its goal the discovery of the 
rational basis for judgements and actions, and as its principal technique the 
elicitation of verbal justification. Thus, this research tradition (and I 
seriously doubt whether other viable ones presently exist in cognitive 
development) has one great limitation from the present point of view, namely 
that crucial evidence for the nature and course of phenic development 
consists of what children say, so, as Smedslund (1970) has pointed out, facts 
about the nature of the child's language are assumed in order to derive facts 
about phenic structure. Without some independent method it would evidently 
be ludicrous then to use facts about phenic development to explain language 
development. And yet it is a commonly held view that language development 
is explicable in terms of cognitive development. In fact, I do not believe that 
Piagetians have yet discovered a valid method for investigating cognitive 
development in the age range 1-4 years. Their investigations of sensori-motor 
intelligence provide a basis for speculation about the phenic framework 
governing very early language (see Edwards, 1973 and Bates, 1979)10 and, of 
course, by 4 years child language is sufficiently adult-like to make it a 
plausible tool for exploring cognitive development. In the intervening age 
range, however, there has been little convincing progress. Indeed, Piagetian 
claims about some supposedly vital limitations of child thought during this 
period (e.g. inability to reason deductively, egocentricity) seem at best to be 
dubious now (see Donaldson, 1978). So, even if we can justify causal links 
between cognitive and linguistic development, this is no panacea, since 
information about cognitive development in the important growth period of 1-
10 Even here the needed basis lacks an immediate empirical justification. Some 
preliminary work has been carried out by Golinkoff (1975; Golinkoff and Kerr, 1978). 
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4 years is either completely lacking or unreliable, and there is no obvious 
methodology available for securing such information. 
3. Early Language: the problem of perspicuous description 
About twenty years ago, a new approach to the study of early language 
development emerged in which attempts were made to investigate the 
properties of child language considered as a system for communication. To 
begin with (in accordance with the Wernerian developmental principle that 
new forms (of investigation) first serve old purposes ( of theory)) this shift was 
largely a shift of method, the goal being, as formerly, a specification of the set 
of sentences the child could produce or understand (in some limited sense of 
this word, e.g. 'assign a structural description to'). The most remarkable 
effort of this sort was Lois Bloom's (1970) thesis. The point of investigating the 
system for communication rather than the language per se was that it 
seemed plain that syntactic description was an impossibly arbitrary exercise 
unless some additional constraining data could be found. A natural step was 
then to examine not just the child's utterances but also the messages which 
were transmitted by these utterances. Assumptions about correspondences 
between message forms (i.e. meanings) and utterance forms (i.e. sentences) 
invoking bi-uniqueness could then be used to constrain grammatical 
description of the child's language. In fact, Bloom made much less use of 
these putative correspondences than did other workers such as Schlesinger 
(1971b) and, later, Brown (1973) and Halliday (1975), preferring instead to 
follow the line urged by Chomsky (1965, 1968) and supported by McNeill 
(1970), in which arguments about adult English yield a ready-made 
apparatus for the description of child language. This may be regarded as an 
aberration from which Bloom (1973, 1974; Bloom, Rocissano and Hood, 1976) 
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has made an admirable recovery. 11 
However little use Bloom may have made of the child's messages (as 
determined by adult interpreters), she established the fundamental 
methodological point, namely that this sort of analysis is possible. This 
method became known as the 'method of rich interpretation' - a misnomer, 
since it is simply the 'method of interpretation' - and its use has been a 
common feature of most subsequent work on early language. Its use has not 
gone unquestioned (e.g. Brown, 1973; Campbell, 197612 ; Howe, 1976; Edwards, 
1978; Macrae, 1979); but the questions have been concerned with details 
rather than general principles. For a rebuttal of Howe (1976), see Bloom, 
Capatides and Tackeff(1981) and Golinkoff(1981). However, there remains a 
difficulty. To me, at any rate, it is an open question whether at any 
intermediate point in development these two constructions, the system for 
communication and the language, are to be given identical descriptions or 
not. Certainly it seems clear that in the adult they are not: attempts to 
describe the former construct (Grice, 1967; Lewis, 1969; Stalnaker, 1972) have 
so far failed to make significant contact with attempts to describe the latter 
(Linguistic Inquiry: passim) as has been forcefully pointed out by Chomsky 
(1975) and Katz (1977). Equally certainly, the two constructs have distinct 
ontogenies (Vygotsky, 1962). In the case of the adult a good case can be made 
for pursuing investigation of each system independently; and it may even be 
the case (as Chomsky, 1975 and Katz, 1977 have argued) that it is better 
(easier) to begin with description of language. For the case of the child, this 
11 It seems quite remarkable that Chomsky (1975;1980a,b) persists with the notion that 
linguistic research can reveal innate constraints governing language acquisition, in the 
face of (a) profound and growing disagreement about how the most studied language -
English - should be described; (b) gross differentiation of the concept 'human language' (see 
the recent clarification of the nature of pidgins, creoles and dying languages), with 
consequent weakening of the notion 'empirical linguistic universal'; (c) cogent and very 
early criticisms of his hypotheses by, for example, Lyons (1966) and Putnam (1967); (d) a 
stubborn concern amongst students of child language for independent empirical 
justification of descriptive categories; and (e) the failure of the hypothesis to attract direct 
empirical support or to inspire interesting research. 
12 See Chapter 2. 
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possibility does not exist. Gold (1967) has shown that languages of nonfinite 
cardinality cannot be identified on the basis of a text presentation, i.e. a 
sequence of sentences belonging to them. Since this is exactly (no more, no 
less) what is available to the child linguist who eschews study of the system of 
communication, it is clear that we cannot proceed with child language in the 
same way as we have with the language of the adult.13 But here is our 
difficulty: we have not so far found a way of integrating knowledge about 
human communication with knowledge about human language. Indeed, in 
a way they seem to pass each other by. On the one hand, efforts have been 
made to extend structural linguistic analysis to larger and larger structures 
- from sound to word to sentence to complete texts - and on the other hand, the 
rational analysis of communication lately initiated by Grice, Lewis and other 
philosophers has encouraged a downward extension into grammatical 
processes by functionally-minded linguists such as Garcia (1975). From the 
point of view of this chapter, this is a clear absurdity: complementary 
explanations are being presented as if they were in competition! They are 
complementary, of course, because the rational processes at the heart of 
communication are at least potentially phenic, while the grammatical 
processes at the heart of language are normally cryptic - 'grammar is an 
underground process' (Seuren, 1978). Naturally, each kind of process 
functions as a default for the other so that, (a) in contexts that are familiar 
and habitual, communication can proceed in a routine manner and (b) in 
contexts where deviant or unusual utterances are received, grammatical 
analysis can proceed under rational control. Thus, as I see it, the case for 
autonomy of grammar stands or falls with the case for psychological 
dualism! Further, Chomsky - though perhaps correct in claiming autonomy 
13 This seems to be the most effective use for results like Gold's, namely to apply them to 
the activities of linguists rather than to the activities of children, since these formal results 
cannot readily be interpreted in the context of language acquisition (see Levelt, 1975 for 
discussion). 
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for grammar - errs massively in his view that linguistics is a branch of 
cognitive psychology; on the contrary, it has nothing to do with cognitive 
psychology (strictly conceived) but deals exclusively with cryptic structures 
and processes14 • On the other hand, communicative processes, such as 
understanding, involve not just the autonomous language function but the 
whole being (see Ziff, 1972 - easily the best and clearest presentation of this 
point of view; among psychologists, Herbert Clark's is perhaps the most 
congenial treatment - see Clark and Clark, 1977). 
The way in which grammatical and rational processes interlock in deriving 
a message from a text (i.e. utterance or inscription) is a matter of current 
speculation and need not be explored herelS • It is sufficient to note that, from 
this point of view, messages qua products of understanding are not linguistic 
objects. Thus, somewhat longwindedly, our difficulty is now clear: certainly it 
is possible to make defensible guesses about what messages are associated 
with which utterances in the speech of young children, but without 
knowledge of the structure of their message representations and the rational 
processes available to them we still have not radically improved our position 
as far as linguistic description is concerned. The point may be clearly 
illustrated with respect to the description of one-word utterances, where at 
least three distinct positions can be discerned. According to one common 
view (now less popular - for cogent criticism see Miller, 1976, Barrett, 1982b), 
such utterances transmit propositional messages which are initially encoded 
as a (cryptic) isomorphic structure which is converted via grammatical 
processes of reduction into a single morph (see model 1). A second extreme 
view (expounded in Chapter 2), which is uncommon but perfectly viable 
(Klein, 1977), is that such utterances transmit nonpropositional, 
14 Of course (see section 2 of this chapter), Chomsky's definition of cognitive psychology is 
different; 'cognizing' is constitutive in his framework, thus processes involving tacit 
knowledge are included. 
15 See Chapter 4. 
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structureless messages which are encoded directly as single morphs (see 
model 2). A third, intermediate view (Bloom, 1973) - see model 3 - is that such 
utterances transmit propositional messages by first selecting (by a rational 
process) a single message element and then proceeding as in model 2. 
message 
(eo, el ... en) 
message 
e 
utterance base 
=> (e' e' e ') 0, 1··· n 
interdomain 
boundary 
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utterance base 
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interdomain 
boundary 
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e·' => 1 
linguistic 
processes 
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A converse version of this third scheme is explicitly suggested by Sachs and 
Truswell (1978) as a means of accounting for comprehension of multiword 
utterances by children whose own utterances are limited to single words. It 
seems to me that the evidence favours a developmental sequence of model 2 
followed by model 3 (see Bowerman, 1976 for a thorough review). 
As may be seen by inspecting the models, how the language of a child at 
this stage is to be described depends on (a) the complexity of the phenic 
structures that we think are involved, and (b) whether we think that the 
child can learn that a single message element (suitably encoded) will convey 
a complex message. Thus, analysis of a corpus consisting of pairings of 
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messages and utterances must proceed on two fronts - cognitive and 
linguistic. 16 The discussion of cognitive development in section 2 should 
make it clear that there are few grounds for optimism amongst students of 
early child language. An adequate methodology seems more distant than 
ever. 
4. Puzzles and Prospects 
In the preceding sections I have illustrated some of the difficulties 
encountered by the application of a particular theoretical framework -
namely one in which consciousness is taken to be more or less constitutive of 
mental or cognitive activity - to cognitive and linguistic development. In this 
section I shall try to show some of the benefits that might result from 
adopting this theoretical scheme. 
4.1. Concept Development 
One obvious degree of freedom introduced is the possibility of dual 
representation, for any structure may be represented differently at different 
levels. I shall argue that this allows resolution of some vexing problems 
concerning concept development and early lexical development. We can see, 
though, that it leads straight away to natural descriptions of concept 
acquisition. Consider first a case involving an individual concept. Piaget 
(1951) describes an encounter (p. 225) between his daughter and a slug. She 
points at it and says 'There's the slug again!', mistakenly identifying it with 
a different slug encountered earlier at some distance (perhaps; see 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1977 for a different account). Presumably, the slug's phenic 
representation was different for Piaget and his daughter. For Piaget, 
elementary reasonings about time, space and motion established distinct 
phenic representations for the two slugs; for Jacqueline the two slugs were 
assimilated to a single phenic representation. For an individual concept it 
16 Braine (1976) has made a valiant attempt to do this. However, the requirement of 
independent analyses of message and utterance corpora calls for new techniques on both 
fronts. Braine has certainly improved on older ones, but there still seems a long way to go. 
Chapter 1 Page 28 
seems clear that necessary and sufficient conditions cannot be given in terms 
of the perceptible features shared by successive appearances of the object 
denoted. Rather it is a causal criterion something like a path in space-time 
that determines the extension of such concepts.17 However, for many objects 
(if not for slugs) a structure based on perceptible features serves as an 
indispensable heuristic for identification. In such cases it seems a natural 
guess that whereas the causal criterion is represented phenically (if at all), 
the heuristic identification procedure is cryptic. 
Interesting cases involving kind concepts are afforded by such skills as 
plant identification and medical diagnosis: here the phenic representation (of 
species or syndrome) is determined by its place in a hierarchy, and 
identification ultimately depends upon serial examination of key characters 
and the making of inferences based on this hierarchy. However, the skilled 
botanist or clinician soon acquires a cryptic representation of these plants 
and diseases which permits rapid and reliable (although unjustified) 
identification. The representations are obviously quite different in character, 
since different information is employed at cryptic and phenic levels. That is, 
in the phenic process, microscopic characters may be employed: obviously 
these are unavailable for the cryptic process, supposing that this is based on 
the 'look of the patient or plant'. This example also shows that we must be 
careful not to confuse the method of acquisition of a skill with its eventual 
representation. For someone may learn to identify, for example, mushrooms 
with the aid of a phenic representation and a sequence of diagnostic tests. At 
the conclusion of this learning, however, he will have acquired an 
independent method of identifying mushrooms - 'by eye'. Of course, the 
phenic method is still potentially available as a back-up (and in medical cases 
17 A particularly interesting example of this principle at work can be seen in Bunuel's 
film The Obscure Object of Desire (the intentional object!), in which a leading part is taken 
by two quite different actresses. Despite gross differences in physical ap?ea:~nce and 
behaviour, the viewer has no difficulty in perceiving 'them' as a single mdIvIdual. 
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one would hope rather more than just a potential back-up) technique, but if 
the cryptic method is more efficient, then knowledge of the phenic technique 
may lapse through disuse. Again, there are surely skills, e.g. swimming, 
bicycle riding, which do not have a phenic origin. Consequently, although 
grammar in the adult is an 'underground process', we need not suppose 
either that (a) all grammatical structures and processes have cryptic origins 
or that (b) those which do have phenic origins are isomorphic to the phenic 
structures/ processes from which they derive. For example, syntactic 
categorization of early vocabulary may reflect simple early phenic 
distinctions of object, action, etc., although, of course, such distinctions 
cannot be noncircularly applied to later vocabulary, by which time related, 
but different, cryptic distinctions have taken their place. Again, if kinds of 
objects are initially distinguished phenically in terms of what actions can be 
carried out with them (as Piaget has maintained) then this need not deter us 
from supposing that a cryptic distinction is simultaneously developing on the 
basis of low-level perceptual variables. This seems to be the implicit basis of 
Nelson's (1973b, 1974) suggestion that early concepts have a functional origin 
despite the fact that identification of instances depends upon registering 
perceptual similarities. 
In the case of both individual and kind concepts, then, there are grounds for 
distinguishing between what is criterial to the individual and the kind (the 
phenic content of the concept) and what information might be used 
heuristically to identify the individual or members of the kind (the cryptic 
content of the concept). A similar suggestion has been made by Osherson and 
Smith (1981). 
Questions concerning the origins of concepts have proved difficult for 
epistemologists and psychologists alike. Successful resolution of the 
longstanding problems in this area would therefore add greatly to the 
credibility of a dualist approach. An old guess about how concepts are 
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acquired is the following: a series of denotata of the word in question, say~, 
are ostensively presented to the child, who notices what features these 
denotata have in common. This set of common features, so abstracted, then 
functions as a dog-identifying-criterion and constitutes the meaning of the 
word dog and the child's concept of doghood. This is often regarded as an 
absurd story because in order to 'notice what is common' to the various 
denotata the child would have to have available a means for identifying each 
of the relevant criterial attributes, i.e. a system of concepts. According to this 
model of concept formation, all that the child learns in acquiring a new word 
is what particular logical function of existing primitive concepts is to be 
associated with that word. There are two, related, difficulties with this theory 
of concept formation. Firstly, where do the primitive concepts come from? 
Evidently they cannot be acquired in the manner just described. One answer 
(Fodor, 1975) is that they are innate. How happy one is likely to feel about this 
rather depends on how rich the primitive framework is required to be. 
Fodor's notion is that it must indeed be very rich, in which case there is an 
obvious objection, namely that an ontogenetic mystery has been dispelled by 
postulating a phylogenetic oneP8 But if the prior conceptual framework 
consists of a small set of very general concepts, then the second difficulty 
arises. As was noted long ago by Brown (1958) and more recently confirmed 
by Nelson (1973a) and Ninio and Bruner (1978), the earliest predicates are 
words of moderate generality - denoting kinds of objects (attribute-clusters) 
rather than qualities or superordinate categories - and even as adults it is 
concepts of this 'weight' that we naturally employ (Rosch et al., 1976). So 
evidence from early lexical development suggests that the earliest kind 
concepts mastered define functionally significant categories of object rather 
16 See Dennett (1980) for a similar objection to Chomsky's innateness hypothesis. A 
second consequence of Fodor's analysis is that there is no genuine concept development. I 
attempt to refute this argument in Chapter 3, using the framework developed here. 
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than the elementary universal attributes needed to 'bootstrap' concept 
development. 
To some degree these difficulties are avoided by the currently popular notion 
of stereotype or prototype. 19 Instead of the story given above, we would now 
say that kinds are identified by comparing each exemplar to a stored 
stereotypical individual (or, possibly, by comparison with a small set of such 
individuals). Words are then linked to their denotata via these stereotypes and 
similarity relations. This theory has many advantages. It relates early 
vocabulary acquisition in a natural way to the objects that have functional 
importance for the young child, and the obviously spontaneous quality of 
these acquisitions is easily explained. The notion that such categories have a 
nuclear member or members, and that similarity to the nuclear member 
regulates membership, allows for the possibility that two individuals, 
sharing no salient properties, can belong to the same category - a frequently 
noted finding (Vygotsky, 1962; Bowerman, 1978a).al Finally, 
overgeneralization - such a characteristic feature of early use of language -
can be accounted for, either by supposing that relative similarity is what is 
involved (i.e. the 'nearest' stereotype determines what word is used) or that 
new individuals get added to a pool of stereotypes, each such addition 
stretching the boundaries of the concept. 
This theory has numerous merits. However, the notion of similarity must 
be unpacked. What does it mean for an individual to be similar to some other 
individual? Surely, only that they share certain properties. So this theory of 
concept formation and semantic development, like the older one, makes an 
appeal to the notion of a primitive conceptual system, albeit in a less 
19 The earliest formulation of this notion appears in Vygotsky (193411962). While the 
discussion of 'family resemblance' in Wittgenstein (1953) poses the problem (which 
stereotypes solve), it is not until Putnam (1970) and Ziff (1972) that the notion is once more 
clearly expressed. It is now, of course, pervasive. 
20 Incidentally, this finding shows that the similarity space is nonmetric (since 
transitivity fails), which scotches the formal model proposed by Osherson and Smith (1981). 
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immediate and forthright manner!21 It does not seem likely that there is any 
escape from such a notion. Even Quine, not noted for ontological generosity, 
now talks of 'innate similarity standards' (1975: 69m as a basis of language 
learning. 
Now what is problematic about this theory? A line of argument leads 
inescapably to the view that at the onset of language acquisition the child is 
armed with a primitive system of concepts which groups objects together on 
the basis of fixed attributes with elementary perceptual consequences. But 
there is a mass of evidence (Vygotsky, 1962; Inhelder and Piaget, 1964; and 
see now Kemler and Smith, 1979), derived from children's behaviour in 
matching and sorting tasks, which shows that young children have very 
great difficulty in grouping objects together on the basis of an elementary 
fixed attribute. Certainly, Ricciuti (1965) and Nelson (1973a) have shown that 
young children can perform well with such tasks when it is members of a 
kind (i.e. a complex cluster of attributes) that are to be grouped, but use of an 
elementary attribute as a basis for sorting or matching is a much later 
acquisition. Moreover, it is also clear (Nelson, 1976) that the first attributive 
adjectives acquired by young children denote attributes which are transitory 
(e.g. wet, hot, broken) or context-dependent (e.g. big) rather than fixed and 
intrinsic. 
So, on the one hand, we have evidence for the existence of a certain kind of 
concept and, on the other hand, evidence for its absence. The way to a 
resolution, it seems to me, is clear. The elements of the primitive conceptual 
system, Quine's 'innate similarity standards', are represented only 
cryptically and participate solely in cryptic processes: such concepts have no 
phenic representation initially and their establishment at that level is a 
lengthy developmental process. Thus young children do not learn adjectives 
denoting fixed intrinsic attributes, since the content of such concepts is 
21 There is an excellent and conclusive demonstration of this point in Bowerman (1978). 
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represented only cryptically. For the same reason, they cannot 'hold such 
attributes in mind' so as to regulate performance in matching or sorting 
tasks. 
4.2. Meta]jnguistic Development 
A second difficult area where a dualist framework should prove helpful is 
the development of linguistic awareness. Experiments of my own (Campbell 
and Macdonald, 1982), and of Braun-Lamesch (1972) show that 3-4 year oids 
have enormous difficulty in making inferences about the meaning of 
nonsense words occurring in otherwise straightforward utterances which, 
qua utterances, have been accurately understood by them. An obvious guess 
about why this should be so is that individual words lack phenic 
representation at this stage of development (and so cannot participate in 
inferences). Likewise Karmiloff-Smith (1978) found that children of much the 
same age 'explained' gender assignment in French in terms of rules that 
they were plainly not following. Her explanation for this contradictory result, 
reformulated here in my terms, was that gender concord at this stage is 
determined by cryptic phonological processes except for a small number of 
exceptional cases which are decided by a phenic process involving 
determination of sex. The children's explanations, naturally enough, 
reflected this phenic process entirely and the cryptic process not at all. Other 
examples could be cited but the point is already clear enough. However, there 
is a residual puzzle here. While it seems obviously correct that 3-4 year olds 
lack phenic representations of words, this is odd in a way, since language 
learning begins with single words. Indeed, in section 3 I argued that there 
was a reasonable case for supposing that at certain early stages of acquisition 
(following Bloom and Sachs) inferences involving words were employed in 
the production of single-word utterances and in the comprehension of 
multiword utterances. It seems possible that it is wrong to think of the 
development of linguistic awareness as a one-way process (from cryptic to 
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phenic).22 Surely it is a common pattern of motor skill acquisition that the 
actions constituting the skill are first carried out in the phenic mode, with 
selection and coordination of elementary action segments consciously 
regulated. What practice seems to achieve - and how this happens is an utter 
mystery - is the gradual replacement of this phenic system by a cryptic 
system, proceeding from smaller to larger units. Indeed, the ancient study of 
Bryan and Harter (1897) claimed to show this pattern of acquisition for typing 
skills: cryptic control (Bryan and Harter spoke of 'habits') is established 
successively at letter, word and phrase levels, eventually leaving the typist 
free to concentrate on the incoming text. Now the contemporary wisdom 
concerning the acquisition of word forms is that children initially use word 
forms without any awareness of them as semantically and auditorily distinct 
entities, and that with increasing age they become better able to attend to 
these forms and thereby attain some metalinguistic understanding. It is less 
clear whether there is any similar consensus regarding knowledge of word 
meaning. But what evidence is there for this view, admitting its general 
plausibility? I can think of nothing that rules out the possibility that (a) in the 
early stages of acquisition word selection and articulation are deliberate 
processes guided by the phenic contents of the concept associated with the 
word and by, say, a phenic sound image respectively; and that (b) in later 
stages word selection and articulation become automatic processes guided 
cryptically, leaving the learner free to concentrate on high-level tasks. 
Suppose this to be true. Why then does the preschooler have such manifest 
difficulties in bringing words qua semantic or auditory objects to mind? 
Earlier in this section I mentioned the possibility that phenic processes 
involved in the early stages of acquisition of concepts might lapse through 
disuse once mastery had been achieved. This is a familiar and comfortable 
22 That is, loss of awareness may be as important for acquisition as growth. People who 
wear inverting spectacles manage to stay on their bicycles just so long as no one asks them 
whether they see the world the right way up or not! 
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notion and may possibly apply here also. But there is another possibility, 
equally familiar and comfortable. A characteristic symptom of cognitive 
development around 5 years is a difficulty in shifting perspective with regard 
to some problem or task. Piagetians have offered numerous hypotheses of this 
sort as explanations for the well-known systematic errors associated with the 
development of logico-mathematical knowledge. In my terms we might 
express this idea crudely in the following way: having plugged in one phenic 
system, children at this stage find it difficult to unplug it and plug in another. 
So it may be that they lack sufficient flexibility or versatility of consciousness 
to jump between the levels of sentence, phrase and word. Perhaps the late 
preschooler's attention in speaking and listening is 'locked' at the higher 
levels of control, and thus phenic monitoring of word selection and 
articulation is blocked. Some support for this view is provided by the 
sustained outbreak of late word-level errors which occurs and lasts 
throughout this period of development (cf. Bowerman, 1982). At any rate, the 
notion that children might pass from a stage where words are phenically 
represented to a stage where they are cryptically represented does not seem 
incoherent or unintelligible and presents the prospect of interesting 
explanations for a range of troublesome developmental phenomena. 
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the unoriginality of these 
proposals: they are to my mind (at least) latent in the recent writings of 
Bloom, Bowerman, Brown, Karmiloff-Smith and NelsonZ3 . It is, of course, 
difficult for psychologists trained in Britain or America to feel comfortable 
with psychological dualism, because of the strong empiricist/determinist 
traditions in these countries. However, in the European literature from the 
early part of this century until the outbreak of the Second World War there is 
23 What I have in mind here is the tendency, common to these writers, to resist the easy 
identification of the conceptual basis of an utterance with its semantic basis (in their terms). 
Of course, in my terms the former is a phenic structure and the latter is cryptic so that such an 
identification becomes impossible. 
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the basis for an alternative approach. Because of the unsolved methodological 
problems associated with it, such an approach can hardly be said to 
challenge current scientific practice seriously. However, it seems to me that 
its considerable theoretical advantages recommend us to reconsider these 
methodological problems and seek solutions to them. At any rate, no one need 
be afraid of psychological dualism: our problem is not to distinguish 'the 
mental' from 'the physical' but to distinguish cognitive from other kinds of 
psychological process. Whether this distinction is drawn in the way I have 
urged or in other ways (such as Chomsky's), we need not be unduly nervous 
about the metaphysical consequences. 2A 
5. Postscript, 1992 
The original version of this paper was written in 1979, and it was updated 
in 1986. While it set the agenda for much of my work since (and is included 
here for that reason), it is in some respects rather dated. For instance, the 
section on infant development requires reconsideration. The hopeful signs 
which I identified in some of the work on infant perception have come to 
nothing. Indeed, infancy work now seems to take less note of the need to 
assess the significance of infant action. One case in point would be the well-
known work on early 'imitation'. I discuss this in Chapter 6, so will not dwell 
on it here. Another case is the work of Baillargeon (e.g. 1987) on early object 
permanence. Although this work enjoys great influence and is widely cited, 
her method involves a long chain of inference in linking the response 
measured (fixation time) to the thought that prompted it. Roughly, since 
infants look longer at display A than at display B, it follows that they are 
surprised by A and not by B: since A contains a disappearing object (or some 
other misbehaviour) it follows that they are surprised by this misbehaviour. 
Clearly it is difficult to be comfortable with this sequence of inferences unless 
the procedures used exclude all less highflown explanations: I would 
24 Cf. the excellent discussion of this point by Chomsky (1980a: 5m. 
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contend that we cannot be at all sure that they do, and that the conclusions 
drawn by Baillargeon must be considered to be very adventurous! 
Elsewhere in Section 2, I castigate 'cognitive psychology' for failing to face 
up to the issue of awareness and for failing to grapple with functions in 
which awareness is intimately involved; at the end of the section I lament the 
absence of post-Piagetian work on 1-4 year olds. I am delighted to say that 
neither complaint would now hold water. There has been a rapidly 
burgeoning interest in the nature and function of awareness throughout 
cognitive psychology (see Weiskrantz, 1988 for a landmark conference), and 
so far as the latter point goes, the difficult thing now is to find post-Piagetian 
work that is not concerned with 1-4 year olds! The potent stimulus here has 
been Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner's exciting discoveries (see Perner, 1991 
for review): it is superfluous to add that it comes as absolutely no surprise to 
me that this new impetus comes neither from Britain nor from North 
America but from Austria. I should perhaps add that I don't think any of 
these developments occurred as a result of anyone reading my words! 
So far as the section on early language is concerned, I would change very 
little. My final words - 'an adequate methodology seems as distant as ever' -
seem as true to me today as they did in 1979, and the proof if this is that the 
ship of syntactic development is more or less abandoned. Certainly, there are 
an industrious crew of Chomskyans still aboard, but they do not admit any 
'problem of perspicuous description': they know, like true believers, that UG 
must be true. I comment on their work in Chapter 6. 
It is the notions and puzzles of Section 4.1 that have particularly directed 
my own thought and work in the intervening period. Although my view of 
some of these puzzles, and their possible solution, has changed, I would 
stand by most of what is said in this section. 
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Chapter 2: Propositions and Early Utterances 
1. Introduction 
One of the most common ideas about the early utterances of children is 
that they express complete thoughts. For this reason these utterances have 
often been called holophrases or sentence-words. This view of the child's 
earliest utterances is quite respectable - it has been expressed, for example, 
by Preyer (1889), Leopold (1939-49), de Laguna (1927) and other pioneers in the 
field of child language. However, this position has more recently been 
challenged very strongly by Bloom (1973). What I shall attempt here is to add 
some of my own arguments to Bloom's and also to raise a general question 
about methodology in the description of early child language. 
First of all, I would like to give some examples of the evil consequences of 
assuming that one-word utterances express complete thoughts. The thesis 
takes two forms: (1) that single-word utterances correspond to whole 
sentences, and (2) that single-word utterances express propositions. Modern 
treatments of the one-word stage generally appeal to the first form of the 
thesis - that one-word utterances correspond to whole sentences. In 
consequence, we have from Ingram (1972) and from Antinucci and Parisi 
(1974) analyses of one-word utterances in which extremely large trees bear 
extremely tiny fruits! 
Ingram, indeed, is so besotted by this idea that he proposes complex 
sentential structures for the cries of the neonate! However, the arch-exponent 
of this thesis is McNeill who argues in the introduction to his book (1966), 
' .. not only do children acquire knowledge of sentence structure but 
virtually everything that occurs in language acquisition depends on 
prior knowledge of basic aspects of sentence structure. The concept of a 
sentence may be part of man's innate mental capacity. The argument 
of the book is designed to justify this assertion. In brief the argument is 
as follows. The facts of language acquisition could not be as they are 
unless the concept of a sentence is available to children at the start of 
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their learning ... children everywhere begin with exactly the same 
initial hypothesis: sentences consist of single words.' 
In deference to McNeill's status as a prominent theorist of child language, 
I shall call the thesis that one-word utterances correspond to whole sentences 
-the McNeill Hypothesis. 
2. One Word Utterances and Sentences 
Now as far as I can see, the principal reason for seeking to analyze one-
word utterances in this way is an extrinsic one - it disposes of the problem of 
explaining how children come to construct sentences by supposing that they 
know how to construct them before they actually do! However, I believe that 
the case should be argued on its own merits. Are there intrinsic properties of 
the one-word stage which require this kind of description or not? If not, then 
it seems to me we must face the problem of explaining the transition to a 
sentential language, however inconvenient this might be. 
The earliest stage of language acquisition is quite properly called the one-
word stage. It lasts normally for about six months in the early part of the 
second year. It is now generally recognised that the majority of these 
utterances fall into two distinct types. On the one hand there are utterances 
by means of which the child names aspects of his ongoing experience -
persons, objects, actions, events and so on. Such utterances are sometimes 
called nominations or comments. On the other hand, there are utterances by 
means of which the child attempts to obtain something - an object, the 
attention of a person, an action and so on: these are sometimes called 
requests. Common to both types of utterance we have the circumstance that 
the thing named or requested is a participant in an ongoing or familiar 
sensori-motor scheme (to use Piagetian terminology). It is being looked at, 
eaten, played with or, in the case of an action requested, it is a familiar and 
enjoyable event. 
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The question of interest here is whether or not we have any justification for 
supposing that the child playing with his ball who says Ball is uttering a 
token of the sentence This is a baIl or Ballhoodis here} . Similarly, in the case 
of the child who reaches into his mother's chair and says Up!, are we 
justified in supposing that this is a token of the sentence I want to be up or 
some such? For it is this that those who believe in the McNeill Hypothesis are 
committed to. 
N ow of course we have very clear prima facie evidence that the claim is 
false: namely the fact that they utter only one word at a time. However, this in 
itself is not enough, since we readily identify these utterances as actions with 
something like the meaning and force of the complete sentences This is a ball 
and I want to be up. McNeill and others explain the fact that children at this 
stage don't say This is a ball and I want to be up but only Ball and Up! by 
appealing to limitations of one kind or another. Obviously, certain words and 
grammatical devices are lacking so that the best we might hope for would be 
This ball, perhaps, or Baby up! , or Want up! . We don't even get forms like 
these, the argument runs, because non-specific limitations of processing 
capacity preclude the utterance of more than one word at a time. Because the 
primary object of study is the child's linguistic knowledge rather than his 
linguistic performance we are therefore justified in speaking of sentences 
even when no sentences are spoken! 
Now what is wrong with this plausible story? Firstly, it is too good a story: it 
allows us to speak of sentences when the neonate cries, when the dog barks 
and when the pig grunts, as Ingram appears to want to do. We need to be 
sure that the utterances really have the meaning or force that they are said to 
have. I shall argue that they do not. Secondly, Bloom (1973) has obtained 
evidence that children at this stage are able to produce longer utterances if 
I Italics denote utterances or elements of utterance; Boldface denotes sentences or 
elements of sentences; forms enclosed in single quotes denote propositions or elements of 
meaning. 
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the burden of meaning is lifted, so that the limitation in processing capacity -
if there is such a limitation - is specific to language. Thirdly, it seems to me 
that the appeal made to the competence/performance distinction here is 
utterly ad hoc and constitutes a dangerous abuse of an otherwise useful 
distinction. 
I will deal with this last criticism first, since it is the most 
straightforward. The account which is given by McNeill and others is that 
one-word utterances constitute predicates and that it is the subjects of these 
sentences which are unexpressed. But why should this be so? Why should we 
not rather interpret Ball as the subject of a sentence and the accompanying 
gestures as indicating that it is here. In any case there are no convincing 
arguments, as the philosopher Quine has often pointed out, for saying that 
Ball is a subject or a predicate since all lexical items may be analyzed as 
predicates. The competence/performance distinction is being used here 
simply as a license to invent structures that fit the prejudices of the theorist. 
To see this, consider the following absurd argument. Children typically do 
not produce tensed utterances until late in their third year. Let us suppose 
that this is because their conception of time is extremely primitive and 
limited. This is, of course, a non-specific cognitive limitation - that is, it 
affects all of the child's behaviour - not just his language. Therefore it has 
nothing to do with the child's linguistic competence. So we may describe such 
untensed utterances as tokens of tensed sentences! Now, this is clearly a 
dreadful argument but it seems no different in principle from the use of the 
competence/performance distinction to explain, or rather explain away, the 
absence of subjects from the one-word utterances of the younger child. It 
seems evident that appeals to this distinction must be made in a principled 
way, if the study of child language is not to become devoid of empirical 
significance. 
To turn now to the second objection, evidence is available that children at 
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this stage are able to produce longer utterances. This strange and unexpected 
evidence was provided by Bloom's daughter Allison who, around 16 months, 
began to produce two-word utterances involving an unintelligible word 
weeduh. This word behaved like a classical pivot word: it did not occur alone 
and it occurred in fixed position at the end of utterances. However, despite 
strenuous efforts and consultations with others Bloom could make no sense 
of it. All the episodes involving weeduh are listed in her monograph and for 
what it is worth I can make no sense of it either. Moreover, this turned out to 
be a false start since Allison then reverted to one-word utterances for a period 
of 4-8 months before she again began to produce two-word utterances. After 
its disappearance, weeduh never reappeared. Now, clearly one would like to 
have more evidence of this sort before generalizing. Bloom comments on the 
lack of such supporting evidence and surmises that it was only because of her 
elaborate recording arrangements that she managed to identify the 
phenomenon properly. She supposes that others may have dismissed the 
phenomenon as baby-talk or jargon. At any rate the significance of the 
phenomenon, if genuine, is clear enough. If children have this ability but do 
not make use of it, then the most likely explanation is that they have no use 
for it. In other words, a one-word utterance is not an incomplete expression 
of a complete sentence, but a complete expression of an incomplete sentence -
or of something quite different from a sentence. 
N ow let us take my first objection. It is the trickiest of the three but perhaps 
the most central and certainly the most interesting. How can we be sure that 
the child's utterances really have the meaning or force of the complete 
sentences that they supposedly represent? First of all we need some idea of 
what the meaning and force of the complete sentences are. I am here 
assuming familiarity with the distinction between meaning and force as 
outlined originally by, I believe, Frege, and more recently by Austin, Searle 
and many others. In the cases we are considering with the child our two 
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sample utterances might be analyzed as follows. 
Utterance Sentence represented Force Meanin~ 
(Proposition expressed) 
(a) Ball This is a ball Assertion 'This is a ball' 
(b) Up! I want to be up Demand 'I am up' 
In (a) the proposition expressed is presented as being true and the 
listener's responsibility is simply to add this item of information to his model 
of the world. In (b) the proposition expressed is presented as being false and 
the listener's responsibility is to try to make it true. So what the McNeill 
Hypothesis boils down to under this analysis is that the child's utterances, 
Ball and Up!, have the force and meaning of the full sentences This is a ball 
and I want to be up. 
Now I have already indicated the outline of my objection to this. In 
describing the one-word stage I claimed that the child's utterances, 
excluding marginal cases, were of two distinct types - acts of naming and 
requests for objects or services. I believe that one should attribute meaning 
and force to the child's utterances as follows: 
Utterance 
(c) Ball 
(d) Up! 
Force 
name 
request 
Meaning 
'ball' 
'lift' 
I am suggesting, then, that while the forces of those utterances are 
roughly similar to those of the sentences that they supposedly represent, they 
do not express propositions at all. The meaning of those utterances is simply 
in case (c) the object named and in case (d) the action requested. 
The first thing to notice about this account is that it is prima facie 
reasonable. 
(1) It allows force and meaning to the child's utterances, which no one would 
wish to deny. 
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(2) No violence is done to our intuitions about the acts of naming or 
requesting - neither requires per ~ the expression of a proposition: in the 
case of naming, a speech act with roughly the same properties - the act of 
referrin~, is often supposed to be involved in the execution of other speech 
acts; in the case of requesting, there is no difficulty with the notion that the 
addressee complies with a request by supplying the requested object or 
service, rather than by endeavouring to make a proposition true! Quite the 
contrary, in fact. 
(3) We need not worry too much about the grunting of pigs and the barking of 
dogs. Such bestial utterances may have to be regarded as forceful and not 
entirely meaningless but at least we are spared the embarrassment of 
supposing them to express propositions. 
3. One Word Utterances and Propositions 
Since I have now presented an alternative account of equal face-validity 
and, I should say, greater plausibility, it only remains to ask whether there 
are any considerations which make it essential to treat these utterances as 
expressing propositions, since it is this and this alone which will now justify 
the McNeill Hypothesis2 • Two things come immediately to mind. If they 
express propositions then we should expect to find elements of utterance 
corresponding to subject and predicate. This circumstance obviously doesn't 
obtain. Secondly, if they express propositions then there should be some 
commitment on the part of the child to the truth-value of his utterance. It is 
this circumstance that distinguishes the ability to lie as an indicator of 
propositional thought, since in the case of lying we have a statement which is 
presented as being true whilst it is believed to be false. So what we must look 
for here is evidence that the child is aware that in saying ball, for example, 
2This kind of question - a question about the mental content of communicative acts - is of 
course unfashionable nowadays, at any rate in Anglo-American psychology. However, there 
is an older, repressed literature dealing with such questions - some of which contains much 
good sense and intelligent observation. For example, Romanes (e.g. 1888) and Lloyd 
Morgan (e.g. 1894) are useful sources and more recently, though in a slightly different 
context, Kohler (1925) showed a keen interest in such questions. It seems to me likely that the 
current interest in early language and in pongolinguistics (e.g. Brown, 1970) must restore 
such questions to their former position of primary significance for general psychological 
theory. 
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he is presenting the statement This is a ball as true. Now it seems to me that 
this kind of awareness could only arise from experience with occasions when 
his utterances turned out to be mistaken. But I shall argue that the 
properties of the one-word stage are such that this kind of occasion simply 
does not arise. Take Ball first: if it expresses a proposition it is something like 
'This object is a ball' . Now, from our point of view we could regard this as 
true or false depending on whether the object in question was a ball or not. 
Notice, however, that if you or I examined a stick, say, and said This is a ball, 
an onlooker would surely take this as evidence not that we had made a 
mistake but that we were either insane or a pathological liar. This 
observation is due to Wittgenstein (1969) where he makes use of this 
distinction to examine the epistemological status of certain propositions - as I 
am trying to do here. Now, of course, the one-word uttering child is in exactly 
this position, since his naming utterances are always fixed in the here and 
now. If, while faced with a stick, he calls it Ball then our natural conclusion 
is not that he has made a mistake but that the meaning of ball in his 
language is such that This object is a ball is true even when it is a stick. That 
is, we do not take this as evidence that in looking at the stick the child has 
mistakenly supposed that it is a ball! It is of course open to us to conclude that 
the child is insane or a pathological liar. It seems to me then that as far as 
acts of naming are concerned there are no opportunities for the child to make 
mistakes about what the named object is, and hence no opportunities to learn 
about the status of his utterances with respect to truth at this stage and it is 
only when his conceptual world begins to extend beyond the Here and the 
N ow that we may reasonably raise the question of whether propositions are 
being expressed. That is, I am suggesting that the design features of 
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displaced reference and propositionality may be linked in ontogenesis3 • These 
arguments apply with equal force to the case of requests, in an exactly 
parallel fashion. In neither type of utterance, then, do we have any grounds 
for supposing that they express propositions. To sum up, it seems to me that 
the notion that children's one-word utterances should be regarded as 
incompletely expressed complete thoughts lacks any empirical support from, 
at least, this early stage of language development and, since it also lacks 
plausibility, that it should be discarded from further consideration in favour 
of simpler accounts. 
4. Consequences for Methodology 
I would like to conclude now with a general point concerning methodology. 
Perhaps in child language analysis we have been too ready to postulate 
unexpressed elements of utterance. My arguments with respect to the one-
word stage amount to a rejection of the stratagem of McNeill whereby 
unexpressed subjects are postulated. 
Now obviously we cannot hope to represent sentences without recourse to 
unexpressed elements of utterance; the work of Chomsky has shown us that. 
But equally obviously, the description of child language will inevitably lack a 
reliable empirical connection if there is to be no limitation to the kinds of 
element which can fail to survive utterance. Any attempt to write grammar 
for child language will remain at best a marginally empirical exercise 
unless we have some consistent criteria for limiting the possible 
discrepancies between sentences and utterances. As long ago as 1964 
Chomsky raised the question of how grammatical descriptions of children's 
language could be obtained in a case where the usual sources of information 
3 It is interesting to note that Hockett (1960) in his well-known discussion of design 
features makes no mention of 'propositionality'. Thorpe (1972) and Lyons (1972) in more 
recent attacks on much the same problem do give some limited acknowledgement to the 
importance of this feature. If my arguments are correct and if the value of determining an 
answer to this question is accepted then the natural way to investigate the presence of 
propositionality in communicative systems would be to make detailed studies of the 
ontogenesis of displaced reference. 
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about grammaticality, ambiguity and structural relationship are entirely 
lacking. It seems to me that 104 years later this question of Chomsky's has 
still not received a satisfactory answer. We have been building castles in the 
air. Nor is the problem of discrepancy between sentence and utterance 
confined to the one-word stage. In the two-word stage, for example, we have 
the problem of utterances which are analyzed as Noun + Noun. 
Some of these involve only a missing copula, e.g. Sweater chair (location) 
or a missing inflection, e.g. Daddy book (possession) and cause no serious 
problems5 • However, severe difficulties are raised by utterances which seem 
to be composed of a subject followed by direct object without intervening verb. 
Here the unexpressed element of utterance is once again lexical. It seems to 
me that if we have to allow for the possible non-realization of lexical elements 
in simple sentences in child language, then grammar writing at this stage is 
a pure mirage. However, there is another possibility. Examples of this kind of 
utterance are exceedingly rare in the literature. Perhaps they can be 
explained away. Consider Bloom's famous example of Mommy sock (Bloom, 
1970). Examination of her data shows that apart from a handful of marginal 
cases the only Noun + Noun sentences which cannot be analyzed as 
innocuous instances of location, attribution or possession are those in which 
the first noun is Mummy. Now Eve Clark has recently noted (Clark, 1973) 
nine different reports of the use of Mummy as a request marker. That is, 
utterances of Mummy + Noun occur in contexts where it is clear that the 
utterance should be glossed as I want + Noun. Perhaps the most compelling 
observations of this sort were made by Piaget (1951). Now, it is noteworthy that 
some of Kathryn's utterances of the form Mummy + Noun occurred in 
contexts in which her mother was not present. Might it not be that Bloom has 
failed to notice that here Mummy, though superficially a noun, is in fact 
4 My opinion remains the same, but - alas - for 10 read 28! 
5 These examples are from Kathryn I in Bloom (1970). 
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functioning in a quite different way? At any rate, I am encouraged to suppose 
that this is so: after all, Bloom made no special efforts to determine the 
grammatical category of such lexical items - she merely allocated them to 
classes in accordance with adult norms. So it may be that there are no 
subject-object utterances.6 
At any rate it seems to me that a useful guiding principle in child 
language research should be that lexical elements, if present in simple 
sentences, are obligatorily expressed in utterance. And conversely that if 
lexical elements are absent from utterances, they are absent from the 
grammatical form which the utterance represents. 
6 More recently Ewing (1983) has reached a similar conclusion. 
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Chapter 3: On Fodor on Cognitive Developmene 
Fodor's Language of Thought (1975) is an altogether exasperating book. Such 
prominent features as Fodor's homey fireside style of discourse, his facile 
and hurried treatment of inconvenient alternative views and his willingness 
to press on with his central argument through crowds of likely looking 
reductios are a constant irritation to the ?reader - or to this reader at any rate. 
Very likely, to use a Fodorism, it's as full of bad arguments and false 
assumptions as an egg of meat. However, to use another Fodorism, it is, in a 
sense, 'the only book we've got'. The solitary-book-owners that I have in mind 
are those linguists, philosophers and psychologists who feel that an 
understanding of the general properties of language will result only from 
living in the debatable lands between these three more or less established 
countries. Such nomads ought to be grateful to Fodor for providing them with 
a map, although no doubt they will often have occasion to find fault with it. 
As one of these nomads - a refugee from psychology - let me therefore record 
my gratitude before proceeding to find the faults. 
The argument of Fodor's that I want to discuss is presented in Chapter 2 of 
his book, and contains the following assumptions:2 
(1) The only psychological models of cognitive processes that seem even 
remotely plausible represent such processes as computational. 
(2) Computation presupposes a medium of computation: a representational 
system. 
I Published as Campbell (1982) 
2 Assumptions 1 and 2 are from p. 27 of Fodor's (1975) text; 3 is slightly tendentious in that 
I have discounted Fodor's caveat on p. 60, to the effect that this particular view of how to cash 
the notion of learning semantic properties is just one among an equivalent many. My 
arguments against 3 depend very much on the way this notion is cashed. Assumption 4 
appears on p. 65 and elsewhere; 5 is a reading of pp. 89-90. Irritatingly, Fodor gives no 
explicit indication of how he sees the relation between concepts and predicates of a 
representational system. I have supposed (perhaps wrongly) that they are to be taken as 
related in the usual way. Assumptions 6, 7 and 8 are conclusions. 
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(3) Learning a language involves learning the semantic properties of its 
predicates, where this is construed as learning a truth definition that 
delivers, in some cases directly, in others via recursion, a translation of 
the predicates into predicates of the internal representational system. 
(4) In order to avoid a nasty regress, some predicates of the internal 
representational system must be innate or, at best, not learned. 
(5) Concepts (qua senses of expressions of the public language or of 
expressions of the internal representation system) cannot be learned 
except by a process of hypothesis formation and confirmation. 
(6) For such a process to work, hypotheses must be expressed in a form 
suitable for the necessary computations to be carried out namely as 
expressions of the internal representation system. 
(7) Thus no concept can be learned whose extension we are not already able to 
represent by the sense of an expression in the internal representational 
system. 
(8) It thus appears that, whatever is involved in cognitive development, it 
cannot be that children acquire a conceptual system or a representational 
system of greater expressive power than the one they are born with. 
Now this conclusion is in flat contradiction with, to adopt Fodor's idiom 
once more, the only theories of cognitive development we've got. A common 
feature of the writings of Piaget, Vygotsky, Werner and Bruner is the claim, 
supported by many observations, that cognitive development involves a steady 
increase of representational power. To take Piaget's views (e.g. 1970, Ch. 1), 
after an initial stage where no representational powers are assumed, there is 
a subsequent stage where only objects in or adjacent to the immediate 
surroundings are representable, a third stage where objects remote in time 
and space can be represented, and a final stage where possible or virtual 
objects may be represented. Moreover, the study of animals other than man 
also suggests gross differences in representational power. Kohler (1925), for 
example, showed what appeared to be very serious limitations in the 
representational capacities of chimpanzees, our closest surviving relatives. 
These two positions complement each other and together relieve evolutionary 
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biology of what would be an insupportable burden, since the enormous 
intellectual gulf between man and ape is not matched by a corresponding 
evolutionary gulf. The view that ontogenesis in man results in an increase in 
representational power allows us to continue to suppose that man and ape do 
not differ very much in their inheritance. I take it as a basic responsibility of 
developmental psychology that it must not get rid of ontogenetic mysteries by 
postulating phylogenetic ones. Accordingly, we should be very sure of our 
ground before we attribute to human infants representational powers over 
and above those that we would be happy to attribute to an infant chimpanzee. 
All this is aside from and in addition to the difficulty and general 
undesirability of casting aside so many of the hard-won insights of 
comparative and developmental psychology. 
These considerations place important constraints on Fodor's theory; in 
particular, those predicates of the internal representation system that are 
supposed to be innate must be quite sharply restricted. To disregard these 
constraints leads only to absurdity. I should now make my own views clear: 
while I am sympathetic to some elements of Fodor's general approach, I find 
the conclusion of his argument about cognitive development extremely 
disagreeable, for the reasons just stated. Let us see what can be done to resist 
this conclusion. 
N ow of course it would be possible to reject some or all of the steps in 
Fodor's argument. Even step (1) is really not much more than a declaration 
of faith in determinism and in the possibility of a complete analysis of 
cognition. While I share this faith (at least strategically), I do not see that it is 
forced upon us. Assumptions (3) and (5) are, I believe, the most vulnerable to 
criticism. Although I cannot attempt a full examination of them here, I shall 
try to indicate the bases from which rejection could proceed. In the case of the 
third assumption, although Fodor speaks of learning a truth definition 
rather than of learning independent translations for each predicate, it is 
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clear (see, for example, Hacking, 1975, Ch. 12) that for very many predicates 
direct (Le. non-recursive) translation will be given by such a definition. It 
may thus be said that Fodor is committed to the view that, for many pairs of 
predicates, learning the semantic properties of one predicate does not 
interact with learning the properties of the other. Against this, it is a 
commonplace of linguistic thought, since Saussure, that the value of any 
sign is determined by the relations of opposition and contrast that bind it to 
the other signs - by its place in the language-system. In particular, for very 
many pairs of predicates, learning the semantic properties of one assists and 
is assisted by learning the semantic properties of the other (cf. odd-even, 
young-old, etc.). For discussion and background, see Lyons, 1977, Sections 
7.3-7.6 and 8. At this point, it may be objected that, since learning the 
semantic properties of a predicate it la Fodor means learning (via a truth 
definition) a T-sentence which gives a translation of that predicate in the 
language of thought, these translations are only superficially independent, 
since the predicates of the language of thought are already related to each 
other by the required Saussurean oppositions and contrasts. But how could 
this be so? Surely it could be so only if the semantic properties of the 
predicates of the language of thought were not learned as independent 
biconditionals relating them to primitive innate predicates (as Fodor would 
have it, 1975, pp. 89-90). There remains the possibility that the innate 
predicates themselves form a structured system of the required sort. Before 
unloading this problem on to evolutionary biology, we should be sure that the 
regress will work. It seems to me rather dubious, in fact. On the contrary, 
empirical semantic research may be said to show that as well as 'inheriting' 
oppositions vertically, complex predicates show emergent oppositions at the 
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new leve1.3 It seems to me, then, that there are a priori grounds for rejecting 
assumption (3). (For a different argument with a similar conclusion - though 
not directed against Fodor - see Harrison (1973, Part II) and 1978). 
Perhaps more cogent than these theoretical objections are certain 
empirical ones. Diachronic studies of various lexical fields in German by 
Trier, Weisgerber and others (see again Lyons, 1977, Section 8.4-8.6 for review) 
show that it is pointless to attempt an explanation of historical changes in 
meaning of isolated words. Research on language acquisition is beginning to 
yield similarly persuasive results. For example, in the acquisition of the field 
of size-adjectives in English, the opposed pair of words big-little undergoes a 
restriction of meaning leading to deviance after several years of correct usage 
(cf. Campbell and Wales, 1970, Section 5, and Maratsos, 1973; see, Carey 
(1978) for a thorough review). A natural explanation of this phenomenon is 
that the deviant restriction in the meaning of big is the result of pre-emption 
of part of its range of application by the other size adjectives - tall, long, etc. -
which denote special dimensions of variation in size. Without some systemic 
assumptions, such an explanation would not go through. From my own 
research on the field of English colour adjectives (Campbell, Macdonald & 
Dockrell, 1982) I offer the example in Figure 1. The change in meaning of the 
adjective purple, for example, seems incomprehensible in isolation from the 
other changes in the field, for example, the expansion of the range of 
application of the term red. 
3 See, for example, the discussion of the semantics of English causative constructions in 
Shibatani (1976), where it is argued - to my mind convincingly - that there is a semantic 
distinction to be drawn between sentences like (a) and (b): 
(a) The manager moved Smith from menswear to children's toys. 
(b) The manager made Smith move from menswear to children's toys. 
Unlike Shibatani (whose characterization of the distinction is that sentences of type (a) 
involve direct physical manipulation) it seems to me that the distinction involves 
cancellation of agentivity in the embedded subject in type (a) constructions. However the 
point remains that (a) is 'vertically' related to (b) and yet distinct from it. Another way of 
putting my claim would be to say that true paraphrases are possible only in a metalanguage: 
otherwise, a distinction is induced. 
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Figure 1: The north-west quadrant contains adult colour-naming norms for a 
collection of thirty-three colours. The remaining quadrants show a 
series of three maps of the colour-vocabulary (obtained from 
naming-tasks) of a male subject at the ages shown, for the same 
collection of colours. In these diagrams a numbered circle 
represents a particular solid colour. They are disposed on the page 
so as to satisfy (a) adult judges' decisions about which basic name 
applies, and (b) brightness relationships - the darkest colours being 
at the periphery. Thus (1) is a dark navy blue, (20) a lilac shade, etc. 
In the diagram showing adult norms, colours enclosed by two 
encircling lines were unanimously described and colours enclosed 
within a single encircling line were described by the same adjective 
by two-thirds or more of the sample. The remaining colours are 
allocated by arrows to those names which were most often applied. 
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Moreover, Rogers (1978) has shown in a study of mothers' talk to children 
that their talk is structured in such a way as to emphasize the oppositional 
structure of the fields investigated (size-adjectives and animal-names). These 
observations suggest very strongly that learning the semantic properties of 
predicates is not a series of isolated achievements but rather a systemic 
construction from the first, thus reinforcing the theoretical arguments 
against Fodor's assumption. 
To deal a swift and satisfactory blow to assumption (5) is somewhat harder, 
partly because of the vagueness of the claim, but also because it may 
reasonably be doubted whether Fodor is making a genuine empirical claim. 
His notion of what constitutes a process of hypothesis formation and 
confirmation is general enough to encompass perception (which, p. 44, 
'typically involves hypothesis formation and confirmation'), and 
discrimination learning (which, p. 35, note 6, 'ought to be reduced to concept 
learning'). Moreover, the only kinds of learning that Fodor suggests do not 
involve hypothesis formation and confirmation are sensory learning 
('learning what middle C sounds like played on the oboe', p. 34) and rote 
learning of lists. My conclusion is that Fodor considers every adjustment of 
the organism that is ampliative - that, in Bruner's phrase, 'goes beyond the 
information given' - to be mediated by a process of hypothesis formation and 
confirmation. Thus, assumption (5) is a simple corollary of this much more 
general claim. I strongly suspect that the only thing that would persuade 
Fodor to abandon assumption (5) would be a demonstration that concept 
learning was non-ampliative! It would be quite absurd for me to attempt a 
refutation here of the view that 'going beyond the information given' 
necessarily involves a process of hypothesis formation and confirmation. 
Perhaps it is sufficient to observe that theoretical psychology, past and 
present, is littered with more or less plausible alternative views. It is surely 
just the spider in Fodor's web of belief. 
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However, there is a way of construing assumption (5) so that it does have 
genuine empirical content: namely, where we (i) understand by 'concept 
learning' something distinguishable from other kinds of learning and from 
perception and (ii) understand by 'hypothesis formation and confirmation' 
some particular variety of non-deductive process that results in the 
strengthening of existing beliefs or in the acquisition of new ones. Now, there 
is a kind of learning task (discussed by Fodor, 1975, pp. 35-42) with respect to 
which such a version of assumption (5) is, at worst, tenable. In its simplest 
form the task involves the presentation, at short intervals, of a series of 
complex objects each of which is accompanied (usually followed) by an 
indication that it is or is not an object of a certain designated ad hoc type. The 
subject may be required to interpolate decisions about whether each object is 
or is not of the type, or he may be required to stop the presentation when he 
can identify the type by means of a description. In the former case, the task is 
ended when the subject achieves some arbitrary criterion of successive 
correct anticipations: in the latter case, the task is continued until the subject 
'correctly'4 identifies the type. Provided that the designated type is neither the 
only nor the most plausible/natural basis for partitioning the set of presented 
objects, it seems reasonable to speak of concept learning. Moreover, both 
subjective experience of such tasks and the details of performance (see 
Bourne (1966) and especially Pikas (1966) for review) are consistent with the 
view that, in solving these problems, subjects typically make guesses about 
the nature of the designated type and revise these guesses in a more or less 
principled way in the light of each newly presented object. However, even 
with respect to this tendentious operationalization of the notion of concept 
learning, it is by no means clear that such inferential procedures are either 
necessary or effective, since it often happens that subjects satisfy quite 
4 Scare quotes, since here (keeping an open mind about Nature) what is designated as a 
correct description of the type is certainly arbitrary. 
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substantial-looking criteria of successful performance before they are able to 
give a 'correct' description of the type, and since under certain 
circumstances subjects will offer (with iron certainty) absurd and unjustified 
descriptions (Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972). Accordingly, there seems to 
be little justification for supposing that these inferential procedures must be 
employed in every variety of this concept learning task, and none at all for 
supposing them to be essential to concept learning in general. 
In considering language learning, however, we are not interested in 
concept learning in general but in a very particular kind - a kind, moreover, 
that departs in substantial ways from the task just discussed. In the first 
place, if my arguments against assumption (3) are accepted, the task involves 
simultaneous learning of several designated types (as in, for example, the 
case of the colour lexicon), rather than just one type. In the second place, the 
time-scale is grossly different, the intervals between relevant objects being 
large5 (days rather than seconds) and irregular, and the duration of the 
'task' being measured in years (Carey, 1978), rather than minutes. The 
validity of the usual laboratory task (which provides the only and meagre 
empirical warrant for Fodor's assumption) as a representative of the real 
task of learning lexical concepts is thus seriously open to question. Of course, 
the depressing aspect of this discussion is that these trivial observations have 
not been recognized before as a reason for working with laboratory tasks of 
greater prima facie validity. 
Despite these criticisms of Fodor's assumptions, for the rest of this chapter 
I want to concede all the steps of Fodor's argument and to argue that we can 
nevertheless resist its conclusion by supposing that we have to deal not with 
one internal representational system but with two. How does this help us to 
avoid the conclusion? I will suppose that there is a primary representational 
5 The duration of this inter-trial interval should not, however be exaggerated. Since, by 
hypothesis, several types are being learned simultaneously, any object relevant to the 
learning of one type will be relevant to all. 
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system, at least some of whose predicates are innate and a secondary system, 
none of whose predicates are innate. Further, I will suppose that the notion of 
representational power found in theories of cognitive development such as 
Piaget's applies only to the development of the secondary system. Finally, I 
will suppose that concepts associated with the predicates of the secondary 
system are learned as possibly quite complex functions of the concepts of the 
primary system. Informally, we may think of new predicates being built up 
in a Boolean way within each level of representation and copied between 
levels in either direction (see Figure 2). Representations required for 
cognitive operations in the sense of Piaget, say, would have to be established 
in the secondary system before they could be so employed. This provides, 
incidentally, an interpretation for the Piagetian notion of 'internalization'. 
Learning the properties of natural language predicates may then involve 
either direct translations into the primary system or indirect ones via the 
secondary system, or both. This does not seem to affect the main point, that by 
this strategem of reserving representational power (of the required sort) to 
the predicates of the secondary system, we can escape Fodor's horrible 
conclusion, while staying more or less within the framework that he adopts. 
Primary System: PI P2 P4 
Secondary System: PI 
Figure 2: Combination and transfer between representational systems. 
In fact, Fodor flirts with a notion almost exactly like this one at various 
points in his book, for example, p. 85: 
'Essentially similar considerations suggest how it might after all be 
the case that there are thoughts that only someone who speaks a 
language can think. True, for every predicate in the natural 
language it must be possible to express a coextensive predicate in the 
Chapter 3 Page 59 
internal code. It does not follow that for every natural language 
predicate that can be entertained there is an entertainable6 predicate 
of the internal code. It is no news that single items in the vocabulary 
of a natural language may encode concepts of extreme sophistication 
and complexity. If terms of the natural language can become 
incorporated into the computational system by something like a 
process of abbreviatory definition, then it is quite conceivable that 
learning a natural language may increase the complexity of 
thoughts that we can think. To believe this, it is only necessary to 
assume that the complexity of thinkable thoughts is determined 
(inter alia) by some mechanism whose capacities are sensitive to the 
form in which the thoughts are couched. As we remarked above, 
memory mechanisms are quite plausibly supposed to have this 
property. So, I am not committed to asserting that an articulate 
organism has no cognitive advantage over an inarticulate one.' 
But when he turns a few pages later to attack cognitive development with 
his razor, this is more or less what he does commit himself to. It seems, in 
fact, that he thinks of 'entertainability' not as an absolute property of certain 
predicates - as I am proposing for the predicates of the secondary system - but 
as a property of predicates relative to the particular memory system to which 
they are summoned:- in this case, working memory or short term memory. 
Fodor's proposal here seems very strange. His proposed internal 
representation system will contain innate primitive predicates, complex 
predicates formed by Boolean recursion from the primitives, and terms of 
natural language. It is hard to see exactly what he might have in mind. For 
example, are the natural language terms to 'baptize' certain complex 
predicates with a compact tag so that they may fit into the limited 
accommodation of working memory? Surely there is no need for such 
contortions. Does a predicate need a name as well as an address? However, 
for what it is worth - Fodor exegesis is something of a mug's game - I have, 
again informally, tried to give a picture of what I think Fodor thinks might be 
6 Fodor's emphasis. 
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happening in Figure 3. 
Stage I .. Stage 2 
-PI [=QI] 
-p2[=Q~ 
Stage 3 .. 
PI & P2 [=QaJ 
PI &QI[=Q41 
-Q3 [=QsJ 
'4&Q5[=Qsl 
etc. 
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Figure 3: Predicates entertainable at successive stages of development of 
working memory capacity. PI, P2 are 'language of thought' 
predicates; QI, Q2 are natural language predicates; Stage <n> 
is the stage in which the length of the longest entertainable 
combination of predicates is <n>. 
For Fodor, then, development involves some expansion of the capacity of 
this memory system, thus allowing more complex expressions to be 
entertained, a rather modest cognitive advantage. If, on the other hand, we 
take 'entertainability' as a defining property of the predicates of the secondary 
system, then the cognitive advantages of developing such a system become 
rather more substantial, like being able to understand what is said and to 
figure out what to say next, for example! It should be made clear that, for 
myself if not for Fodor, I see no future for the notion of 'entertainability' 
unless it means something like 'accessible to consciousness'. Accordingly, it 
seems to be appropriate and indeed justifiable to identify the notion of 
representation found in Piaget's writings and interpreted here by my 
proposed secondary system of representation with Fodor's notion of 
'entertainability' and other such cautious flirtations with psychological 
dualism. 
I would like now to forget Fodor for a moment and to ask whether - quite 
apart from this technical question of dissolving an argument - there is 
independent motivation for the idea that two levels of representation and two 
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kinds of representational system are necessary in theoretical psychology, 
with just one system being involved in (roughly) conscious cognitive activity. 
This set of notions is not, of course, a new one. It has been aired, in one form 
or another, for as long as there has been a philosophy of mind. Even in the 
context of experimental psychology, we can find a similar set of notions in the 
theoretical writings of the founders of the subject, for example Wilhelm 
Wundt. I have recently (see Chapter 1) struggled very hard to make a case for 
resuscitating these distinctions and to give some kind of account of their role 
in the history of psychological ideas. I will confine myself here to a few 
remarks. In the first place, recognition of particular individual objects is an 
ability that we share with many other species. This ability seems to 
presuppose a representation of the object in question, and yet in general we 
have no explicit knowledge of the bases of this act of recognition. Aside from 
the negative results of introspection, the process is normally too fast and too 
reliable to make it plausible to suppose that any reflective entertainment of 
hypotheses is involved. On the other hand, we can reflect about these same 
individual objects. 'It seems to be Fodor all right,' I say to myself when I meet 
the stranger in the forest, 'but it can't be, because I know for a fact that he's a 
thousand miles away, in quite another forest!' It seems to me that in thinking 
of Fodor in that other forest I must be employing a system of representation 
quite different from the one that led to my initial, faulty identification. It was, 
I suppose, a difficulty in coordinating representations of this second kind that 
led to the celebrated misidentification by Piaget's daughter of the slug some 
distance along the track with the slug her father had pointed out to her on 
leaving their house! 
As a second example, very young children use their few early words in a 
way that suggests a rather liberal process of comparison between the objects 
they encounter and representations of certain privileged objects that have 
become associated with the word. When the bases of similarity that are 
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implicated in this process are extracted by examining children's usage - as 
Clark (1973) and Bowerman (1978) have done - what often tend to turn up are 
elementary perceptible features of shape, colour and texture. So these very 
young children appear to be equipped with representations of these simple 
perceptual properties. On the other hand, it seems clear that what these 
children are talking about in such cases are objects - qua members of kinds, 
rather than simple perceptual properties. Furthermore, a study by Nelson 
(1976) shows that, when young children do begin to talk about properties, it 
tends to be transitory or extrinsic properties like 'hot', 'wet', 'broken', 'dirty', 
rather than fixed intrinsic ones, like 'round', 'red', or 'smooth', that they talk 
about in the first place. Second, as is very well known, it is not until much 
later that children can indicate, by their ability to solve certain sorts of 
matching and sorting problems, that they can hold such fixed intrinsic 
properties in mind; that is to say, can entertain such concepts (e.g., Campbell 
et al., 1976). It seems to me reasonable to try to resolve this puzzle by 
supposing that different levels of representation of the properties are 
involved: that, in the case of early word use, only the primary system is used 
and that, in the case of the matching and sorting problems, the secondary 
system is necessary for solution. A final point about this example that is 
worth making is that the nature of the properties represented is very 
primitive. If any predicates are to be innate then I would expect these to be. 
Even Quine (1975) allows such parameters their place as 'innate similarity 
standards' in his discussions of language learning. The point is that, if 
'entertainability' were just a relation of 'containability' between a predicate 
and a memory-system, as Fodor would have it, then surely such predicates 
(being so primitive) would be among the first to be entertained instead of 
practically the last guests at the party. It should be made clear that Fodor is 
at pains at an early point in the book to deny the psychological validity of 
precisely the distinction I have been trying to draw, or at least to illustrate (cf. 
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Fodor, 1975, pp. 52, 53): 
'While I have argued for a language of thought, what I have really 
shown is at best that there is a language of computation for thinking 
is something that organisms do. But the sorts of data processes I 
have been discussing, though they may well go on in the nervous 
systems of organisms, are presumably not, in the most direct sense, 
attributable to the organisms themselves. There is, obviously, a 
horribly difficult problem about what determines what a person (as 
distinct from his body, or parts of his body) did. Many philosophers 
care terrifically about drawing this distinction, and so they should. It 
can be crucial in such contexts as the assessment of legal or moral 
responsibility. It can also be crucial where the goal is 
phenomenology: i.e., the systematic characterization of the conscious 
states of the organism. But whatever relevance the distinction 
between states of the organism and states of its nervous system may 
have for some purposes, there is no particular reason to suppose that 
it is relevant to the purposes of cognitive psychology. ' 
Well, of course, there doesn't seem to me to be any intelligent way of 
distinguishing levels of representation that doesn't treat the second notion of 
representation as a mental act, i.e. as something organisms do rather than 
as something that happens to them. 
Finally, it would be idle to pretend that I am proposing a strategy that 
would be easy for experimental psychologists to implement, or that the 
theoretical problems are as straightforward as these carefully chosen 
examples might suggest. I have made a personal commitment to this 
strategy only after much heart-searching and brain-racking, since I can see 
no other possibility of getting to grips with central problems of cognitive 
psychology such as language acquisition. To use the Fodorism for the last 
time, 'It's the only hope we've got.' 
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Chapter 4: Language Acquisition and the Definition of Pragmatics 1 
I will begin by identifying two tendencies - 'results' is too strong a word - of 
work in my own field which I will use in subsequent argument. The first of 
these tendencies is that it has begun to seem (paradoxically enough) in child 
language research that there is no such thing as a child lan"ua"e. Rather 
there are only idiolects - at any rate in the early years. This is of course 
hardly surprising since, in the cultures mostly studied, it is unusual for 
young children to have much contact with their peers before age 3 or so. 
However, even within triplets, as Schaerlaekens (1973) has shown, there are 
marked divergences in the course of language acquisition. Here, of course, 
the important point is that the input or target idiolect is the same for each 
triplet. These divergences are found at all linguistic levels: they make the 
construction of notional proto-languages such as, say, the 3-word stage in the 
acquisition of English, quite impossible in my view. This has led me to doubt 
whether it is reasonable at all to speak - even for adults - of knowing a 
language where a language is thought of as a transcendental and socially-
determined institution. If we know one language then we know several, it 
seems. Despite enormous divergences of idiolect I - a speaker of an obscure 
British English dialect - succeed in communicating with inexpert speakers of 
English as a second language, with 2 year old children and even with North 
Americans! It may be possible, I suppose, to argue that what makes this 
communicative virtuosity possible is the possession of a large variety of 
linguistic competences, but that seems to me to be a doomed hypothesis. 
Rather, I prefer the idea that we each have our idiolects and use our 
intelligence and common sense to make them fit! Surely one of the great 
advantages of the notion of 'negotiation of meaning' - which has been so 
common in pragmatic writings - is that it frees us from this old idea of a 
I Published as Campbell, 1981 
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language being an institution shared by a community of speakers. Of course, 
for certain purposes it may be useful to stick - as dictionary makers must 
stick, for example - to the derivative notion of a language as a union of 
overlapping idiolects of members of a culturally-defined community, but 
inasmuch as a science of language is possible the goals of that science should 
be concerned with idiolect. 
The second bias which I will import from work in psychology is more 
personal. In my recent work (see Chapter 1) I have argued, largely on the 
basis of certain puzzles in early language acquisition, that it is essential to 
revive the old psychological distinction between, roughly, conscious and 
unconscious structures and processes. While there has been a continuing 
acknowledgement of the importance of this distinction in mainland Europe, 
in Anglo-American psychology it has practically faded from view outside of 
psychoanalytic writings. Instead, the distinction has been either ignored, as 
irrelevant, or worse, conscious activity has been treated as epiphenomenal -
being regarded as uninvolved with the causation of behaviour. 
Even if that were true - which I do not for one moment believe - it is quite 
astonishing that such a large group of psychologists should have turned 
away from the task of describing and perhaps explaining this form of mental 
life. I have preferred to identify these two levels of cognitive function by 
means of theoretical terms, referring to effortful, reportable cognition as 
phenic and to effortless, unreportable cognition as cryptic. A good example of 
the need to distinguish them comes from work done by Annette Karmiloff-
Smith at Geneva on acquisition of the French determiner system (cf. 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1978, 1979). Her work showed that 3-4 year old children 
assigned gender to new nouns routinely on the basis of the phonological form 
of the noun ending, regardless of the sex of the denoted object or of the actual 
grammatical gender of the noun. However, when faced with new nouns 
whose ending favoured neither gender, these children would typically assign 
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gender on the basis of sex, if possible, or invented sex, if not. So, semantically-
based gender assignment ~ used but only as a default procedure when 
phonologically-based gender failed. Of course with increasing age Karmiloff-
Smith's subjects began to use semantic and syntactic information in 
assigning gender. However, the remarkable aspect of her results was that 
phonological categories - which were the first to be utilised in the actual 
assignment of gender - were the last thing to be offered as an explanation of 
why they had used this article or that, or this form of an adjective rather than 
that. On the other hand, at the time when phonological categories were 
plainly controlling gender assignment her children typically justified their 
gender assignments semantically, in terms of the real or imagined sex of the 
denoted objects. It seemed to me that a natural way to resolve this contra-
dictory tangle is to suppose that gender-related morphological decisions are 
normally made by a cryptic process but are defaulted to a phenic process 
whenever the noun ending cannot be assimilated to one of the key 
phonological categories. Children's explanations would, naturally enough, 
reflect this phenic process entirely and the phonological process not at all. 
Now it might be thought that the distinction between these two levels of 
cognition could be granted but that phenic structures and processes would 
have a role to play only in metalinguistic communication. I think this is 
false, for two reasons. In the first place, ordinary communication involves 
understanding what is said, which I take to mean something more - a lot 
more - than just figuring out what proposition is being expressed and 
knowing what would make it true. It seems to me that the pre-theoretical 
notion that gives the key to what is additionally involved here is makin~ sense 
of what is said - making adjustments to a mental representation of the 
universe of discourse in such a way that what is said becomes sensible. A 
good example of this sort of thing is what Herb Clark has called bridgin~ 
inferences (Clark and Clark, 1977, Chapter 3). Suppose, reporting a late-
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night gathering someone says 'And then the police arrived and so we all 
swallowed our cigarettes'. To make sense of what was said we need a 
bridging inference. For example, that the cigarettes contained an illegal 
substance. I think it is fairly clear that in general such inferences involve 
real cognitive effort and hence phenic structures and processes -a conclusion 
which is supported by Clark's experimental work. Perhaps when 
communication occurs between ideal speaker-hearers obeying impeccable 
conversational principles it may proceed effortlessly. However this would be 
extraordinary communication. Ordinary communication, as Schegloff, 
Sacks and Jefferson (1977) and Jefferson (1974) have shown, is littered with 
all sorts of repair-sequences showing, or so it seems to me, effortful cognition 
at work. My second reason for believing that such processes play an essential 
role in language is the following. What a speaker thinks about the meaning 
of linguistic elements - words, syntactic formations or whatever - may be 
described as prescriptions. But they can hardly be dismissed as prescriptions 
unless it can be shown that they do not affect his choice of these elements. But 
surely on occasion they do. Karmiloff-Smith's children entertained a false 
theory of their own system of assigning gender but did employ this theory in 
assigning gender to a small set of difficult cases. In English at the moment 
we are experiencing a wave of idiolect change where the remnant of a system 
of grammatical gender is being transformed into a strictly semantic system, 
resulting in several changes, the introduction of new pronouns, for example, 
he-or-she, the abolition of it as a means of referring to children and other 
domestic animals, and the employment of pronoun-avoiding syntactic 
stratagems. In most idiolects this new system is quite unstable, the old 
cryptic system breaking through whenever the effort of keeping selection of 
these elements under phenic control proves too much. 
As a last example, let us assume the truth of the popular theory, due to 
Hom (1972) that expressions which can be considered as intermediate on a 
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scale, such as some, possible, the number-names, the equative comparative 
and or are for many idiolects semantically compatible with expressions 
denoting more extreme values on these scales so that some is compatible with 
all, possible with necessary, etc. Of course they may be used and often are 
used to denote values incompatible with the value denoted by the appropriate 
extreme. The fact that they may be used in this way is then explained by 
appealing to implicatures based on the maxim of quantity. Briefly, if the 
extreme value were applicable, the maxim generally requires the use of the 
extreme expression. Since the extreme expression has not been used, by 
implicature the extreme value is not applicable. It seems to me that 
investigation would show that in many idiolects, mine for example, these 
cryptic structures and their associated processes are in unstable conflict with 
phenic structures - prescriptions, if you like - which specify these 
intermediate expressions as ambiguous, resulting in the redundant and 
erratic addition of what Horn has called the implicature-cancelling 
suspenders only some, some or all, at least some, at least as big as, two or 
more, andl or, etc. 
A much more awkward question will occupy the rest of this chapter. 
Suppose that we do acknowledge the centrality of the idiolect and the 
complementary, if occasionally conflicting, roles of phenic and cryptic activity 
in language use. What consequences does this have for the traditional 
division of linguistics into syntax, semantics and pragmatics and for what 
we understand by pragmatics in particular? What makes this question such 
an awkward one is that there is no really satisfactory pre-theoretical notion of 
what pragmatics is, nor is there any obvious consensus amongst linguists or 
philosophers of language about what phenomena should be counted as 
pragmatic phenomena. For some it has been little more than a handy label 
for certain phenomena, such as thematic structure, deixis or reference. 
Others have employed the notion systematically, but in quite diverse ways. 
Chapter 4 Page ffi 
For some, the principles governing the process of making sense of what is 
said - of making sense of utterance meaning - are pragmatic principles. For 
others, such principles are considered to be external to linguistics proper -
belonging instead to a theory of rational cooperation. Again, for some, in 
relating sentence-meaning to utterance-meaning a sharp distinction is made 
between syntactic and semantic principles which together determine a 
propositional function for each sentence and pragmatic principles which 
specify what actual proposition is determined by the function in context: for 
others pragmatic principles combine first with syntactic and semantic 
principles to yield a literal utterance meaning and are then employed in a 
second cycle to yield an actual utterance meaning. Finally, pragmatic 
principles such as Grice's conversational maxims have been applied at quite 
distinct levels in the functional hierarchy; Horn, for example in his 
treatment of the scalars appeals to the maxim of quantity as controlling the 
move from sentence meaning to utterance meaning; others have chosen to 
apply the maxims to the determination of the act-content of an utterance 
already fully specified as to meaning - to what I have been calling makinf: 
sense of what is said. 
N ow, it is appealing at first sight to employ the distinction between phenic 
and cryptic activity in a direct and simple manner, associating knowledge of 
the language (of one's own idiolect, that is) with the cryptic automatic level 
and knowledge of how to employ this system in speaking and understanding 
with the phenic level, thus retaining an analogue of the original radical 
distinction of Morris (1938) between syntax and semantics on the one hand 
and, pragmatics on the other. A proposal along these lines has been made by 
Seuren (1978). However, the confusing picture of pragmatics revealed by 
recent work suggests fairly strongly that this view is wrong. Why? Consider 
once again Horn's treatment of the scalars. If A asks B, How many children 
do you have? and B answers Two, then, since B may be presumed to know 
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exactly how many children he has and to be obeying the maxim of quantity, A 
may reasonably infer that B does not have three children or any larger 
number since he should then have said so. However, it is hard to imagine A 
in this situation deliberating Does B mean exactly two or at least two? and 
resolving the equivocality of the scalar by the inference just described. It is 
even harder to imagine A actually initiating a process of repair by saying to B 
Do you mean exactly two or at least two? Such inferences, if Horn is indeed 
correct to analyse them in this way, must surely be automatic and 
unreportable - in my terms cryptic. 
On the other hand, if A asks B Do you have two children?, it is not at all 
hard to imagine B thinking Does A mean exactly two or at least two? and 
either resolving the equivocality in favour of exactly two by an inference 
involving the maxim of quantity or in favour of at least two by a different 
inference involving the larger context - say, that A is trying to establish 
thresholds for tax purposes or the allotment of housing or the like. Of course, 
the maxim of quantity is involved here as well, since - assuming mutual 
knowledge of the purposes of exchange - for A to have asked Do you have at 
least two children? would have been redundant. Again, in this example it is 
not at all hard to imagine B initiating a repair by saying to A Do you mean 
exactly two or at least two? or, perhaps more likely, deciding to treat the 
question as a indirect request and answering I have four. So my claim here is 
that under different circumstances a listener may be aware or unaware of 
the equivocality of a scalar and may resolve the equivocality by effortless or by 
effortful inference. So it would be wrong to make a strong direct connection 
between phenic and pragmatic processes on the one hand and cryptic and 
grammatical processes on the other. However, I do agree with Seuren (and 
practically everyone else) that it is important to distinguish linguistic from 
extra-linguistic elements in the activities of saying and understanding and if 
we have to make this distinction with respect to idiolects - as I am urging -
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then Seuren's notion that what we ought to count as lin~uistic processes are, 
to use Seuren's term, underground - fluent, effortless and unreportable -
seems to me to give much the best hope of success. Accordingly, as a first step 
it seems necessary to distinguish between what might be called micro-
pra~matic and macropra~matic levels. Macropragmatic processes would be 
analyzed in terms of explicit inferences guided by principles of rational 
cooperation while micropragmatic processes would be analyzed as if they 
involved such inferences. However, it may also be possible to go a little further 
and indeed, it is desirable to do so if one dislikes the notion of unconscious 
inference - as I do. It seems to me that the ontogenesis of many types of 
skilful performance follows a pattern of the following sort: initially, the 
performance - whatever it is - is guided phenically; the results of many 
component parts of the performance are monitored and controlled in a 
deliberate and thoughtful way. However, with time and practice automatic 
cryptic processes are acquired - goodness knows how - which enable a 
smoother and more fluent performance. However, it is typically the case that 
these cryptic processes are merely heuristic; they deal adequately with the 
majority of circumstances but when they break down the control of the 
performance is returned, by default, to deliberate phenic guidance. Clinical 
diagnosis provides an interesting case in point. It is a truism of the art of 
diagnosis that experienced physicians can make, in many cases, an accurate 
diagnosis based on gross aspects of the patient's appearance - the 
characteristic facial appearance and gait associated with Parkinson's 
disease is perhaps the best-known example. Of course ethical standards 
require that such intuitive diagnoses be backed up by a deliberate eliminative 
procedure based on the results of laboratory tests and so forth. And in some 
cases, the 'look of the patient' gives no clue. Similar heuristics are employed 
by those skilled in plant identification: with practice, what began as slow 
deliberate fumbling through a botanical key gives way to smooth effortless 
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identification. The important point for my argument is that these intuitive 
cryptic procedures are based upon criteria - presumably complex and subtle 
perceptual properties of faces, leaf-shapes, etc. - quite different from the 
explicit phenic procedures which generally involve close examination of 
highly local properties. A slightly different example is the process of 
attribution of art objects, such as paintings. There, one may know a Piero 
della Francesca painting when one sees one without having any idea why. 
Such intuitive attributions can be contrasted in the same sort of way with the 
deliberate feature-by-feature attributions of a professional art historian whose 
judgments are subject to verification by examination of brushwork, 
composition, iconography and historical data. It seems to me that in all these 
cases there is little reason to suppose that the intuitive procedure is 
homomorphic with the explicit one - that it is not a sequence of inferences 
driven underground by practice but rather an independent heuristic (i.e. 
operating within a more limited domain) with a possibly quite different 
dynamical structure. What I want to suggest, then, is that the pattern of 
development just discussed occurs also in the learning of a language: that 
success in achieving communicative goals in speaking and understanding 
can lead in some mysterious way to the acquisition of short-cut cryptic 
heuristics which satisfactorily replace intelligent and deliberate processes of 
guidance and control through a large part of their domain. When these 
processes fail to yield a result, then control may be returned by default to the 
phenic level. Accordingly, it may be possible to relate macro and micro-
pragmatic processes in roughly the following way: a macropragmatic 
process is one constituted by a sequence of explicit inferences governed by 
principles of rational cooperation. A micropragmatic process develops as a 
cryptic and heuristic procedure which partially replaces some macro-
pragmatic process and which defaults to it in the event of breakdown. 
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Chapter 5: Royal Investigations of the Origins of Language 1 
Introduction 
Students of language development in children are familiar with accounts 
of three isolation experiments, that is, experiments in which infants are 
isolated in order to discover whether they have a natural tendency to create 
language and, if so, what sort of language. These experiments are alleged to 
have been carried out (in chronological order) by Psamtik I of Egypt. 
Frederick II (Hohenstaufen) of Sicily, and James IV of Scotland (cf. Marx, 
1967, p. 443, 450-51; Blumenthal, 1970, p. 100). 
In view of the present revival of interest in the origins of language, it has 
seemed to us timely to examine these ancient investigations from two points 
of view. First of all, there is the question of authentication: did they indeed 
take place and, if so, how were they conducted and what were their 
outcomes? In the second place, what light do they shed on the genetic 
question to which they were addressed, viz., what is the nature of 
spontaneously created language? In the course of our research we stumbled 
upon a fourth royal investigation, that of Akbar the Great, 16th-century ruler 
of Moghul India. This isolation study is not well-known (see sect. 4 below) 
and deserves to be better known. In addition, although accounts of the three 
earlier experiments are commonplace, they are seldom accurate and never 
accompanied by full texts and bibliographic details of source materials. For 
these reasons we feel that it is worthwhile to provide contemporary students 
of child language with a convenient and comprehensive guide to the origins, 
weird and wonderful though they be, of their subject. 
We will proceed in the following manner. For each experiment we will give 
the primary source-texts (in translation) and refer to any principal secondary 
texts. After commenting on these texts we will discuss the question of 
authenticity. A natural further step is to consider the plausibility of these 
1 Published as Campbell and Grieve,1982 
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investigations. That is, to ask whether it is plausible that the individual in 
question should have carried out such a study. As we show below, it turns out 
that plausibility is a highly unreliable guide to authenticity. There are two 
grounds for this claim. The first is an a priori argument:2 an individual who 
is known for empirical inquisitiveness and an interest in genetic or linguistic 
questions is not only more likely to carry out isolation experiments than other 
individuals, he is also more likely to have such experiments falsely attributed 
to him by garrulous and imaginative chroniclers (whether motivated by 
malice, a desire to 'gild the lily' or a simple wish to make their books more 
interesting). 
The second ground is empirical: plausibility and authenticity are simply 
not correlated in the cases discussed. 
Finally, we will consider whether these experiments illuminate the genetic 
question in any way and briefly review the possibility of investigating this 
question by less barbarous methods. 
1. The experiment of Psamtik (psammetichus) I of Egypt 
1.1 Sources 
We know of this experiment only through Herodotus' accoune. Psamtik lived 
from 663 to 610 B.C., and Herodotus from 485 to 425. His account is based 
upon what he was told by the priests of Hephaestus at Memphis. It runs as 
follows: 
'Now until Psammetichus reigned over them, the Egyptians believed that 
they were the eldest of all men. But ever since Psammetichus became 
king and resolved to learn who were indeed the eldest, they have believed 
that the Phrygians were before them, but they themselves before the rest. 
For when Psammetichus was not able by enquiring to learn the answer 
from any man, he conceived this device. He gave two new-born babes of 
2 Weare indebted to Professor G. Barrow of St. Andrews University for making this point 
clear to us. 
3 Herodotus' wen known Histories are of course available in a number of editions with a 
range of alternative translations and commentaries. The text presented below is from the 
English translation by Powell (1949:109-10) of Book II, section 2. 
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ordinary men to a shepherd, to nurture among his flocks after this 
manner. He charged him that none should utter any speech before them, 
but they should live by themselves in a solitary habitation; and at the due 
hours the shepherd should bring goats to them, and give them their fill of 
milk, and perform the other things needful. Thus Psammetichus did 
and commanded because he desired, when the babes should be past 
meaningless whimperings, to hear what tongue they would utter first. 
And these things came to pass; for after the shepherd had wrought thus 
for a space of two years, when he opened the door and entered in, both the 
babes fell down before him, and cried becos, and stretched out their 
hands. Now when the shepherd heard it the first time, he held his peace; 
but when this word was oftentimes spoken as he came to care for them, 
then he told his lord, and brought the children into his presence when he 
commanded. And when Psammetichus had also heard it, he enquired 
which nation called anything becos; and enquiring, he found that the 
Phrygians call bread by this name. Thus the Egyptians, guided by this 
sign, confessed that the Phrygians were elder than they. That so it came 
to pass I heard of the priests of Hephaestus in Memphis.' 
Psamtik is thus thought to have believed that isolated children would speak 
the language of their aboriginal ancestors. This belief is presented as an 
assumption to be used in interpreting the experimental outcome, not as an 
hypothesis itself requiring empirical confirmation. It is characteristic of 
early writing on the subject of language origins that some particular 
language (perhaps 'dead' but in some way identifiable) should be regarded as 
the original. A particularly clear example of this assumption is provided by 
the following passage from the Wibhanga Atuwaba (cf. Hardy, 1966, p. 23), an 
ancient Singhalese Buddhist text: 
'Parents place their children when young either on a cot or a chair, and 
speak different things, or perform different actions. Their words are thus 
distinctly fixed by their children (on their minds) thinking that such was 
said by him and such by the other; and in process of time they learn the 
entire language. If a child, born of a Damila mother and an Andhaka 
father, should hear his mother speak first, he would learn the Damila 
language. but if he should hear his father first, he would speak the 
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Andhaka. If, however, he should not hear either of them, he would speak 
the Magadhi. If, again, a person in an uninhabited forest in which no 
speech is heard, should intuitively attempt to articulate words, he would 
speak the very Magadhi.' 
Psamtik is credited with having found it necessary to isolate two children 
(contra the gedanken-experiments in the Wibhanga Atuwaba), suggesting 
perhaps that he thought that language would not be developed without some 
society. However, it is also possible that the use of two subjects may have been 
merely a precaution against inadvertent mortality. In any event, the outcome 
of the experiment, as reported, was hardly sufficient to bear the weight of the 
inference that ensued. Some have argued that beeos might have been 
modelled upon the bleating of the goats (cf. Lloyd, 1976, p. 5; Sennert, 1643, 
sect.VI; Farrar, 1865, p. 13), but this seems equally tendentious and futile. It 
is interesting that Psamtik is supposed to have asked in what tongue is there 
anything called beeos rather than in what tongue is there something called 
beeos which would fit the occasion of utterance. What would he have said if 
his advisers had informed him that beeos was Egyptian for the tusk of an 
elephant? Could it be that semantic emptiness or lability in the Original 
Language was considered possible but that phonological change was not? At 
any rate it is clear that a latent Urspraehe (perhaps consisting only of a 
collection of meaningless phonological forms) was assumed to be present in 
the minds of the children by Psamtik (or by the fabricators of the tale, ifit was 
indeed only legendary). 
1.2 Authenticity 
Herodotus' report of this experiment has several features that might 
incline one to accept it as genuine. It bristles with impressive detail, the 
design shows remarkable sophistication (secure isolation, newborn children, 
minimal caregiving, awareness of babbling, etc.) and the outcome was 
presumably unwelcome to the Egyptians (they knew perfectly well who were 
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the oldest people!). However, accepting it as genuine is quite unjustified. A 
recent commentary on Book II (Lloyd, 1976) makes this very clear. 
Firstly, the sophisticated nature of the design suggests an Ionian origin --
Greek doctors were already employing such controlled methods in Ionia (cf. 
Farrington, 1944; 1969). Secondly, goats' milk was not used for suckling 
infants in Egypt (indeed, its only known application was as a remedy for anal 
dysfunction) but was so used in Ionia (cows' milk was not). Thirdly, there is a 
remark, at the end of the account, to the effect that the story was known to 
Greek scholars in a slightly different form. Lloyd argues convincingly that a 
version of this experiment had appeared earlier in Hecateus of Miletus' 
Genealogies (only fragments of this survive) and it is possible that Herodotus 
may have simply 'lifted' the story from there (for exhaustive discussion see 
Heidel, 1935). 
There are still various possible alternative explanations. For example, it 
might have been a fictional satire aimed at foolish Egyptians or it might have 
actually happened in Ionia and somehow 'migrated' to Egypt. However, 
whatever its provenance, any claim that the experiment took place in this 
way or in that way is seriously weakened by this analysis of Lloyd's, since, at 
best, it greatly increases the remoteness of Herodotus' report from the actual 
event. 
1.3 Plausibility 
Herodotus describes an experiment of Psamtik's which might be thought 
of as an investigation of a genetic question, namely an attempt to fathom the 
depth of the springs then regarded as the source of the Nile, but since this is 
no better authenticated than the language experiment it does not help much. 
In the case of Psamtik, then, we know neither that such an experiment was 
consistent nor that it was inconsistent with his personal characteristics, 
since so little is known about him. 
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2. The Experiment of Frederick n (Hohenstaufen) of Sicily 
2.1 Sources 
Once again, we know of this experiment through only one source, the 
chronicle of Brother Salimbene, a Franciscan friar. The story occurs in the 
Chronicle as one of a long list of strange experiments recounted by the friar 
and runs as follows: 
'Like Psammetichus, in Herodotus, he made linguistic experiments on 
the vile bodies of hapless infants, bidding foster-mothers and nurses to 
suckle and bathe and wash the children, but in no wise to prattle or 
speak with them; for he would have learnt whether they would speak the 
Hebrew language (which had been the first), or Greek, or Latin, or 
Arabic, or perchance the tongue of their parents of whom they had been 
born. But he laboured in vain, for the children could not live without 
clappings of the hands, and gestures, and gladness of countenance, and 
blandishments.'4 
2.2 Authenticity 
Although, unlike the previous case, Salimbene (1221-88) was a 
contemporary of Frederick (1194-1250), he had no connection with his court, 
and his personal knowledge of Frederick was limited to a glimpse of him 
passing through the streets of Parma in 1235. It would be unwise, therefore, 
to suppose that Salimbene's sources of information were reliable. This is 
particularly the case since Frederick, though Holy Roman Emperor and 
active in Crusades, was excommunicated by Pope Gregory IX in 1227 and 
thereafter lived in almost continual conflict with the Church. It is therefore 
likely that Salimbene would have included in his Chronicle any discreditable 
tale that reached his ears (or his imagination). 
As for the text itself, once again we have as a background assumption that 
some identifiable language should be the basis of the Ursprache. However, in 
this case, as well as the usual classical languages, it is thought possible that 
4 The text given is from Coulton's (1907) translation of part of the Chronicle. An edition of 
the original chronicle, Cronica Fratis Salimbene de Adam Ordinus Minorum, appears in 
Monumenta Germaniae Historiae, XXXII, Scriptores, ed. by O. Holger-Egger, p. 350. 
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the language of the parents might be produced, in this case probably a 
vernacular, Sicilian. At this time the classical languages and the 
vernaculars were regarded as being quite different, only the former involving 
'necessary' forms. There is an illuminating contemporary discussion of this 
point by Dante,5 who argues that the outcome of experiments such as this 
would inevitably favour the classical languages. 
The explanation of the outcome of Frederick's experiment is equally 
striking. In Western educational thought it is not until the early 18th century 
that such weight begins to be placed on the social and affective aspects of 
early childrearing. As we shall show below, Frederick was an extremely 
original thinker who cared nothing for received opinion and whose grasp of 
the elements of scientific investigation was not to be equalled for several 
centuries. These unusual aspects of Salimbene's report add to its credibility, 
since they are unlikely inventions. 
2.3 Plausibility 
Frederick was possibly the most unusual monarch in European history. In 
his time he was called stupor mundi et immutator mirabilis, 'wondrous 
transformer of the world', and with good reason. Two excellent biographies, 
by Kantorowicz (1928) and by Van Cleve (1972), and the specialist 
investigations of Haskins (1924, 1929) are the principal sources for the sketch 
which follows. Frederick's strongest personal intellectual interests were 
biological. He assembled an immense menagerie which accompanied him 
whenever he travelled. It included camels, lynxes, leopards, lions, panthers, 
apes, bears, a giraffe and an elephant; hawks, owls, eagles, buzzards, 
falcons, peacocks, parrots and an ostrich. In addition, his court was always 
accompanied by a collection of human curiosities: concubines, slave-girls, 
eunuchs, acrobats, conjurors, rope-dancers, etc. He maintained animal 
5 In De Vulgare Eloquentia, translated into English, with notes, by A.C. Ferrers Howell. 
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. London, 1890). 
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reservations in various parts of his kingdom, the most remarkable of which 
was a collection of waterbirds housed in 'natural' (i.e., not in a zoo) 
conditions in a marsh near Foggia. Like many mediaeval rulers he was 
passionately fond of falconry but here again his interest was scientific as 
well, so much so that he wrote a treatise, De Arte Venandi cum Avibus , 
which is the basis of all subsequent writing on the subject.6 This treatise is a 
large work and it contains an introduction of about 100 pages dealing with 
avian biology in general and describing many simple investigations of 
anatomy and behaviour carried out by Frederick. Aristotle is taken to task on 
more than one occasion for mistakes in his natural histories. Frederick is 
never in any doubt which should be given greater weight, the wisdom of the 
great philosophers and teachers or the evidence of observation and 
experiment. Of course, in other quarters, such as the mediaeval universities, 
such empirical questioning of received knowledge would have been regarded 
as obscene and heretical. There is little doubt that Frederick carried out other 
sorts of experiments as well. In the list provided by Salimbene some are 
undeniably dubious, but others have some substantiation - such as the 
'ringing' experiment to discover the longevity of fish (cf. Hauber, 1912) - and 
others, like the isolation experiment, are sufficiently unusual in design or 
conception to make us doubt whether they are fabrications. For example, to 
compare the effects of activity and inactivity on digestion he had two men eat 
the same meal, sleep and go hunting respectively, whereupon they were 
simultaneously disembowelled and their stomach contents examined! 
Of Frederick's other intellectual interests we should mention at this point 
his interests in language. He is reputed to have spoken nine languages and to 
have been literate in seven. He anticipated the vernacular poetry of Dante by 
composing many Sicilian odes and lyrics and, most remarkably, inspired the 
6 Bibliographical details and a review from the standpoint of the history of science can be 
found in Haskins (1921). A modern edition in English with copious illustration and 
accompanying background material is available (Wood and Fyfe, 1948). 
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officials of his court to write vernacular poetry as well! It is clear that the 
imputed isolation experiments is entirely consistent with what is known 
about Frederick's interests and resources. 
3. The Experiment of James IV of Scotland 
3.1 Sources 
This experiment is reported in the History of Robert Lindesay of Pitscottie 
as follows: 
'The king gart tak ane dum woman and pat hir in Inchekeytht and gaif 
hir tua zoung bairnes in companie witht hir and gart furnische them of 
all necessar thingis pertening to their nurischment that is to say, meit, 
drink, fyre and candell, claithis, witht all wther kynds of necessaris 
quhilk (is) requyrit to man or woman desyrand the effect hierof to come to 
knaw quhat langage thir bairnes walk speik quhene they come to 
lauchful aige. Sum sayis they spak goode hebrew bot as to myself I knaw 
not bot be the authoris reherse. (Thir actis foirsaid was done in the zeir of 
god 1m iiijC lxxxxiij zeiris.)'7 
3.2 Authenticity 
Like the previous case, Pitscottie (1500?-1565) had no personal acquaintance 
with the monarch, nor personal knowledge of the experiment, since James 
died in 1513. 'Lauchful aige' is 'lawful age'. Exactly what is meant by this is 
unclear: it may have been that age at which children were thought capable of 
sin, that is, according to the Church, 7, or it may have been the age at which 
children ceased to be 'pupils' - 12 for girls, 14 for boys.s Pitscottie's final 
remark is clearly a signal to the reader that the reported outcome is to be 
regarded as a humorous invention, since his entire history up to that point 
and for a decade or so beyond is based upon 'authoris reherse' - hearsay. The 
experiment is, unlike the previous two, characterised as open-ended, no 
7 Robert Lindesay of Pitscottie's Historie and Cronicles of Scotland exists in several 
manuscripts. The (1899-1931) edition by AJ.G. Mackay (Edinburgh: Wm. Blackwood for 
the Scottish Text Society) is based on two of the oldest MSS. It is well-known as a colourful and 
unreliable history (cf. the remarks in Nicholson 1974:328, 627). The text reproduced below is 
from volume 1, p. 237 of Mackay's edition. 
8 This latter suggestion was offered by Professor G. Donaldson of Edinburgh University. 
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particular possible outcomes being specified. It is plainly a less satisfactory 
account evidentially, than either of the previous texts. Herodotus described 
Psamtik's experiment in an impressively detailed way and Salimbene's 
account, as we have noted, had certain features which make it an unlikely 
fabrication. But Pitscottie's lacks details of procedure and outcome and, 
indeed, has all the characteristics one would expect of a colourful fabrication 
- an uninhabited island as the venue (i.e. no-one could bear witness that it 
had not taken place) and a ludicrous outcome. It does, however, have two 
features that the others lack, a date and a place. The island of Inchkeith lies 
in the Firth of Forth, readily accessible from James' palaces in Edinburgh 
and Linlithgow. It was certainly visited by James during the 1490s for the 
purposes of falconry and he maintained a mews there (cf. Treasurer's 
Accounts9 ). However, there are no entries in the Accounts which relate to the 
experiment (such as, e.g., payments to the dumb woman). Moreover, 
Inchkeith was used from 1497 onwards as a repository for the victims of 
venereal disease, introduced to Edinburgh by the followers of Perkin Warbeck 
- a pretender to the English throne. tO It is a small island and it seems likely 
that the experiment would have had to be concluded before this use for 
purposes of quarantine. Of course, it could be that the date given, 1493, refers 
to the conclusion of the experiment. But if this is so, then the experiment is 
even less credible since James was only 20 in 1493. On the whole, then, we 
have no very good grounds for taking Pitscottie's story as genuine. Despite 
this, we have made very extensive inquiries in search of additional historical 
9 (Treasurer's Accounts) Compota Thesaurariorum Regum Scotorum: Accounts of the 
Lord High Treasurer of Scotland, ed. by T. Dickson and Sir J. Balfour Paul (1877-1916). 
These accounts, though incomplete for certain years (e.g., 1499), together with the Exchequer 
Rolls of Scotland, ed. by J. Stuart and others (1878-1908) provide a fair record of the official 
expenditure of the Crown. As such they are perhaps the most important primary documents 
for the royal history of the period. Indeed, there are few other reliable records from the 
mediaeval period in Scotland that survive. 
10 Mentioned in Edinburgh Burgh records (cf. Marwick 1869-82, 1871). Inchkeith was 
used in 1475 for a similar purpose - quarantine of plague victims (cf. Exchequer Rolls, VIII, 
364). Apart from these incidents, Inchkeith's principal function was as an important naval 
station. 
Chapter 5 Page 83 
evidence, but without any substantial results. There are no records surviving 
from either the Parish of Kinghorn (in which Inchkeith is located) or the 
Abbey of Inchcolm, a neighbouring island in the Firth. As footnote 9 shows, 
the surviving state papers are not complete, but contain no mention of the 
experiment. Neither do the unofficial contemporary writings of De Ayalall or 
the court poet Dunbar (Mackenzie, 1932). As well as that of Pits cot tie there 
are three other 16th-century histories, Buchanan (ed. Ruddiman, 1715), 
Drummond of Hawthornden (1655), and Lesley (1830). None of them mentions 
the experiment. The solitary ray of hope that there may be more to the story 
than frivolous invention comes from Pinkerton's 18th-century history (1797, 
p. 25) in which there is an account of the experiment (later embellished by 
Thomson,1893), which differs from that given by Pitscottie. Pinkerton was a 
normally reliable professional historian and we can be sure that he must 
have had good reason for giving a different account. But what was his 
reason? He cites, in addition to Pitscottie, a location in Buchanan (Chap.XIII, 
sect.7) but in Ruddiman's edition of Buchanan there is no mention of the 
experiment, at that place or at any other. Pinkerton's account runs as 
follows: 
'To make some discovery on the origin of language, two infants under the 
charge of a dumb woman were sent into the isle of Inchkeith: but the self-
taught speech has not been explained: and it is needless to add that it 
must have been original, and perhaps though there was some society, 
little superior to the brutish babble of those unfortunate beings, lost 
during infancy in extensive forests.' 
So, according to this account, there was (undeciphered) spontaneous 
speech. Pinkerton's own observations - 'it is needless ... ' show that he was 
acquainted with the great debate amongst continental philosophers and 
educators which took place at this time and which had as one of its foci the 
II Ambassador to Scotland from the Court of Spain. His letters are collected in volume 1 of 
Bergenroth (1862-68), and a translation of the material relating to James IV can be found in 
P. Hume Brown ,1891. 
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nature of feral children (cf. Lane, 1977, for a thorough account of this). It 
seems to us a distinct possibility that somewhere in that massive literature 
there is material relating to this and other isolation experiments but so far 
we have been unable to find it. It may be, then, that the last word has not been 
said about this putative experiment of James. However, it must be conceded 
that, on available evidence, it seems unlikely that the experiment was 
performed. 
3.3 Plausibility 
There is a mass of evidence which shows that James was interested in 
experiment and in the development of the sciences, particularly medicine. 
Moreover, like Frederick he was a collector of curiosities. To take the last 
point first, he gave instructions to his merchant seamen (all of whom 
engaged in occasional piracy) that he would reward them for any human or 
animal oddity (cf. Chambers and Thomson, 1855). It is also fairly certain that 
he kept and maintained a joined twin. There are accounts of this in Pitscottie 
(Vol.I, p. 233) and in Drummond of Hawthornden (1655, p. 69). We shall give 
the account which appears in Aikman's translations from Buchanan's Latin 
(for purposes of clarity): 
'About this time a strange kind of monster was born in Scotland. In the 
lower part of the body it resembled a male child, differing in nothing 
from the ordinary shape of the human body, but above the navel, the 
trunk, and all the other members became double, and were distinct, both 
in their use and appearance. They caused it to be carefully brought up, 
and educated, particularly in music, in which it wonderfully excelled. It 
also learned different languages, and in their various inclinations, the 
two bodies appeared to disagree between themselves, sometimes 
disputing, each preferring different objects, and sometimes consulting, 
as if for the common pleasure of both, and, what was remarkable, when 
the lower limbs, or loins were struck, both felt the blow in common, but 
when pricked or otherwise hurt above, only one of the bodies was sensible 
of pain, which distinction was most conspicuous in death; for, when the 
one body had died several days before the other, that which remained, 
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when the dead half became putrescent, wasted away by degrees. I write 
this the more confidently, because there are many persons of undoubted 
veracity still alive, who saw the prodigy.' 
Buchanan's dating of the monster's birth is 1490 and Pitscottie states that 
it lived for 28 years and, during this time was maintained by the court. (For a 
more recent case, see Gedda, 1951.) James' interests in medicine and science 
have been amply substantiated by Guthrie (1497) and Read (1938a, 1938b & 
1947, Chap. 2). His new university at Aberdeen had a separate medical 
faculty (albeit one devoted to the customary doctrinaire and theoretical 
methods of teaching) and he founded the more practically-minded college of 
surgeons and barbers in Edinburgh, whose graduates had to satisfy their 
examiners that they 'knew anotamell [anatomy], nature and complexion of 
every member humanis bodie, and ... the vaynis of the samyn, that he may 
mak flewbothomell [phlebotomy] in dew tyme ... (for) every man aucht to 
knaw the nature and the substance of every thing that he werkis, or ellis he is 
negligent'. Moreover, each member was entitled to canis in yeir ane 
condempnit man efter he be deid to mak anatomell of, quhairthrow we may 
haif experience' (cited in Mackie, 1958). 
J ames himself was an enthusiastic surgeon: the Treasurer's Accounts 
show payments to individuals who had their teeth extracted by him, and 
suchlike. In science, James founded what Read (1938b) has described as 
Scotland's first research laboratory in Stirling Castle around 1500. The 
director of this establishment was a mysterious Italian, John Damian de 
Falcusis (later appointed Abbot of Tongland - a sinecure) who came to 
Scotland around that time from Paris. Damian was an alchemist who 
became a close friend of James. He was provided with excellent facilities for 
his work, as the Treasurer's Accounts show, in addition to a position at the 
Court and luxurious garments of office (cf. Read, 1938b). There is no evidence 
either that he succeeded in multiplying his seed gold or that he was ever 
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seriously called to account. However, another of Damian's experiments 
apparently was subjected to public test - human flight! The experiment is 
described in William Dunbar's hilarious and savage satirical poem, The 
Fenyeit Frier of Tungland (ed. by Mackenzie, 1932) and also by John Lesley, 
Bishop of Ross (see Lesley,1830, p. 76). 
Like Frederick, we can reasonably suppose that James had an interest in 
language and poetry. According to the Spanish ambassador to the Scottish 
court, Don Pedro de Ayala, James was a wonderful linguist, speaking Latin, 
French, German, Flemish, Italian, Spanish and Gaelic, but Mackie (1958, 
p.118) regards this as a diplomatic embellishment. It is certain, however, that 
James fostered vernacular poetry, which flourished as never before (nor 
since) during his reign. Dunbar, whom we have already mentioned, was the 
finest of these poets and was attached to James' court. 
It should now be evident that it is wholly consistent with what is known 
about James that he should have carried out the isolation experiment. 
However, the direct evidence, as we have noted, is very weak. 
4. The Experiment of Akbar the Great, Moghul Emperor of India, 1542·1605 
4.1 Background 
Akbar's experiment is by far the most interesting of these royal 
investigations. In the first place, it is the only one that is adequately vouched 
by contemporary documents. There are three primary sources for the 
experiment: Abu'l-Fazl, Badauni, and Xavier (see below) - and a large 
number of secondary sources some of which, though not contemporary, are 
still of interest. Some of these are referred to below. In the second place, 
Akbar's experiment was superior to the other putative experiments in 
conception and design. Lastly, Akbar's experiment has received hardly any 
attention from psychologists or linguists this century. It is described as a 
matter of course, along with the other experiments in some 19th-century 
texts, e.g., Farrar (1865), Muller (1861, pp. 480-82) and Tylor (1878, pp.79-81), 
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but after Tylor does not appear to have been mentioned in linguistic or 
psychological texts until Panconcelli-Calzia (1937, 1955: reference only to 
Catrou, 1705 - a poor secondary source) and Borst (1957 -63 Iv, p. 2050: 
reference to the same source). Marx (1967) and Blumenthal (1970), though 
including surveys of early investigations, fail to mention Akbar's 
experiment. More recently, Hewes (1977, p. 98) and Blakemore (1976) have 
mentioned it, though once again without adequate detail or references. We 
'discovered' it by reading Panconcelli-Calzia (op.cit.) as a result of reading 
Marx, who evidently had not read it himself.12 Muller, as well as being a 
prominent linguist, specialized in Indian history and hence was thoroughly 
familiar with the Akbar experiment. However, he made little reference to it 
in his copious writings, possibly because of his rather exotic views on the 
subject, to wit, 
'It is useless to inquire whether infants, left to themselves, would invent 
a language. It would be impossible, unnatural and illegal to try to 
experiment, and without repeated experiments, the assertion of those 
who believe and those who disbelieve the possibility of children inventing 
a language of their own are equally valueless!' (1861, p. 480) 
Thus Muller takes the possibility of replication as an essential criterion of 
'genuine' experiments and, presumably, empirical observations in general. 
For a student of history this is a fairly extraordinary point of view! 
We shall begin by giving some relevant details of Akbar's life and 
character, since we assume that neither Akbar himself, nor the mode of life 
of a Moghul Emperor, is familiar to most readers of these pages. 
12 One may reasonably speculate that other investigations may come to light. For 
example, there is a tantalizing reference by M. Robert Reboul in Herve (1909) to an attempt to 
carry out an isolation experiment by Louis-Francois Jauffret in the early 19th century. 
Jauffret was the founder of the famous Societe des Observateurs de l'Homme. Hewes (1978) 
contains further details of this possible 'lost' experiment. Although we have described this 
method of investigation as 'barbarous', this last example shows that the method's appeal is not 
limited to the mediaeval mind. Indeed, at the time of writing this note we have received news 
of an attempt by a Californian group to obtain funds (and presumably permission) for such 
an experiment in the remote southern seas .. 
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The standard biographical source for Akbar for many years has been 
Smith (1917), which contains a useful, but biased bibliography of 
contemporary material. Smith, like most biographers, concentrates on 
economic and political aspects of Akbar's reign and, in fact, fails to mention 
the experiment. Smith's biography has now been superseded by Srivastava 
(1962, 1967), which is much superior. Good sources for the religious and 
intellectual history of the period are MacLagan (1932) and Aziz (1969). 
Akbar became Moghul Emperor on the death of his father in 1556. His 
early career showed no particular unusual features, except for a notable 
degree of religious tolerance (for instance he abolished a poll-tax on non-
Muslims and took non-Muslim wives) which may well have been adopted as 
a political expedient, and a taste for exotic sports, such as pigeon-flying and 
polo (played in the dark with slow-burning balls of lignite) as well as the 
traditional royal pursuits of falconry and hunting. Hunting of large game in 
Moghul India was a particularly bloody business, involving the slow 
encroachment over several days of a 60 mile diameter circle of beaters on the 
hunters located at the centre. In one such qamargha during Akbar's reign 
15,000 animals were slaughtered. 
The first sign of eccentricity appears in 1575, when Akbar built the 'Ibadat-
Khana (Hall of Worship) in his palace at Fatehpur Sikri, just south of Agra. 
This was, despite its name, a debating hall, built in the form of a cross. 
Akbar was illiterate and, naturally, greatly valued oral debate, although he 
possessed, and was said to be thoroughly acqainted with, a library of 24,000 
books and manuscripts. The four wings of the cross were occupied during 
debates by the Ularna (Islamic jurists and professors), the Sayyids 
(descendents of Muhammad), the Shaikhs (wizards and prophets) and 
finally, dilettante members of Akbar's court. Some details of the subjects of 
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debate are provided in The Dabistan13 and Badaunp4. It is 1578, however, 
which marks the intellectual watershed of Akbar's life. At this time he 
experienced a kind of vision and, as a result, adopted a thoroughly free-
thinking, though still spiritualised, mode of life. He introduced various non-
Muslim regimes, e.g., special fasts, into his personal habits, abandoned the 
murderous qamarghas (described above) and introduced into the debates in 
the 'lbadat-Khana Christians, Hindus, Jain Buddhists, Jews, Zoroastrians 
and Sabeans. He established himself in partial authority over the faith by 
means of the so-called Infallibility Decree of 1579 and invited the first of three 
Jesuit missions from Goa to his court. These missions failed in their object of 
conversion, Akbar having deep rooted objection to (1) obedience and 
submission to the Church and (2) dismissal of all but one wife, the latter 
action being, of course, politically impossible. In fact, it is clear that Akbar's 
interest in Christianity was almost entirely academic. He wished to 
introduce diversity into the debates in the 'Ibadat-Khana and also to obtain 
fresh ideas about possible faiths. In 1582 he promulgated, with the 
connivance of Shaikh Abu'l Fazl, his closest advisor, a new faith - the Din-i-
Ilahi - which was eclectic and ecumenistic in nature, bringing together what 
Akbar perceived as being the most valid doctrines of the religions that he had 
studied. This faith did not survive him. The language experiment, which we 
now describe, was carried out during the period 1578-82 and thus coincides 
with this great intellectual and spiritual crisis in Akbar's life. 
4.2 Sources 
We give below, in full, the three contemporary accounts of the experiment. 
13 The Dabistan is a Persian manuscript thought to have been written by one Muhsin Fani 
around 1648. It deals with various religions and, in particular, with the origins of Akbar's 
own faith, the Din-i-Ilahi The text given below is extracted from section V11l of David Shea's 
English translation (Paris, 1843). 
14 Mulla Abdul Qadir Badauni published a three-volume history in Persian (the second 
volume being devoted to the reign of Akbar) shortly after Akbar's death, the Muntakhab-ut-
Tawarikh. The whole work has now been translated into English and published in the 
Bibiliotheca Indica series by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. The text given below is from the 
translation of volume II by W. H. Lowe (1884), p. 296 
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The first of these is from the Akbarnama of Abu'l-Fazl.15 The Shaikh was a 
close personal confidant and advisor and, like Akbar himself, a partisan of 
free-thinking attitudes to Islam. Although Abu'l-Fazl's history is given a low 
valuation by Smith (1917) and also by other Europeans such as Beveridge (cf. 
footnote 16) and Haig (1937), this is called in question by Srivastava (1962) and 
by Aneer (1973). The work is often described as tedious, repetitious, full of 
pointless flattery and obscure allusions. That may be, but nothing factual in 
the Akbarnama has been faulted and the work was based closely upon state 
papers and other court records including aide-memoires recounting Akbar's 
every action and word. Akbar (like other Moghul emperors) kept a close eye 
upon posterity and employed scribes to follow him and compile these aide-
memoires for the benefit of his historian, Abu'l-Fazl. For these reasons we 
feel that the greatest weight should be given to his account of the experiment, 
which now follows: 
'One of the occurrences was the testing of the silent of speech. There was 
a great meeting, and every kind of enlightenment was discussed. In the 
24th Divine year (1578) H.M. said that speech came to every tribe from 
hearing, and that each remembered from another from the beginning of 
existence. If they arranged that human speech did not reach them, they 
certainly would not have the power of speech. If the fountain of speech 
bubbled over in one of them, he would regard this as Divine speech, and 
accept it as such. As some who heard this appeared to deny it, he, in 
order to convince them, had a serai built in a place which civilized 
sounds dit not reach. The newly born were put into that place of 
experience, and honest and active guards were put over them. For a time 
tongue-tied wet-nurses were admitted there. As they had closed the door 
of speech, the place was commonly called the Gang Mahal (the dumb-
house). On the 9th August 1582 he went out to hunt. That night he stayed 
in Faizabad, and next day he went with a few special attendants to the 
house of experiment. No cry came from that house of silence, nor was 
15 The Akbarnama, once again a Persian manuscript, was translated into English by H. 
Beveridge and published in 3 volumes by the Asiatic Society of Bengal in their Bibiotheca 
Indica series (1897-1910). The text which follows appears on pp. 581-2, sect. 393, volume III of 
that edition. 
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any speech hear there. In spite of their four years they had no part of the 
talisman of speech, and nothing came out except the noise of the dumb. 
What the wise Sovereign had understood several years before was on this 
day impressed on the hearts of the formalists and the superficial. This 
became a source of instruction to crowds of men. H.M. said, 'Though my 
words were proved, they still are saying the same things with a 
tongueless tongue. The world is a miserable abode of sceptics. To shut the 
lips is really to indulge in garrulity. They have hamstrung the camel of 
the Why and Wherefore, and have closed the gate of speech with iron 
walls. 
Verse 
Enough, Nizami, be silent of discourse, 
Why speak to a world with cotton in its ears, 
Shut your demonstrations into a narrow phial, 
Put them all in a phial and place a stone thereon.' 
We may note, for further reference, two points of ambiguity. First, it is not 
clear whether the speech, whatsoever it might be, is to be regarded as Divine 
or whether the type of speech that it is (e.g., Persian, Hebrew, etc.) is to be 
counted as Divine. That is we do not know whether Akbar entertained two 
hypotheses (no speech, some particular known speech) or three (no speech, 
some unknown speech, some particular known speech). Second, something 
'came out', viz. 'the noise of the dumb'. It is unclear to us exactly what is 
meant by this. Beveridge makes no additional comment here. Although a 
scholar of 16th century Persian might be able to make this more precise, it 
seems likely that the outcome will remain essentially ambiguous: were they 
simply 'noises' or perhaps a kind of language, however primitive? 
The second contemporary account is by Badauni. Badauni was an orthodox 
Sunni Muslim and detested Akbar's religious vagaries. His history contains 
much derogation of these tendencies and, accordingly, was not published 
until after Akbar's death. Srivastava (1962) regards it as bigoted and less 
reliable than the Akbarnama and observes that the translation of the relevant 
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volume by Lowe is inaccurate. 
'At this time they brought a man to Court, who had no ears nor any trace 
of the orifices of the ear. In spite of this he heard everything that was said 
to him, though the place of the ears was quite level. And in this year, in 
order to verify the circumstances of this case, an order was issued that 
several suckling infants should be kept in a secluded place far from 
habitations, where they should not hear a word spoken. Well-disciplined 
nurses were to be placed over them, who were to refrain from giving 
them any instructions in speaking, so as to test the accuracy of the 
tradition which says: 'Every one that is born is born with a natural 
tendency', by ascertaining what religion and sect these infants would 
incline to and above all what creed they would repeat. To carry out this 
order about twenty sucklings were taken from their mothers, for a 
consideration in money, and were placed in an empty house, which got 
the name of 'Dumb-house'. After three or four years they all turned out 
dumb and the appellation of the place turned out prophetic. Many of 
these sucklings became the nurselings of mother earth: 
My mother is earth, and I am a suckling, 
The propensity of children for their mother is strange, 
Soon will it be that resting from trouble 
I shall fall drunk with sleep on my mother's bosom.' 
We may note that the connection between the earless man and the 
experiment is, to say the least, obscure! The 'natural tendency' referred to is, 
of course, to Islam. The final metaphor is clearly for death. 
The third and last truly contemporary account is by Hieronymus Xavier, 
who had charge of the third Jesuit mission to Akbar in 1598. The account 
appears in a letter of Xavier's, which was published in a number of different 
locations16 • We give the translation by Beveridge (1888). A convenient source 
for this translation is MacLagan (1932). Xavier is reporting a conversation 
wi th Akbar himself: 
16 Xavier's letter (in Latin) originally appeared in a pamphlet by John Oranus of Liege 
(1601), Japonica, Sinensia, Mogorana, hoc est, de rebus apu~ eas gentes.a Patribus ?ocietas 
Jesu anna 1598 et 99 gestis. The original Latin and an EnglIsh translatIon appear In 
Beveridge (1888). 
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'He told me that nearly 20 years ago he had 30 children shut up before 
they could speak, and put guards over them so that the nurses might not 
teach them their language. His object was to see what language they 
would talk when they grew older. He was resolved to follow the laws and 
customs of the country whose language was that spoken by the children. 
But his endeavours were a failure, for none of the children came to speak 
distinctly. Wherefore at this time he allowed no law but his own.' 
Although there are some discrepancies with the account in the 
Akbarnama, the details are very similar and there is a perfect 
correspondence of dates. Xavier, like Badauni, attributes a purely religious 
motive to Akbar. Abu'I-Fazl is, as we have seen, much less clear about this. 
After all, according to Abu'I-Fazl, Akbar's own belief (in advance of the 
experiment) was that there would be no power of speech. It is interesting that 
the motive, even if religious, is still different from the motives of 
Psammetichus and James IV; which were ethnological. 
Thrning now to secondary sources, we have managed to discover five that 
are not far removed in time from the date of the experiment. These are 
Purchas (1626, p. 516), Sennert (1643), the Dabistan (footnote 13), Manucci 
(1653ff.) and Catrou (1705). Purchas' and Sennert's accounts are clearly 
based on Xavier's and add nothing to it. The others differ, in different ways, 
from the primary accounts and are given in full. 
From the Dabistan (ca. 1648): 
'In like manner, a number of children were put in a place called 
Gangmahel, where everything necessary was furnished to them; but 
none could articulate a letter; having remained there to their fourteenth 
year, they were found to be dumb, which made it evident, that letters and 
language are not natural to man, that is, cannot be used unless they 
have been acquired by instruction, and it is then only that the use of 
conversation becomes possible. From this the conclusion was drawn that 
the world is very ancient and language of long date.' 
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From Manucci (1653ff.): 
'Akbar had been anxious for a long time to satisfy two subjects of 
curiosity, which he kept in his heart. The frst was to know what 
language a child would speak who had not the use of speech or any 
master to teach it. The second was to find the source of the famous river 
Ganges. For the first of these inquiries he ordered the erection of a house 
with many rooms at a distance of six leagues from the city of Agrah, and 
directed them to place in it twelve children, who should be retained there 
till the age of twelve years. An injunction was laid on everyone that, 
under pain of death, no one should speak a word to them or allow them to 
communicate with each other. This was done, because one set of men 
asserted that they would speak the natural language, that which was the 
language of our first parents. Others held that they would speak the 
Hebrew language; others that they would not speak anything but 
Chaldean; while the Hindu philosophas and mathamaticians asserted 
that they must infallibly speak the Samscript (Sanskrit) language, which 
is their Latin. However, the twelve years having passed, they produced 
the twelve children before the king. Interpreters for the various 
languages were called in to help. Each one put questions to the children, 
and they answered just nothing at all. On the contrary, they were timid, 
frightened, and fearful, and such they continued to be for the rest of their 
lives.' 
From Catrou (1705): 
'It may be said, that curiosity and a thirst for knowledge were the ruling 
passions of Akebar. His indulgence of these propensities prompted him to 
a very singular experiment. He was desirous to ascertain the language 
in which children would express themselves, who had been kept in 
ignorance of the articulate sounds of any known language. The emperor 
had been informed, that the Hebrew was the original language of the 
human race, and the one, which all, who had not been taught any other, 
would naturally speak. In order to secure a conviction on this point, he 
ordered twelve children to be taken from the breast, and to be closely 
confined in a castle, which was situated six leagues from Agra. They 
had given to them, for nurses, twelve women, who were dumb, with the 
addition of a man, who was also dumb, to save as porter. The porter was 
forbidden, on pain of death, ever to open the gates of the castle. When the 
Chapter 5 Page 95 
children had attained the age of twelve years, Akebar commanded that 
they should be brought into his presence. He then assembled in his 
palace persons skilled in various languages. A Jew, who was at Agra, 
was appointed to the office of deciding, whether the language to which 
they might give utterance, was Hebrew. The capital furnished Arabians 
and Chaldeans in abundance. The Indian philosophers, on their side, 
contended, that the children would speak the Sanscrit, which is the 
dialect of the learned of the country, and holds among them the same 
place, as does the Latin among the learned in Europe. The ancient books 
of philosophy and the Indian theology are written in this language. 
When these children appeared before the emperor, to the surprise of 
every one, they were found incapable of expressing themselves in any 
language, or even of uttering any articulate sounds. They had learnt, 
from the example of their nurses, to substitute signs for articulate 
sounds. They used only certain gestures to express their thoughts, and 
these were all the means which they possessed of conveying their ideas, 
or a sense of their wants. They were, indeed, so extremely shy, and, at 
the same time, of an aspect and manners so uncouth and uncultivated, 
that it required great labour and perseverance to bring them under any 
discipline, and to enable them to acquire the proper use of their tongues, 
of which they had previously almost entirely denied themselves the 
. , 
exerCIse. 
These secondary accounts are of dubious value. To varying extents they 
differ from the contemporary accounts and, naturally, from each other. This 
is true even of Catrou and Manucci, and in that case we know that the former 
is directly based upon the latter. In the case of discrepancy we must (other 
things being equal) prefer the contemporary accounts. So we may reasonably 
discount the claim in Manucci that the children were not allowed to 
communicate with one another, which makes a nonsense of the whole 
experiment. Why undertake the cost and trouble of isolating a large group if 
isolating one child would be sufficient? The Dabistan is interesting on 
account of its remarkably perceptive conclusion. Catrou's is undoubtedly the 
most provocative account, since it comes closest to what we would suppose to 
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be the most likely outcome of such an experiment (cf. discussion below). 
However, without arduous and costly bibliographic research (which would 
very likely be fruitless) it'is impossible to evaluate Catrou's claims about the 
outcome of the experiment. As is commonplace in historical research, the 
state papers and other fundamental documents available to Catrou are now 
lost (Srivastava, 1962). 
At present, then, we are justified (or so it seems to us) in assuming that 
Akbar's experiment tells us only that a system of communication based upon 
speech cannot be created in a single generation. This is the strongest claim 
compatible with Akbar's data. It is possible that, had the period of isolation 
been longer, such a system would have been developed. Equally, it is possible 
that there was a rudimentary system of this sort but that its presence went 
unnoticed. The difficulty of distinguishing language from gibberish (cf. 
glossolalia) is well-known. 
4.3 Plausibility 
We would like to begin by drawing attention to the scientific isolation of this 
experiment of Akbar's. As far as we know there is no general treatment of 
the development of scientific thought in India (as there is, for example, in the 
case of China, cf. Needham, 1954- ). Islamic influence on the development of 
astronomy, chemistry and medicine in the West has been considerable, and 
Frederick Irs anachronistic empiricism can perhaps be traced to the 
Islamic faction within his court. Yet, a recent survey of the intellectual 
influence of Islam in India (Aziz, 1969) fails to mention any scientific 
involvement. 
Although in the case of Akbar it is superfluous to investigate the 
plausibility of his experiment, since the direct evidence is so strong, it is 
worth doing so since it shows that plausibility (obviously not a sufficient 
condition for attributing such an experiment) is not a necessary condition 
either. There is no convincing evidence that empirical procedures were 
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common at the time of Akbar in India. So Akbar's experiment must be 
regarded as inconsistent with what other information we have about his 
background and scientific interests. Indeed, the only grounds on which we 
might claim that the experiment was a plausible one are that Akbar, as 
shown by his activities in the 'Ibadat Khana, had a strong interest in 
fundamental religious questions, many of which are genetic in nature. But 
the tremendous costs of his fantastic many-sided debating forum surely 
suggest that Akbar regarded scholarly argument, rather than experiment, 
as the proper way of resolving such questions! Accordingly, we ought to 
conclude that it was not in character for Akbar to carry out this experiment. 
And yet he surely did, so it may be that, although it seems to be an entirely 
natural procedure, our practice of assessing plausibility may be quite 
valueless as far as the question of authenticity is concerned. 
5. General Discussion 
Plainly there is little to be gleaned from these experiments which bears on 
the genetic question. The only experiment with a relevant outcome is Akbar's 
and there, as we have already remarked, the outcome is ambiguous. The 
'noise of the dumb' reported by Abu1 Fazl and corroborated by Xavier could 
have been practically anything from silence to fully-fledged language. 
Moreover, in the absence of speech we would expect there to have been some 
gestural communication (see below for substantiation) and yet this was not 
reported in the contemporary accounts. 
The second issue to be dealt with here is more troublesome: can we, 
accepting the impossibility of contemporary 'royal investigations', do 
anything to answer the genetic question today? Our discussion of this issue 
will be brief and rather dense 
First of all, it seems to us that the classical question, 'What language will 
be spoken by children isolated from birth?' could and should be made more 
precise. A number of relatively free parameters can be recognised, as follows: 
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(1) the presence of one or more caretakers; 
(2) the number of children isolated· , 
(3) the a"es of the children at the start of the experiment; 
(4) the period of isolation; 
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(5) the set of communicative resources available to each ordered pair of 
individuals (channel) in the group. By this is meant the repertoires of 
detectable (i.e., visible, audible, tactile) gestures able to serve as signs; 
(6) the system for communication that is (by virtue of experience and/or 
heredity) natural to each individual; 
(7) the system for communication which has been established (by intra-
group contact) for each ordered pair of individuals (channel) in the 
group; 
(8) the communicative load during the period of isolation--that is, the 
interests, wishes, intentions, needs, etc., of the ordered pairs of 
members of the group insofar as they (a) are novel and (b) relate to joint 
action and interaction, and 
(9) the physical circumstances of isolation. 
For any particular experiment, some of these parameters will be constant 
((1), (2), (3), (4), the natural system of the caretakers, and (9» during the 
period of isolation. The remainder will vary with ongoing sensory and motor 
development (5), affective and cognitive development (8) or with all 
parameters (the natural systems of the children, and (7». When different 
possible experiments are considered, however, all of the constant parameters 
must be regarded as variables. In addition, some of the variable parameters 
may be varied between experiments: most obviously, selection of deaf and/or 
dumb caretakers and/or children will interfere radically with parameter (5). 
Although parameter (6) has a clear interpretation for caretakers and will in 
general be a natural language, it is less clear for the case of the children. 
What we intend here is the minimal system of meaningful audible and 
visible gesture which is given by inheritance together with (for points later in 
the course of an experiment or for later starting points) the modification and 
augmentation of this system which results from development of the systems 
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of variable (7). Roughly, for each child, the system mentioned in (6) will be 
revised so as to correspond with the union of the systems of variable (7) for 
each channel involving that child. Now, since the values of all parameters 
other than (7) are either (a) available for direct manipulation or (b) dependent 
on relatively autonomous psychological development, we may think of the 
array of values mentioned in (7) as the output of a very general time-function 
of the other eight parameters. 
The classical question may then be seen as a question about the value of 
this function (let us call it the language acquisition function, LAF) for a 
limiting17 set of values of its arguments, namely where no resources are 
available on any caretaker-originating channel and where !lQ system of 
communication has been established on any child-originating channel. In 
fact, it is evident that this is not only a limiting case of the general function 
but also an unattainably ideal one. In practice, no caretaker could be 
'pruned' of communicative resources and still be able to take care. Equally, 
children who were isolated without a caretaker before their communicative 
resources had developed to the point where systems of communication could 
be established would simply not survive. It is therefore quite plain that the 
classical question (construed as this ideal case) cannot be answered directly, 
Le., empirically. However, if we could discover the nature of the general 
function LAF (by determining its value for other empirically and ethically 
feasible values of its arguments) then we could give a theoretical answer to 
17 We shall not discuss the most extreme limiting case, where a single infant is isolated. 
As is well-known, there have been a number of celebrated 'natural' experiments of this sort 
(cf. for reviews, Panconcelli-Calzia 1935 & 1937; Zingg 1940, and Brown 1958 (Chap.V); for 
the most interesting such cases, see Lane 1977, Curtiss 1977, and the strange and possibly 
fanciful Armen 1971). It is sufficient to note that in no such case has the isolate shown signs 
of being able to communicate in a systematic way and to record our own view that it is 
inconceivable that any should, except for the sort of communication system that might be 
established with an animal caretaker. From the point of view of this paper, a more interesting 
'natural' experiment would be one in which two or more infants were accidentally isolated. 
However, apart from the dubious case of the wolf-children of Midnapore (Singh and Zingg 
1942; Ogburn and Bose 1959; MacLean 1977), who showed no reported signs of ability to 
communicate, there are no usable reports of such cases. 
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the classical question. In fact, we know a little about LAF already. For 
example, Feldman et al. (1977) have shown that in the case of only children 
who are profoundly deaf and who are raised by parents who deliberately 
inhibit conventional visible gesture, the output of LAF after 3 years or so is a 
system of visible gesture substantially more complex than the residue of 
natural gesture (pointing, etc.) employed by these caretakers. Further, it has 
often been noted (cf., e.g., Stokoe, 1974; Tervoort, 1961) that groups of young 
deaf children will develop (with minimal assistance or, indeed, despite active 
opposition) quite complicated gestural systems well-adapted to their 
communicative load. So it seems as if LAF has some limited powers of 
augmentation, a position which is also implicit in the hypothesis that the 
'creole continuum' cf. Bickerton, 1974) is the synchronic consequence of rapid 
development of an original pidgin by successive generations (Hall, 1966). 
Another kind of 'natural' experiment which bears on LAF is the case of 
twins. It is well known that a high proportion of twins (identical or otherwise 
- develop 'secret languages' for communication within the twin (cf. Zazzo, 
1960 II, chap.4). Although these are often marginal and simple this is not 
always the case. In addition to the more or less inscrutable cases cited by 
Hale (1888) and Jesperson (1922) there is the spectacular modem case of Po to 
and Cabengo (Orange, 1977)18. Whether such cases provide evidence for the 
position that LAF is an augmentative function is unclear but it seems certain 
at least that quite radical alterations are possible. Finally, there is a natural 
source of evidence which has only recently begun to be tapped, viz., cases 
where children with normal hearing are reared by deaf parents. Potentially, 
such cases are promising since they come so close to the conditions of the 
classical isolation experiment. However, modern urban cases are 
complicated by the factors of television and hearing relatives, both readily 
16 According to Edward Klima (personal communication), the 'secret language' of Poto 
and Cabengo appears to be a version of English. 
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available speaking caretakers. Some systematic work has recently been 
reported by Schiff and Ventry (1976) and Schiff (1979). The latter paper gives a 
comprehensive bibliography of previous, unsystematic case reports. While 
such children typically show eventual deficits which may persist through 
middle childhood (Schiff and Ventry, 1976), they swiftly surpass the oral 
language of their principal caretakers and, at any rate in the first year and a 
half of language acquisition, their oral language develops in much the same 
fashion as normal-caretaker controls. In Schifrs words (1979, p. 581) 
"children, when cognitively ready, need little exposure to the normal model 
language to learn to speak during the early stages of development". Certainly, 
there is nothing in this research which speaks against the notion that LAF is 
augmentative and much that speaks for it. 
However much information such natural experiments may yield, it 
remains unlikely that it will be sufficient to determine the function LAF. 
Moreover, the times pan of such investigations is perforce long and their 
moral character (given the alternative of intervention) dubious at best. A 
more practical, if less gaudy, method for obtaining further information about 
LAF would involve parents' voluntarily adhering to speciific communicative 
regimes for short periods during development whilst closely monitoring the 
systems for communication employed by the children during this period. 
Natural experiments which approach this characterisation have now been 
quite widely investigated (cf. the studies collected in Snow and Ferguson, 
1977). All that would additionally be involved is the element of control over 
caretaker-originating channels and control or measurement of the 
communicative load. 
As a final point, we would like to mention the old argument due to Hale 
(1886, 1888) that the geographical distribution of unrelated language isolates 
is correlated with the probability of abandoned groups of children managing 
to survive. Thus, in hostile environments, such as the Arctic regions or the 
Chapter 5 Page 102 
great deserts, no unrelated languages are to be found, while in regions where 
the climate is favourable and food is plentiful (Hale's favourite example was 
California) many unrelated languages are found. Hale used this presumed 
correlation as evidence supporting his view that abandoned groups of 
children would routinely re-invent language. This now seems rather 
hopeless, since the number of apparently unrelatable languages has shrunk 
so dramatically since Hale's time. The question which now arises is whether 
the ~ of language isolates in favourable areas constitutes evidence against 
Hale's view that rapid language invention is a routine consequence of 
isolation? That is, granting the possibility of rapid language re-invention 
under conditions of isolation, should there not be many more unrelated 
languages than there appear to be? We think not: the processes of 
pidginisation and creolisation show how massive and rapid the effects of 
contact can be. It seems more reasonable to suppose that unrelated language 
isolates are a consequence of geographical, political or economic isolation, 
rather than of natural isolation experimentsP9 
19 An additional ground for not discarding Hale's hypothesis is that it is highly likely 
that such natural isolation experiments have occurred and will continue to occur in 
politically turbulent areas such as Central Mrica and SouthEast Asia. The displacement of 
the Californian Indian peoples resulted in one known case (the Lone woman of San Nicolas 
Island, see Heizer and Elsasser 1963) which might well have been a case of the type Hale 
envisaged (but was not). Also, Moffat (1842, p. 10-11) in a discussion of the varieties of dialect 
found among the Balala and Sechuana Bushmen of Southern Africa observes that '[on 
hunting and scavenging expeditions] fathers and mothers and all who can bear a burden, 
often set out for weeks at a time, and leave their children to the care of two or more infirm old 
people. The infant progeny, some of whom are beginning .to lisp, while others can just master 
a whole sentence, become habituated to a language of theIr own .... In the course of a 
generation the entire character of the language is changed.' 
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Chapter 6: On Innateness: Nee rasa est, nee omnia tenet l 
This chapter presents a sceptical view of innateness claims made by 
linguists, notably Chomsky (e.g., 1980), and by some psychologists. Although 
the topic of innateness is much discussed, there is in linguistic circles a clear 
consensus that linguistic research can help us to discover aspects of 
language-relevant biological endowment and, for some linguists too, there is 
the notion that supposed biological/psychological constraints on what might 
be learned should have a shaping influence on the form of linguistic theory. 
The suggestion is made that as little as possible should be specified by the 
grammars of particular languages and as much as possible should be 
specified within a theory of universal grammar, the latter being a 
representation of innate endowment. 
So long as this tendency was confined to linguists, a sceptical psychologist 
could tolerate it as an aberration of outsiders, in the same sympathetic way 
that allowances are made for foreigners who are ignorant of local custom. 
However, in recent years the disease has spread to the formerly healthy 
branches of developmental psychology. Innateness hypotheses, supported by 
cognate arguments, are now commonplace in the literature of cognitive 
development. So it is time for the sceptic to give utterance! Part of my 
discussion has an autobiographical flavour and I will therefore depart 
occasionally from the usual impersonal approach. 
1. Preamble 
I am old enough to remember the fag-end of the behaviourist hegemony in 
the early 1960s. In those days the mind of the infant was wrongly regarded as 
a tabula rasa - a blank passive slate on which experience inscribed 
associations amongst stimuli and responses. My own enthusiasms were for 
the rather different views of Piaget, and of the group centred around Bruner 
and Miller at Harvard and my own teacher, Margaret Donaldson's group in 
1 Published as Campbell, 1988. 
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Edinburgh, who shared the view that the developing infant constructed 
representations of the world around him in an active, eventually thoughtful 
way and that behaviour could be explained only in reference to these cognitive 
representations and the intentional connections they support. While that sort 
of approach to developmental psychology enjoyed a brief period of popularity, 
it now shows signs of being overtaken by a new hegemony: in this new 
cognitive psychology, which describes itself hubristically as a branch of 
'cognitive science', the infant is represented as a tabula omnifera - a slate on 
which all necessary systems of representation are already inscribed. 
However, the model of mind is once again a passive one - the child plays only 
a trivial role in shaping the course of its development. In my view this new 
hegemony is just as repulsive as the previous, behaviourist paradigm. Why? 
Because it denies the existence of the 'struggle to understand' which is so 
obvious a feature of cognitive development to anyone who cares to look at 
children with unprejudiced eyes. Further, it replaces the previous wrong 
view of our relationship with animals with a new equally wrong one. Under 
behaviourism, differences between animal species were ignored because they 
were thought to be superficial and uninteresting. Under cognitivism, 
differences between animal species are emphasized and exaggerated. In 
neither paradigm is an effective comparative psychology of mental 
development possible. To clarify my own position, I think that there are no 
interesting systems of representation inscribed on the slate; I think that the 
representations that matter are actively constructed by the child in the 
manner adumbrated by Piaget and Bruner and I think that developmental 
psychology must look constantly at animal models if it is to avoid serious 
error. What I want to argue here is that this new tendency is not by any 
means forced on us, despite the urgings of Chomsky and Fodor. I will discuss 
two examples from infant psychology briefly and devote the remainder of the 
chapter to the many manifestations of the tendency in the field of language 
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acquisition. 
2. Infant Development 
The first example is the well-known phenomenon of categorical perception 
of phonetic contrasts in infants of a few months old. It was demonstrated 
originally by Peter Eimas (Eimas et al., 1971) that such infants noticed 
changes in voice onset time of synthetic stop consonants only when these 
changes crossed the boundary of around +35ms which distinguishes voiced 
from voiceless stops for most English speakers. Since a good many other 
languages exploit the same boundary in the same manner, this was quickly 
seized upon as evidence of innate preparation for speech perception. Infants 
in cultures whose language exploits a different boundary showed categorical 
perception with discrimination occurring at the same +35 ms boundary, so 
the discrimination is clearly unlearned. However, a subsequent experiment 
by Kuhl and Miller (1975) showed that the chinchilla - a rodent with similar 
auditory function to man - also discriminated VOT categorically at +35 ms. 
Since it is clear that chinchillas are not innately prepared for speech 
perception, the claim for infants should therefore (pending further evidence) 
lapse as well. However, it did not. Eimas, and even Kuhl herself, now 
systematically ignore the chinchilla result and maintain the fiction that such 
experiments demonstrate an innate capacity for speech perception. Of 
course, it is perfectly possible to represent the categorical perception result in 
this way, but it makes as much sense as to say that we are innately prepared 
to wear shoes, or to operate scissors. Certainly our shoes fit our feet and 
scissors fit our hands, but it is the feet and hands that have influenced the 
design of the shoes and scissors, and not vice-versa. In order to justify a non-
trivial claim about innate capacity for speech perception it is necessary to 
demonstrate that the functional requirements of speech perception (or of 
some closely-related auditory process) somehow shaped the development of 
the capacity. Unless we can establish a causal linkage of this kind as a 
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plausible event in human evolution it makes little sense to speak of innate 
capacity. Some may say that this is all very well, but the work still shows that 
speech perception in some languages exploits biologically determined 
structures, but I don't think the empiricist position in relation to language 
ever amounted to less than this anyway. That position might be stated in the 
terms that languages exploit pre-adapted structures. Just as speaking 
involves the cooperation of organs all of which have other prominent natural 
functions, so the perception of speech exploits the pre-adapted structures of 
the auditory system. 
The second example I will discuss is the claim for neonatal imitation 
made by Meltzoff and Moore, 1977. Meltzoff and Moore claimed that neonates 
would imitate mouth-opening and tongue-protrusion and that the precision 
of imitation was sufficient to justify the further claim that these imitations 
depended on the presence of a system of intermodal representation in the 
infant. The neonate's mouth movements cannot be monitored visually, but 
only kinesthetically (using the muscle sense). So Meltzoff and Moore argued 
that these movements must be represented in both sensory modalities, 
implying an innately-specified system of intermodal representation. Meltzoff 
and Moore's result has been enthusiastically received and is now routinely 
included in introductory textbooks as evidence of innate imitative skill and 
representational ability. It is also widely taken as evidence that Piaget (1951) 
was quite wrong to locate the emergence of imitation of unseen movements at 
around 12 months. 
Now, the data supporting Meltzoff and Moore's claims are muddy and 
controversial; the experiment has a history of subsequent instability, some 
workers finding effects, some failing to find them: those who do find effects 
have similarly weak data that may be just as readily impeached. However, 
even if clear evidence of neonatal imitation of these mouth-movements and 
some hand-movements were obtained, there would still be much to complain 
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about. First of all, the mouth and hand movements constitute elements of the 
baby's suckling repertoire. Mouth and hand movements stimulate the breast 
to deliver milk. This repertoire is found throughout the mammalian order 
and is undoubtedly fixed by heredity. These fixed actions are released by the 
stimulus of the breast and can surely be released by a wide range of other 
stimuli, too. In fact they are all performed regularly, whenever the baby is 
moderately aroused. So what has to be explained in neonatal imitation is a 
simple mapping of modelled actions onto a tiny repertoire. There is clearly no 
need for anything more in the way of intermodal representation than a 
crudely-specified stimulus-response connection! The neonatal cortex shows 
only rudimentary activity and so these behaviours are very likely under 
brains tern control. With the exception of Meltzoff, recent comment in the 
technical literature (see, e.g., Vinter, 1986) has ascribed the observed 
reactions to structures in the superior colliculus and has pointed out that (a) 
the imitations disappear subsequently when cortical mechanisms take 
control and (b) do not reappear until much later, around the time suggested 
by Piaget. Neonatal imitation then, such as it is, does not bear on the 
Piagetian account and certainly does not force the assumption of a system of 
intermodal representations. 
3. On Disparaging Apes 
To introduce the topic of innateness claims in language acquisition I will 
begin with a personal reminiscence. Some years ago I was enjoying lunch in 
a Paris restaurant just opposite the Maison des Sciences de ['Homme. My 
table-companions were several noted linguists and psychologists, to varying 
degrees committed to what is sometimes called 'the generative enterprise'. 
The subject of Terrace's botched chimpanzee language experiment (Terrace, 
1979) was being discussed, together with Seidenberg and Pettito's (1979) 
disparaging dismissal of the Gardners' well-known experiments. The 
discussants, or some of them, drew what seemed to me quite unwarranted 
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satisfaction from these two efforts, which I had regarded as rather crude, if 
commonplace, demonstrations of academic incompetence and malice, 
respectively. They went on to disparage the chimpanzee in general, mocking 
its efforts to master a system devised by another species and making the 
observation that if chimpanzees had any language-learning capacity, why 
hadn't they developed such a system in the wild state? I will return to this 
argument later. For now, let me say that it was at that moment that I decided 
I wanted no further part in an enterprise that sought to distance us from the 
apes in this way. It seemed to me, and still seems, anti-Darwinian and anti-
biological to attribute to ourselves much in the way of mental endowment 
beyond what we share with the great apes. We share a great deal: to mention 
a few shared achievements which are typically not found in other species, 
there is object permanence in the sense of Piaget (1954), productive imitation 
of novel models, insightful solutions of novel problems, culturally-
transmitted tool-use, and self-recognition in mirrors. Comparison of the 
course of acquisition of these achievements in man and ape is often 
instructive. In the case of sensori-motor development, research by Chevalier-
Skolnikoff (1983) gives us just such an illuminating result (see her Tables 6 
and 7). Treating the sequence of sensorimotor stages as a rough scale, Great 
Ape acquisition proceeds more rapidly up to stage IV (manual search for a 
screened object) but then proceeds much more slowly. The ape's rapid early 
progress fits the well-known neotenous relationship between ape and man for 
physical characters (e.g., hair covering and dentition are also more rapid) 
but she is then overtaken. Since most other mammals progress rapidly to 
stage IV and then go no further (this is the case for Old World Monkeys, for 
instance), a plausible hypothesis here is that stages I to IV are due primarily 
to genetically determined developments common to many mammals while 
stages V to VI may require the construction via some learning process of 
efficient mental representations of objects and space, as Piaget suggested. 
Chapter 6 Page 100 
I would like to return now to the argument that spoiled my lunch ten years 
ago in Paris - the argument that since chimpanzees had developed no 
language of their own, it was hardly surprising that they failed to develop one 
under instruction. This is a stupid argument and these clever men would not 
have made such a stupid argument were they not blinded by their prejudice 
that we possess, to use Chomsky's unhappy phrase, 'a mental organ' which 
the chimpanzees lack and which enables language acquisition. Chomsky 
himself has offered the same stupid argument, with his customary hedges 
and caveats (e.g. Chomsky, Huybregts and van Riemsdijk, 1982), and it has 
been much aped by fellow 'entrepreneurs' such as Lightfoot, e.g. 1982, p. 166:-
' .. the important question concerns not what an animal can learn, but 
what an animal does in fact learn under natural conditions. It would 
be an incredible evolutionary accident if chimpanzees had a usable 
capacity for humanlike language but in fact did not use it except when 
subject to laboratory training programs.' 
Why is this a stupid argument? Consider a Bushman and a native of 
Toronto. The Bushman has an extremely limited upper Paleolithic wood and 
stone technology and wears animal skins; the Torontonian on the other hand 
is thoroughly familiar with many technologies and has a complex cognitive 
culture - reading and writing skills, arithmetic skills and so forth. Why has 
the Bushman not developed these Torontonian technologies? Whatever the 
answer, it is most certainly not that the Torontonian has some 'mental 
organs' that the Bushman lacks. A rudimentary examination of what the 
Bushman learns 'under natural conditions' reveals a veritable host of 
Lightfoot's 'incredible evolutionary accidents'. Equally, it is stupid to 
conclude from the apparent absence of language in the wild chimpanzee that 
she is incapable of learning one. On the other hand, compare the Bushman 
and the chimpanzee. They differ genetically rather less than two arbitrary 
species of frog or mouse. Mouse zoologists would probably have heated 
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debates between lumpers and splitters about whether Bushman and 
chimpanzee should be classed as separate species or as different subspecies 
or races. So we have to look for some very tiny difference that will explain how 
it is that Bushmen twitter at each other in a purposive way, that they use 
portable tool-kits and decorate their bodies and so forth. Why should it not be a 
reasonable research strategy to attempt to account for the several small 
differences between Bushman and chimpanzee culture in terms of a general 
difference in cognitive capacity? 
That strategy is rejected by Chomsky and his followers. Instead it is 
proposed that the Bushman is endowed with a 'mental organ' which the 
chimpanzee lacks. This 'mental organ' is characterized in roughly the 
following way: 
Chomsky's Innateness Hypothesis: The Core 
1) Children inherit, as part of their biological endowment, a structure which 
specifies a sharply restricted class of grammars. This structure has 
various free parameters, some initially set to default values. When all 
parameters have been set or adjusted, we have a grammar for a possible 
human language. 
2) This structure is the mental embodiment of a theory of universal 
grammar. 
3) In the course of development, the linguistic experience of the child sets the 
parameters so as to correspond with the grammar of the language being 
learned. 
Ancillary Hypotheses and Devices 
4) Modularity: The mind is modular, a set of cognitive systems which have 
their own principles of development and functioning. The mind is thought 
of as an assemblage of 'mental organs', analogously with the body and 
physical organs. 
5) Poverty of the Stimulus: How do we discover what is in the system of 
universal grammar? Grammatical analysis suggests principles of 
grammar. If a principle is not obvious 'in the stimulus', then it is 
presumed to be a part of the system of universal grammar. 
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6) Psychological Reality: Hypotheses about innate structure or about attained 
structures (i.e., grammars) do not depend upon special evidence of 
'psychological reality'. They may be attributed to the mental equipment of 
the speaker/learner without further ado. This is the result of Chomsky's 
attitude towards psychological evidence from experiment or field study -
such evidence is not regarded as privileged over evidence arising from 
(mainly) analysis of informant judgments. 
7) General Learning Mechanisms: These are disparaged as useless and/or 
incoherent notions of negligible inductive power. 
The Corollary 
8) By studying our judgments about any language, say English, we can 
discover properties of every child's innate mental equipment (by means of 
the argument from Poverty of the Stimulus). Since these are properties of 
every child's equipment, they will be properties of every other language as 
well. 
In the main, it has to be conceded that Chomsky presents this argument as 
a hypothesis about the child's innate endowment, which may have to be 
rejected. However, it is difficult for an outsider not to see the ancillary 
hypotheses as assumed primarily for the purpose of forcing the inference to 
the conclusions of the core. For example, (a) that modularity is invoked to 
justify the encapsulation of grammatical principles from involvement with 
semantic, pragmatic or conceptual criteria and to impoverish the data that 
can be used to discover them by the child; (b) that the poverty Qfthe stimulus 
together with the disparagement of learning capacity is invoked to justify the 
currently favoured form for principles of universal grammar, namely as 
parametrized output conditions which require simple triggering; (c) that the 
ill! psychololPcal reality reguirement is similarly invoked because no 
psychological reality for such principles is ever likely to be demonstrated. 
It is worth demonstrating that Chomsky's presentation of his views on 
innateness, despite his caveats, is an exceedingly arrogant one, though a 
model of civility compared to the position adopted by epigones (e.g. Lightfoot, 
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1982). Consider the following remarks (Chomsky, 1981, p.71):-
'A factor that impedes the study of language and, more generally, 
cognitive development, in my view, is the persistence of certain curious 
doctrines that entirely lack empirical support or inherent plausibility, 
for example, the Piagetian dogma that language development must 
reflect sensori-motor constructions' 
To see that this is a pejorative assessment, let us make three simple 
substitutions:-
'A factor that impedes the study of language and, more generally, 
cognitive development, in my view, is the persistence of certain curious 
doctrines that entirely lack empirical support or inherent plausibility, 
for example, the Chomskyan dogma that the child's mind must reflect 
principles of universal grammar. ' 
In the remainder of the chapter I will attempt to justify this assessment of 
these 'curious doctrines'. 
4. Chomsky's doctrines 'entirely lack empirical support' 
As Chomsky himself admits, the argument from the poverty of the 
stimulus is 'non-demonstrative'. This usage recalls other American 
innovations, such as 'misspoke myself' and 'inoperative statement'. The 
argument is, more simply, invalid. This was pointed out elegantly by Bever 
(1982), as follows:-
Principle X is in UG 
Principle X cannot be learned 
Therefore, it must be innate 
Principle X is in UG 
Principle X cannot be inherited 
Therefore, it must be learned 
While Chomsky's argument conforms to the left-hand schema, the right-
hand argument is equally good, or bad, as you prefer. This reversal of the 
usual pattern of inference is justified since in no case are we offered an 
evolutionary account of how these putative principles arose. Vague claims 
about selective pressure for powerful grammars exactly balance vague 
claims about general learning mechanisms. Moreover, the inductive power 
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of natural selection is no greater than that of the despised Skinnerian theory 
of learning (cf.,e.g. Dennett, 1978, Chapter 5). 
So if we are to find empirical support, where are we to find it? It seems 
useless to search for direct genetic evidence for the hypothesis. In the first 
place, by hypothesis UG is a uniform trait, possessed by all speakers. Like all 
other mental achievements of man, language mastery has zero heritability in 
the technical sense. If there were substantial variation in the genotype (as 
Lightfoot apparently wishes to argue (1982, p. 99, Note 1) before hastily 
idealizing away from such variations), then surely selection would favour 
speakers inheriting favourable combinations of the relevant varying genes 
producing at best, pronounced variation in language mastery and at worst 
loss of equipotentiality for language learning. Of course, a trait may be 
biologically-determined even if it has zero or minimal heritability. This is 
what is claimed for general learning mechanisms, after all (cf. recent 
discussions of heritability of IQ). However, this is likely only if the trait has 
been subject to very strong selective pressure. Even such pressure is not 
always sufficient, cf. visual colour defect and infertility. Language, whatever 
else it is, is a recent achievement. Is it plausible that a few thousand 
generations could have eliminated the original variation in the presumed 
'mental organ'? 
At any rate in taking this view - that if there is an inherited UG it is 
approximately uniform - I have the support of Mary-Louise Kean, Chomsky's 
own student, who now works in aphasia research. Reviewing Chomsky, 
Huybregts and van Riemsdijk, 1982, Kean (1984) writes:-
'More often than not, the typical linguist reveals a serious lack of 
education and an unthinking attachment to catechism when 
succumbing to the temptation to discourse on philosophy, psychology 
and neuroscience .. 
I found myself wincing mightily over [Chomsky's] discussion of 
individual differences and developmental neuropsychology. Nothing that 
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he said was exactly wrong; but it is equally true that one could never 
appreciate from Chomsky's discussion that a, if not the central issue in 
the ontogeny of linguistic capacity is the fact that a surprisingly uniform 
capacity is supported by a physical substrate which shows a remarkable 
range of individual differences. This should be a serious issue for 
anyone that holds the view that human linguistic capacity is a biological 
endowment of the species in any non- trivial sense.' 
So 'genes for language', even if there is a UG, are not more likely to be 
isolated and identified than 'genes for intelligence'. There is, of course, a 
substantial association between the speech areas and certain brain areas 
around the fissure of Sylvius in the left cerebral cortex. There are two things 
to be considered here: (a) the degree of specialization of these brain areas 
during embryogenesis. What kinds and degrees of asymmetrical 
development occur? (b) the actual localization of function in the developed 
adult brain. Regarding asymmetry, studies of skull casts of early men 
suggest a progressive increase in the vascular supply to the Sylvian areas. 
However, the supply is increased bilaterally and, moreover, asymmetry is 
apparently reduced in modern man (Saban, 1983). Asymmetry has also been 
noted in many primate and songbird species (Galaburda, 1984). Regarding 
lateralization, a particular function has to be located somewhere. The 
available data (see Lecours et al., 1984) suggest variation in localization 
depending on age, handedness, illiteracy, polylingualism, employment of 
lexical tone and logographic script. Lecours' estimate is that only around 
25% of the world's population conforms to the classical BrocalWernicke 
theory of localization. 
We are left with the despised psychological reality, then, as a possible 
source of empirical support. The history of attempts to find evidence of this 
sort for the systems described by Chomsky is a dismal one of failure. I can 
think of very few psychologists who have pursued that route for long. We 
might hazard a little inductive generalisation that the future will resemble 
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the past in the context of finding evidence for his innateness hypothesis, too. I 
will discuss two examples of attempts to demonstrate the psychological 
reality of principles of UG. 
Matthei (1981) investigated 4-6 year old children's understanding of the 
notorious each other sentences discussed at length by Chomsky in the late 
1970's, for example, 
(1) The cows wanted the lambs to kiss each other 
According to Chomsky's discussions such sentences should be correctly 
understood as soon as each other is treated as a reciprocal anaphor, since the 
other principles determining interpretation are part of UG with 
appropriately set defaults, or so Matthei argued. So children who treat each 
other as a reciprocal anaphor should select the clause-mate NP as 
antecedent. Matthei found instead that in 65% of cases his subjects took the 
main sentence subject NP as antecedent. This result is typical of the success 
of the new enterprise. I include the example mainly to point out that 
Matthei's subjects did not understand each other as a free pronoun (as is 
claimed by White, 1984 and also by Lightfoot, 1982. Matthei was careful to 
determine (so far as this is possible) whether or not his subjects treated each 
other as a reciprocal anaphor beforehand, and to discard those subjects who 
did not. What Matthei actually says is, reasonably, that in their faulty 
interpretations of the multi-clause sentences, they treat each other as if it 
were a pronoun like the m (for which word a referent outside the clause must 
be found). 
Of course, there is no real leverage on the innateness hypothesis from this 
and other negative evidence. The supposed elements of UG can be supposed to 
be not yet triggered, subject to maturation and so forth and there is always 
the last resort of the 'no psychological reality requirement' principle. 
As a second example, Deutsch and Koster (1982) have investigated 
knowledge of binding principles for reflexives and free pronouns in sentences 
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of the form (equivalent sentences in Dutch, with identical structure). 
(2) Peter's father washed himself. 
(3) Peter's father washed him. 
Again, given knowledge that himselfis reflexive and him an ordinary 
pronoun, knowledge of binding principles A and B should ensure that the two 
sorts of sentence are correctly understood. Deutsch and Koster's 6-year-old 
subjects produced the pattern of error shown below, despite clearly 
demonstrating the relevant lexical knowledge. As in Matthei's experiment, 
the highest level NP - father in this case - is uniformly taken as antecedent. 
Error rate with Reflexive Pronouns: 2% 
Error rate with Non-Reflexive Pronouns: 98% 
In a second experiment, groups of children aged 6, 7 and 15 were 
compared in a task using mixed reflexives and ordinary pronouns. Deutsch, 
Koster and Koster (1986) thought that mixing the types together might induce 
the children to separate them by drawing their attention to the formal 
contrast. Certainly the crudeness of the original result disappears. Six year 
old children now make errors on both types of sentence in around 33% of 
cases; 7 year old children make roughly the same amount of errors but align 
with the findings from the previous experiments more closely. Their errors 
with reflexives are only 9%, but with ordinary pronouns 48%. Interestingly, 
even their adult group contained one subject who misinterpreted the free 
pronouns. In passing, these results of Deutsch and the Kosters are reviewed 
by Helen Goodluck - a participant in the generative enterprise - in the 
following favourable way, completely neglecting the import of the high error 
rate with pronouns (1986, p. 60):-
'U sing a picture-identification task Deutsch and Koster demonstrated that 
6-year-olds are aware of the reference possibilities for the reflexive in 
sentences such as John's friend washed himself and The friend of John 
washed himself, correctly preferring the friend as referent of the reflexive 
in both cases.' 
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I prefer the description of Deutsch, given in the later paper, which reports 
these slightly more interesting results as follows: 
'Children make errors not only in the resolution of coreference relations 
between nonreflexive pronouns and their antecedents, but also in the 
resolution of bound anaphora, with reflexive or reciprocal pronouns. 
The appearance of these errors is not consistent with a position that 
holds that the resolution of reflexive (or reciprocal) anaphors is a self-
contained part of the repertoire of linguistic knowledge which, at some 
juncture in the acquisition process, simply springs into being, like 
Pallas Athena from the head of Zeus.' 
A number of points might be made here, of a cautionary nature: 
1. Many of the experiments attempting to establish the psychological reality of 
principles of UG are not well conducted. There are obvious unnatural 
aspects of their design. If naturalised, more interesting results might have 
been obtained. 
2. For this defect Matthei and Deutsch and Koster can hardly be blamed. No 
one has found a really satisfactory method of studying the comprehension 
of any kind of sentence with any kind of subject. 'Naturalisation' normally 
supplies extra context which allows correct interpretation to proceed 
without need of close grammatical control. 
3. On the other hand, there are strong indications in the language acquisition 
literature that children in the range 5 - 10 employ pronouns in restricted 
ways. Karmiloff-Smith's studies (e.g. 1981) show a strong preference for 
pronouns to be treated as anaphoric to the theme of a narrative or subject of 
a sentence, with referentially-equivalent lexical phrases used to make 
other exophoric links. 
4. A positive aspect of this research is that it reinforces the view, 
strengthening with each issue of the Journal of Child Language, that 
grammatical development continues well beyond the optimistic estimates 
of age 5 or 6 suggested in early days of research on grammatical 
development. 
5. Adherents to the generative enterprise should at least have their 
confidence shaken that direct evidence of knowledge of binding principles 
will be easily revealed. It is also manifest that young children make quite 
gross errors of comprehension in these tasks inconsistent with any simple-
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minded hypothesis of innate knowledge of the principles. 
5. Chomsky's doctrines have 'no inherent plausibility' 
What could make the innateness hypothesis inherently plausible would be 
a demonstration of how the structure UG might come to be established from a 
presumed initial state in which it is absent by means of some evolutionary 
process. But the principles of UG, as parametrised, non-semantic output 
conditions seem quite inaccessible to any such selectional process. What pre-
adapted structure could be moulded into these forms by evolutionary forces? 
The generative enterprise provides no answer. I suspect the answer here is 
that if it is inconceivable that a cognitive structure should be learned. it is 
likely to be just as inconceivable that it should be the product of natural 
selection. 
Notice, too, that while the recondite nature of the principles currently 
formulated makes the 'argument from the poverty of the stimulus' hard to 
resist, it has the same effect for someone wishing to follow the other Bever 
syllogism: - the evolutionary 'stimulus' could not possibly provide selection 
pressures adequate to engender the binding principles (say); therefore, they 
must be learned. So current developments in 'the theory of syntax' serve 
increasingly to purge this school of linguistics of any conceivable biological 
connection and will force it, in my view inevitably, into scientific irrelevance 
and scholastic obscurity. Sic transit .... ! 
6. Postscript, 1992 
In the years since the present chapter was published, there have been a 
few interesting developments so far as this debate is concerned. Research of 
the type represented by Matthei's and Deutsch's experiments has increased 
in quantity, so much so that the exponents - finding difficulty in getting their 
work published in existing organs - have established one of their own, the 
Journal of Language Acquisition. Such research may have increased in 
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quality, too, if the recent survey by Stephen Crain (Crain, 1991) is a reliable 
guide, along the lines suggested at the conclusion of the preceding section. 
However, for my purposes it is sufficient to note that Crain freely concedes the 
failure of such research (to date) to provide convincing evidence of innate 
knowledge of presumed principles of UG. Crain promises that better methods 
reveal such knowledge (at least in certain cases), but his own work is not yet 
adequately published and I have therefore been unable to evaluate that 
promise. Crain's Behavioral and Brain Sciences review is followed by the 
customary long series of commentaries, mostly approving, but the only 
acknowledged sceptic invited to comment was James McCawley, who saw 
nothing to get excited about. 
Finally, it is worth drawing attention to the recent volume of collected 
essays by the doyen of British linguistics, John Lyons (Lyons, 1991). Lyons' 
fervent enthusiasm for Chomsky's work in the late 60s has now decayed, 
perhaps not so far as mine, but his discussions of language acquisition and 
language origins in Chapter 5 of that collection make strong connections 
with the criticisms and reservations of the present chapter. 
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Chapter 7: The Emergence of Representational Drawing 
1. Introduction 
Luquet (1913, 1927) described the earliest drawings of children as 
exhibiting fortuitous realism, meaning by this that although such drawings 
occasionally seem to resemble objects, such resemblance is only accidental. 
Kellogg (e.g. 1970) agreed that the earliest drawings lack content, and limited 
her description of the earliest stages to aspects of form, such as the elements 
involved in a scribble (principally varieties of line) and their placement on the 
drawing surface (top, bottom, middle, baseline fan, etc.). Although some apes 
have been successfully encouraged to make marks on paper with pencils, 
crayons or paint (see Morris, 1967, for review), their drawings also lack 
content and so far as formal features are concerned seem to go no further 
than the sort of placement patterns noted by Kellogg. 
More recent work has not altered this picture much: Matthews (1984) 
suggested that some two year-old scribbles might be attempts to represent 
dynamic aspects of an object, such as its path of motion, and Freeman (1980) 
showed that when asked to draw a nose, say, on an incomplete face, two year-
olds would often begin their scribbling in an appropriate place. Of course, 
these are modest claims and as yet only poorly supported. By three years, 
however, most children are producing new formal elements, such as closed 
figures, intersecting lines and points. Evidently they are equipped to produce 
representational drawings, yet it is by no means obvious that they are capable 
of doing so. Nor is it obvious how we might go about determining whether 
such drawings have a content and what that content might be. This chapter 
is an attempt to suggest a partial solution to these descriptive problems. 
1.1 Van Sommers' findings 
Van Sommers (1984) is a remarkable monograph dealing with drawing. In 
the chapters dealing with children's drawing, he puts forward two claims: 
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that children's drawings show strong idiosyncrasy and strong conservatism. 
These claims are based on a range of ingenious studies and demonstrations 
carried out with children of early school age, his youngest subjects being just 
over five. So far as idiosyncrasy is concerned, his basic demonstration is to 
ask a class of schoolchildren to draw some common object such as a tree or a 
nose. Under these circumstances a very diverse range of drawings results, 
with different children adopting radically different strategies of 
representation (see Figure 11). Figure 2 shows the attempts of a Scottish PI 
class to copy the drawing shown in the top left corner. The idiosyncrasy is 
evident and, as this example shows, unaffected by the shift to drawing an 
object represented in a particular way. Van Sommers claim is amply 
supported by many other examples in his monograph (bicycles, light-bulbs, 
tennis shoes, tape-dispensers, etc.) 
Turning to his claim about conservatism, this is supported by his studies of 
repeated drawings of the same object. When children draw the same object 
on successive occasions, there is strong resemblance between the repeated 
drawings. Van Sommers argues that this resemblance lies in the finished 
products, rather than in the details of execution, suggesting that children 
have a particular graphic goal in mind when constructing a drawing and 
are not simply repeating a stored sequence of drawing movements. In order 
to hinder this sort of motor memory from playing a part, Van Sommers' 
usual technique is to allow some considerable time, as much as a week, to 
elapse between drawings in such repeated-drawing studies. Figure 3 shows 
representative data from Van Sommers. 
In addition to persuasive demonstration, Van Sommers offers several 
experiments from his laboratory. For example, Jones (1972) had one group of 
drawers draw a complex object such as a segmented fan before seeing it 
disassembled and re-assembled. They then drew the fan again. A second 
1 Because of the large numbers of figures in this chapter, these are grouped together at the 
end of the chapter. 
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group made only one drawing, following the demonstration of the fan's 
structure. In terms of faithfulness to the structure of the fan, the (only) 
drawings of the second group were far superior to the second drawings of the 
first group, which rigidly repeated the naiveties of their first drawings. This 
result is perhaps surprising, since one might have expected the extra 
practice in fan-drawing to have helped the first group to produce better 
drawings. Although he does not acknowledge Kellogg's work, nor refer to it, 
Van Sommers' claims regarding conservatism are strongly consistent with 
Kellogg's view that children's drawings have a strong evolutionary 
character. In fact Kellogg and Van Sommers may be thought of as offering an 
account of the development of drawing which differs sharply from the 
standard stage theory reaching back through Piaget (1956) to Luquet and 
ultimately to Kerchensteiner (1905), namely, that a stage of intellectual 
realism - in which drawings represent what children know about the object 
drawn - precedes a stage of visual realism - in which drawings represent the 
visual appearance of the object drawn. Instead, Kellogg and particularly Van 
Sommers are saying that at any stage in development the way in which a 
child will draw an object depends more than anything on the way she has 
drawn that kind of object before. Again, this recalls Gombrich's claim for art 
history (e.g. 1972) - Art depends on Art, not on Nature. 
1.3 Identifying scribbles with content 
The findings of Van Sommers just described mayor may not be replicable 
with younger drawers. However, if they can be replicated, this provides us 
with a method for deciding when the scribbles of younger children should be 
ascribed a content. If a child makes illegible but similar drawings of some 
object over several repetitions, but different illegible drawings of different 
objects, then it seems unreasonable to deny that he has produced a drawing 
of that object: we simply do not understand or share his artistic conventions. 
This point about conventions or iconography is a standard one in art-
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historical discussions, perhaps even over-emphasised by some - such as 
Goodman (1969). There is no doubt, however, that there is an iconography of 
child drawing. After all, it is practically inevitable that drawers whose 
repertoire of graphic elements is restricted to lines, closed figures and points 
will have to adopt a more abstract style of representation than the adult 
norm. This abstract quality then leads to difficulties of interpretation. Such 
abstract strategies of representation occur with adult drawers, too, if the 
characteristics of the medium are sufficiently limiting. Munn's (1973) study 
of Walbiri iconography makes this point very clearly. Aboriginal skin-
paintings such as the ones shown in Figure 4 were at one time thought to be 
purely decorative, but Munn discovered that Walbiri narratives were 
commonly illuminated by drawings made in the sand with a stick. With such 
a medium, and the requirement that construction of the drawings should not 
detain the telling of the tale unduly, an abstract style was adopted: curved or 
straight lines, closed figures, points, etc., denoted a very wide range of objects 
(see Figure 5). In the light of this iconography it becomes evident that the 
skin-paintings represent traditional scenes or stories. 
The literature of child drawing is replete with similar examples. Two well-
known cases are Arnheim's (1954) famous drawing of a Man with a Saw 
(Figure 6), which represents the teeth of the saw and all parts of the man by 
means of closed curves, and Willatt's (1980) drawing of a tennis ball in which 
the closed curve represents not the projection of the ball on the picture plane 
but the outer surface of the ball (Figure 7). In this latter case, the 
representation of a surface by means of a line is quite alien to adult practice, 
of course. So we have good reasons for believing that what may be quite 
illegible to us might nevertheless constitute an attempt to produce a 
representation with definite content. Van Sommers' findings then offer up 
the possibility of a method to decide whether apparent scribbles might be 
representational drawings. 
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2. PreJirninary Observations 
I have collected repeated drawings, in the context of class experiments, 
from three and four year-old children attending the Department Playgroup in 
every year since 1987. In all cases, three drawings were made of each object, 
usually on successive days, although on some occasions an extra day 
intervened. The objects drawn were presented to subjects in a fixed order and 
with constant orientation. Subjects drew with extra-thick pencils of 
triangular cross-section on A5 paper. A variety of objects were used: scissors, 
comb, eggcup, dark spectacles, toothbrush and comforter (see Figure 8). 
These objects were chosen with the notion that they would all be familiar, and 
comparatively simple to draw, but that subjects would have had no prior 
drawing experience with such objects. Drawings were later hand-copied to a 
standard size and weight of line, and annotated for stroke order and 
direction. Inspection of these repeated drawings provided ample evidence of 
an infonnal sort that these pre-school drawers often produced very 
conservative series. Figure 9 shows the drawings of one very conservative 
child, Hazel. It is also evident that there is considerable variation in the order 
and direction of Hazel's stroke-making, despite the strong similarities of the 
final products and the circumstance that drawings were made only one day 
apart. 
However, not all drawing sets were as well-behaved as those of Hazel. It 
was often the case that the drawings resembled neither each other nor the 
target object, particularly with younger drawers. Figure 10 gives some idea of 
the range of resemblance found, using scissor-drawings to illustrate this. As 
is observed in the figure legend, sources of the obvious idiosyncrasy are not 
hard to discover, even in the case of a comparatively simple object like this. 
When a subject takes the trouble to attempt a representation of something like 
a scissor- screw, or to differentiate between the thick and thin teeth of a comb 
(as occasionally happened) this makes it very likely that the subject is not 
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'drawing what s/he knows' but rather making a definite attempt to draw 
what s/he sees. There were other clear signs that the Luquet/Piaget view is 
an inadequate account. For example, some subjects do take only one swift 
look at the object and then make their drawing without further visual 
reference to it, but this is by no means common: most subjects looked back 
and forth while drawing. Perhaps this object-oriented approach to drawing 
was encouraged by the fact that they were mainly drawing objects which they 
had never drawn before. However, even in the case of the eggcup, which is 
after all simply a small cup (which they might have drawn before), there 
were many attempts to represent the car-picture and sometimes even the 
personal name 'Nigel'. The latter finding was a most compelling piece of 
evidence, since the children naturally knew nothing of writing. Some 
striking cases of this sort are shown in Figure 11. In such cases there is no 
possible doubt that the drawing is caused by the object seen. 
When the child's response is a complex object such as a sentence, or a free 
classification or other arrangement of objects, or - as in the present case - a 
drawing, tried and trusted methods of response measurement fail. It is 
possible to count things and to make physical measurements, but they 
seldom yield useful measures and always seem to fall short of answering in a 
valid way to the form and content of the response. In consequence, it is usual 
to resort to the use of independent judges to determine characteristics of the 
response. As a first step towards applying such a method here, judges were 
invited to sort, say, all the scissor drawings from a group of children into 
groups of 3, according to artist. While this method often produced results that 
accorded with intuition, it suffered from the following difficulty. It was quite 
often the case that a younger drawer would produce three similar drawings 
of an object, although the resemblance between each drawing and the object 
was negligible. However, such a subject was apt to make drawings of other 
objects which could hardly be distinguished from those of the first! In such a 
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case we are clearly not dealing with drawings of the object but rather with 
varieties of a leitmotiv or signature. So the use of judges must proceed in two 
stages: a first stage in which all the drawings of one child are sorted 
according to object drawn, and a second stage in which those drawings sets 
that survive Stage I are put together (according to object drawn) and sorted a 
second time according to artist. Thus Stage I picks out cases where a child 
has drawn an object in a distinctive way, so that we have some confidence 
that he has indeed drawn the object. Notice, however, that there is no 
implication of conservatism here. The three drawings might be very different 
from each other, but share some feature which allows them to be picked out 
from drawings of other objects; this shared feature might (but not 
necessarily) be a common point of resemblance to the target object. In Stage 
II only those drawing sets which exhibit some combination of idiosyncrasy 
and conservatism (lots of one or the other, or a modicum of both) are liable to 
be sorted together. While it is tempting to call this combination of properties 
artistic style, it should be borne in mind that this style need not be constant 
across all objects. That is, a child could make repeated drawings of one object 
in one 'style', and of the next object in a different 'style', etc., so that it is not 
quite the ordinary concept of artistic style which is captured by this method. 
In view of these informal observations and decisions regarding method, a 
more systematic investigation was conducted, using a longer interval 
between repeated drawings, and with 5 drawings obtained of each object. The 
first modification was introduced to lessen the risk of 'motor memory'-
induced conservatism, and the second to deal with a statistical problem, 
namely that the independent probability of grouping three particular 
drawings in an arbitrary sorting of, say, 18 drawings is already quite high 
(around .01). Of course, this probability becomes higher if the groupings are 
not independent, as is the case in a sorting task (once 9 sets have been sorted, 
the 10th is determined, etc.). In consequence, if a set of drawings contains 
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those of a few very conservative drawers, the chance of sorting the remaining 
drawings correctly increases sharply. 
3. Method 
Subjects :Twenty-four children took part in the study, 12 girls and 12 boys, of 
mean age 3 years 8 months (range 3;1 to 4;7). They were studied while 
attending a Bridge of Allan playgroup, and tested individually in an 
adjoining room. 
Materials :The objects selected for drawing were a plastic comb, a pair of 
metal scissors, a tennis racket, a light bulb, a man's woollen glove and a 
small metal cooking pot. The objects were presented in a standard orientation 
on all drawing trials, namely: comb - teeth pointing to subject; scissors -
open, blades to left; racket - handle to right; bulb - fitting pointing to subject; 
glove - fingers pointing left; pot - handle on right. These objects were chosen 
in the expectation that no subject would have drawn any of these objects 
before, but that subjects would be familiar with them and would find them 
reasonably straightforward to draw. Drawings were made on A4 paper with 
thick pencils. All sessions were videorecorded to permit later addition of 
stroke order and direction, although no analyses of these features will be 
reported here. 
Procedure :Subjects were seen five times at weekly intervals. In each session 
they made one drawing of each of the six objects. A different random 
ordering of the six drawing tasks was used in each session. Each object was 
handed to the child for examination, then removed and laid on the table in 
the predetermined orientation. The child was supplied with paper and pencil 
and asked to draw the object. No time limit was applied. When a child 
stopped and looked up, s/he was asked if the drawing was finished. The time 
lapse of 7 days was adhered to rigidly where possible. However, due to illness 
there were one or two occasions when there was a longer followed by a 
shorter lapse before the weekly tempo resumed. According to Stanton (1973) 
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this long time interval does not affect the conservative nature of older 
children's drawing sequences. 
Judging: The 720 drawings (24 children x 6 objects x 5 drawings) were 
handcopied onto 9x7cm. cards to eliminate gross differences in size, weight of 
stroke, etc. No information regarding stroke order or direction was marked 
on these hand-copies at this stage.These drawings were sorted by two sets of 
judges. In Stage I, 12 judges were used. Each judge carried out four sorting 
tasks - sorting the entire corpus of 30 drawings from each of four children. 
Children were assigned to judges so that each child's drawings were sorted 
twice, by different judges of course. The judges were not told what objects had 
been drawn, but were told that there were 5 drawings of 6 different objects, 
and that their task was to try to sort the drawings according to object drawn. 
A relatively strict criterion was adopted to decide (for a given object and child) 
whether the child had drawn the object distinctively (when compared with 
other objects). Both judges had to have included at least four of the five 
drawings in a sorted group. If 2 judges sort 30 drawings randomly into 6 sets 
of 5, the probability of this criterion being satisfied is about .00003 (see Section 
6). The reason for choosing such a tough criterion was not simply the desire 
to stay well on the right side of chance, but also to make sure that the huge set 
of drawings was substantially reduced so that sorting according to artist in 
Stage II would not be too burdensome. For example, if all drawing sets had 
survived Stage I, judges in the second Stage would have had to sort sets of 120 
drawings each! In the event, 220 drawings, comprising 44 drawing-sets 
produced by 13 children, survived Stage I. 
Those drawing sets which survived Stage I were combined according to 
object, so that all the scissors-drawings, all the comb-drawings, etc. were 
grouped together. These assemblages of drawings - which varied in size from 
20 to 55, depending on the outcome of the judging process in Stage I - were 
then sorted by a second group of 12 judges. Each judge sorted one such 
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assemblage. Since there were 6 objects and 12 judges, this was arranged so 
that each assemblage was sorted by two different judges. Once again, the 
judges were told nothing about the object depicted, but only that each drawer 
had made 5 drawings of the object and that their task was to sort the 
drawings according to artist. To determine (for a given object and child) 
whether the object had been drawn with consistent and distinctive 'style' 
(when compared with other children), a more liberal criterion was adopted, 
since there was now no need for further reduction of material, of both judges 
having to have included three of the five drawings of the object in a sorted 
group. The probability of 2 judges sorting N drawings into groups of 5 (19 < N 
< 55) lies between .084 and .0016 (see Section 6). 
The judges greatly enjoyed these sorting tasks and would not relinquish 
the material until they were fully satisfied that they had done the best possible 
job. They were sometimes quite sceptical when informed about the nature of 
the objects drawn at the conclusion of the judging process, and were always 
eager to see the correct solutions to the task. Judges varied greatly in time 
taken, but some idea can be got of the zeal with which they tackled this 
aesthetic task by observing that times exceeding two hours were recorded on 
two occasions! 
4. Results 
Stage I: As noted above, only 44 drawing-sets, from 13 subjects, survived this 
stage of judging. This reduction was more severe than experience with 
children in the Department Playgroup had suggested. Perhaps differences in 
population were responsible: it is also the case that the subjects used in this 
study were slightly younger (they were tested in October, whereas the class 
experiments referred to in section 2 always took place in mid- November. 
Intake to playgroups is of course standard, at third birthday or later. The 
drawings of two subjects whose drawings were all eliminated at this stage 
are shown in Figures 12 and 13. John (3;1) employed a simple closed curve or 
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spiral, with the occasional addition of a line or smudge, for most of his 
drawings. Louise (3;4) produced more effortful drawings certainly, and 
sometimes achieved a tolerable resemblance, but her habit of including the 
kind of all-purpose sun-figure drawing much discussed by Rhoda Kellogg 
derailed the sorting process in every case. The drawings of two subjects, 
Angela (4;7) and William (3;10), whose drawings all survived this stage are 
shown in Figures 14 and 15. 
Table 1 shows the drawing sets and children who survived this stage of 
judging. 
Table 1: Subjects who produced drawings sets judged as distinctive 
Child Age Comb Glove Scissors Pot Bulb Racket Total 
Angela 4·7 + + + + + + 6 , 
William 3·10 , + + + + + + 6 
John 4·7 + + + + 4 , 
Martin 4·7 + + + + 4 , 
Laura 4·0 + + + + 4 , 
Jamie 3·10 + + + + 4 , 
Duncan 3·6 , + + + + 4 
Shonagh 3·8 + + + 3 , 
Claire 4·4 + + 2 , 
Kara 3·9 + + 2 , 
Joe 3·6 + + 2 , 
Graeme 3·4 + + 2 , 
Stewart 3·11 + 1 , 
Total 11 10 9 6 4 4 44 
It is evident that there is a strong link with age: in fact the correlation 
between age and number of sets surviving is r=.627 (N=24, p<.OI). There was 
no effect of subject sex on number of sets surviving (t=.992, df=22, p=.35). Table 
1 shows substantial differences between objects. Presumably these are due to 
differences in distinctiveness among the objects which are 'inherited' by the 
drawings. 
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Stage II: Twenty-five drawing sets from 10 children survived this second 
stage of judging. Clearly distinctiveness within a child's output does not 
guarantee distinctiveness between children. 
Table 2: Numbers of drawing sets judged as consistent in 'style' 
Child Age Comb Glov Scis Pot Rack Bulb N N-Stage I Prop 
Jamie 3·10 , + + + + 4 4 1.00 
Angela 4·7 , + + + + 4 6 0.67 
Shonagh 3·8 , + + + 3 3 1.00 
Martin 4·7 , + + + 3 4 0.75 
Laura 4·0 , + + + 3 4 0.75 
William 3·10 , + + + 3 6 0.50 
John 4·7 , + + 2 4 0.50 
Kara 3·9 , + 1 2 0.50 
Joe 3·6 , + 1 2 0.50 
Duncan 3·6 , + 1 4 0.25 
Claire 4·4 , 0 2 0.00 
Stewart 3·11 , 0 1 0.00 
Graeme 3·4 , 0 2 0.00 
Total 5 5 4 4 4 3 25 
Total-Stage I 11 10 9 6 4 4 44 
When assessing the relationship between age of drawer and survival of 
drawings in this stage, two measures seem worth examining: the number of 
surviving drawing sets, and the proportion of surviving drawing sets. The 
latter measure is clearly more appropriate, since it is independent of the 
number surviving Stage 1. However, proportions are bound to be very 
unreliable with bases as low as 1 (Stewart) and no higher than 6 (Angela, 
William). Fortunately, both correlations are low and non-significant: for 
number of drawing sets surviving, r=.377 (N=13, p=.2); for proportion of 
drawing sets surviving, r=.176 (N=13, p=.5). Table 2 shows the patterns of 
survival through this second stage of judging. 
Figures 16-21 show all 44 sets surviving Stage I, with those surviving Stage 
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II marked with a 'II'. Inspection of these drawings sets reveals the sources 
of style very plainly. Some comments are offered below:-
Combs: Most distinctive are Jamie's, with a unique sawtooth representation 
of the teeth and a variety of strange representations of the crosspiece. Kara 
omits the crosspiece from all her drawings. Only Laura attempts to 
distinguish thick and thin teeth, but she does not do so consistently. It seems 
a fairly remarkable feat of judging to distinguish Angela's and Martin's 
drawings! 
Gloves: Jamie's sawtooth fingers are again distinctive, as are William's 
linear representations for both fingers and hand. Only Shonagh draws a 
pure outline. Laura draws a square hand and invariably 3 fingers. 
Scissors: John succeeds in crossing the blades, a feat which lies beyond the 
reach of most young scissor-drawers, and all others here save Angela, whose 
struggles with this difficult problem lead her in different directions and 
confuse the judges. Kara, Jamie and Laura, though they do not achieve a 
satisfactory crossing, make different sorts of failed attempts. 
Pots: Shonagh's pots have distinctive solid handles, and Joe's wavy linear 
handles are also distinctive. The source of Martin's distinctiveness might be 
the oval shape of his pots. 
Rackets: With only 20 drawings to be sorted, this set (and the set of20 bulb 
drawings) should provide a relatively straightforward task for the judges. 
However, the 4 sets of racket-drawings are so distinctive that they should be 
sortable regardless of the size of the group to be sorted. Angela's first racket is 
quite unlike later drawings; rather more puzzling is William's abandonment 
of a distinctive style on the 5th drawing. 
Bulbs: Only Jamie, who consistently represents the interior parts of the 
lightbulb, seems to achieve the level of distinctiveness that would be likely to 
survive in a larger set. 
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5. Discussion 
The judging method adopted seems to work well in Stage I, since the size of 
set to be sorted is constant, and can be made sufficiently large to meet criteria 
of arbitrary severity. Application of the method shows that many drawings 
which are inadequate (in the sense that they do not resemble the object to any 
great degree and do not permit identification of the object drawn) are 
nevertheless drawings of the object. Survival of drawings in Stage I is related 
to age of drawer at a satisfactory level (comparable or better than that found 
for intelligence test items, for example). Considering the ages of the sample 
studied here, it looks as if most children begin to make drawings which vary 
in a stable way with the object drawn between 3;6 and 4;0. 
The judging method worked less well in Stage II, because of the 
considerable variation in the sizes of set to be sorted. However, there are 
indications that the combinations of idiosyncrasy and conservatism that 
constitute 'style' are not particularly age-dependent, and are not constant 
either within drawers across objects or within objects across drawers. So far 
as the former kind of constancy is concerned, it was observed here only with 
Jamie. As for the latter kind, although racket and perhaps bulb drawings 
were well sorted, there were such small numbers of these that it would be 
unwise to attach any significance to the observation. It is doubtful, therefore, 
whether the strong consistency of 'style' observed by van Sommers with older 
drawers is exhibited by these beginners. However, it should be noted that the 
diagnosis of content in early drawings does not depend on this factor of 
'style': Stage I is sufficient to establish whether or not the child is drawing 
the object. 
The technique of repeated drawing of a presented object, when combined 
with the judging method of Stage I, therefore provides the drawing 
researcher with a tool to answer this important question. It also reveals 
particular problems encountered by the beginning drawer in a compelling 
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way. The scissor drawings, for instance, make it clear that representation of 
the crossing of the scissor blades is not just difficult for most children: rather, 
they respond to it with systematic error. 
Perhaps the most difficult question to answer about early drawings is 
whether the drawing is in any real sense a representation of the object 
drawn. Our technique allows us only to say whether drawings vary with the 
object drawn, which is not the same thing. Some drawings collected, such as 
those shown in Figure 9, are undoubtedly caused by the object drawn, but 
again, causation is not a sufficient condition for representation. There is no 
functional link between drawing and object in these tasks (as there is between 
a map and the space mapped, for instance). Perhaps tasks can be contrived 
in which such a functional link is established, so that the child's ability to 
regard the drawing as standing for the object can be assessed. For the 
moment, however, all that can be said on this difficult question is that if these 
earliest drawings have real representational content, then that would be a 
finding consistent with other work. De Loache (1987) suggested that children 
around 2;6 were able to grasp the representational link between a model room 
and the real room modelled. However, later research by the Sheffield group 
(e.g. Blades and Spencer, in press) and by my own students (Rutland, 
Custance and Campbell, submitted) has cast doubt on De Loache's result. 
The crucial insight is due to Blades and Spencer, namely that in De Loache's 
task objects are hidden under unique objects (there is just one couch, one 
chair, etc.). If the hiding place is not unique (more than one chair, etc.) then 
children do not begin to succeed in these tasks either with models (Blades and 
Spencer) or maps (Rutland et al) until late in their third year. So it seems as if 
children begin to use spatial representations, such as maps and models, at 
approximately the same stage of development that they begin to make 
drawings which vary in a stable fashion with the object drawn. It is therefore 
plausible that the key development in all three cases might be the ability to 
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think about (that is, mentally represent) the relative positions of parts of an 
object extended in space. 
6. Appendix: Calculation of probabilities 
Let S(N,G,K) be the number of distinct ways of sorting N objects into G groups 
of size K. Suppose the N objects belong to G types, with K objects of each type. 
The initial problem is to calculate the number of distinct ways of sorting the 
N objects into G groups of size K, such that at least r (where r ~ K) objects 
belonging to some specified type are grouped together. Let this number be 
S(N,G,K; ~r) and let S(N,G,K; r) be the number of distinct ways of sorting the 
N objects into G groups of size K, such that exactly r (r ~ K) objects belonging 
to some specified type are grouped together. LetC(X Y) represent the number 
of distinct ways of selecting Y objects from a set of X objects. Of course, by a 
well-known counting rule:-
1) C(XY) = ~X=-r.....!_ 
(X-Y)! Y! 
N objects may be arranged in sequence in N! ways, and placed in sorting 
bins, K at a time, working along the sequence. There are therefore N! ways of 
sorting N objects into G groups of size K. However, not all of these sorts are 
distinct: the objects in each bin may be rearranged in K! ways, and the bins 
themselves may be rearranged in G! ways, without affecting the identity of a 
sort. It follows that:-
2) S(N,G,K) = N! 
(K!)G G! 
S(N,G,K; ~r) will be calculated cumulatively, since direct calculation involves 
double-counting problems. Thus:-
3) S(N,G,K; ~r) = L S(N,G,K; i) 
i=r to K 
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To count SCN,G,K; r), notice that:-
(i) there are C (K r) ways of selecting r objects of the specified type, 
(ii) there are C((N-K) (K-r)) ways of selecting objects of other types so as to 
complete the group of size K, 
(iii) the remaining N-K objects must be sorted into G-1 groups of size K, and 
this can be done in 8{N-K,G-1,K) distinct ways. 
(iv) provided r ~ K/2, no other group will contain as many as r objects of the 
specified type. The results below are valid only for r ~ K/2. 
It follows from (i) to (iv) that:-
4) SCN,G,K; r) = C(K r) C((N-K) (K-r» SCN-K,G-1,K) 
Let P(N,G,K; ~r) be the probability that in a random sort ofN objects into G 
groups of size K at least r objects of some specified type are in the same sorted 
group. Then:-
5) P(N,G,K; ~r) = _8<N.G.K: >r) 
SCN,G,K) 
- 1 C(K i) CCCN-K) CK-i» SCN-K,G-1,K) 
i=r toK-------------
SCN,G,K) 
= 1 CCK i) CCCN-K) CK-i») PCN,G,K; K) 
i=r to K 
The required probabilities may now be calculated as follows:-
PC30,6,5; 5) = 8<30-5.6-1.5) = 
SC30,6,5) 
25! (51)6..ill = .0000421 
C5!)45! 30! 
P(30,6,5; ~4) = (CC5 4) CC25 1) +1) PC30,6,5; 5) = 126 x .0000421 = .005305 
In the first cycle of judging, the criterion adopted was that, for a given 
object and child, each judge had to have included at least 4 of the 5 objects in a 
sorted group. The probability of this criterion being satisfied when sorting is 
Chapter 7 Page 136 
random (i.e. when the judges have no basis for sorting) is clearly the square 
ofP(30,6,5; ~4), namely .000028 
In the second cycle of judging the sets to be sorted ranged in size from 20 to 
55. Since once again two judges were used, the squares of the associated 
probabilities are the relevant values, as follows:-
p2 (20,4,5; ~3) =.0844 (Bulbs and Rackets) 
p2 (30,6,5; ~3) =.0173 (Pots) 
p2 (45,9,5, ~3) =.0035 (Scissors) 
p2 (50,10,5, ~3) =.0023 (Gloves) 
p2 (55,11,5, ~3) =.0016 (Combs) 
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Figure 1: Noses (above) and Trees drawn by a single class, age 5;6 to 7;0, from 
an Australian primary school (Van Sommers, 1984, pp. 162-3). 
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Figure 2: Copies of the 'caterbee' shown in the top left corner, produced by a 
single PI class, age approx.5 to 6, from a Scottish Primary school. 
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Figure 3: Ten successive drawings from life of a canvas tennis shoe by three 
children, from Van Sommers, 1984, p.206 
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(2.3). 
c 
1. Wallaby 2. Opossum 3. Fighting stick 
1. Thigh design. 0= rock hole. UU=Wallabies drinking. 
2. Thigh design. UU = two opossums sitting. According to the asso-
ciated .. ory. the elements specify a male and female opossum. In the 
story. the dreamer-a man-and his wife are Identified with the opos-
sums. O=meat. The two opossums sit eating meat. This Is probably also 
an allusion to sexual Intercourse for which "eating" Is a standard meta-
phor. No explanation was given for the surrounding ovals. 
3. U=woman sitting at a yawalyu ceremony. /=fighting stick lying 
down behind her. 
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Figure 4: Yawalyu (Walbiri women's decorative thigh paintings), from 
Munn, 1973, p. 83. 
Figure 1 (continued) 
Element Range of meanings 
8. Grove of trees 
~ 
e.n n Hut 
10. --; Actor sitting Actor sitting 
11. /)')11111 Creek bed 
Blanket or "bed" 
12. C) Food or water scoop 
Baby carrier 
Shield 
Spear thrower 
Oval "bed" (ngura). hollow 
In ground for sleeping 
Category description 
Place marker used for trees 
only. usually for depicting 
shade in which a 
kangaroo is lying 
Enclosure for living 
Actor in static position. 
I.e., In contrast to 2, 3, 
4, but not prone (In 
contrast with 1) 
A striated or somewhat 
crumpled space on 
which actor may rest 
Oval. hollow containers, 
and related forms 
Figure 5: 'Sand Story' graphic elements on which designs like those in 
Figure 4 are based. 
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Figure 6: Objects used for repeated life drawing by pre-school children, aged 3 
to 5 years. 
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Scissors 
0;0 ~ I 
Comb I' 
Eggcup 
Spectacles 
Toothbrush 
. IJ'>~ J-~ 
I f 
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Comforter 
Figure 7: Hazel (4;6) makes repeated drawings which show a considerable 
degree of conservatism. 
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DRA. WINGS-OF SCISSORS MADE ON 
TIffiEE SUCCESSIVE DAYS 
Idiosyncrasy arises because of:-
(1) Variation in solutions to the 
problem of representing the joining 
of the scissor blades 
4;7 
Paola 
4;0 
Stefano r t1t 
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EGGCUP DBA. WINGS BY ROSA (4;6) & HEIDI (4;5) 
R.osa 
.. 
TOOTHBRUSH DRAWINGS BY HAZEL (4;7) & HEIDI (4;5) 
it 
I V' t ) ? 
). ( \J1-
Note the attempts to draw "Nigel", the car, the ribs of the toothbnlsh 
and the legend "WISDOM"! 
Figure 9: Repeated drawings showing attempts to reproduced written 
material on the objects. 
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Figure 10: Repeated drawings by John (3;1). These drawing sets were all 
eliminated in the first stage of judging. 
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Figure 11: Repeated drawings by Louise (3;4). These drawing sets were all 
eliminated in the first stage of judging. 
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Figure 12: Repeated drawings by Angela (4;7). These drawing sets all 
survived the first stage of judging. 
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Figure 13: Repeated drawings by William (3;10). These drawing sets all 
survived the first stage of judging. 
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Figure 14: Repeated- drawing-sets of Combs which survived Stage I of 
judging. Those which also survived Stage II are marked 'II'. 
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Figure 15: Repeated- drawing-sets of Gloves which survived Stage I of 
judging. Those which also survived Stage II are marked 'II'. 
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Figure 16: Repeated- drawing-sets of Scissors which survived Stage I of 
judging. Those which also survived Stage II are marked 'II'. 
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Figure 17: Repeated- drawing-sets of Pots which survived Stage I of judging. 
Those which also survived Stage II are marked 'II'. 
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Figure 18: Repeated- drawing-sets of Rackets which survived Stage I of 
judging. Those which also survived Stage II are marked 'II', 
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Figure 19: Repeated- drawing-sets of Light-bulbs which survived Stage I of 
judging. Those which also survived Stage II are marked 'II'. 
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Chapter 8: Children's Thinkinw 
1. Piaget's Approach to Children's Thinking 
The study of children's thinking has been dominated for a very long time 
now by a concern to explain, or to explain away, the phenomena first 
explored by Jean Piaget (1896-1980). These phenomena - the slow and 
faltering approach which children make towards a grasp of the central 
notions of quantification, measurement and logic - have a typical and 
special character. In almost every case, the endpoint of development is 
commitment to a proposition, or set of propositions, which is neither clearly 
dependent on experience (i.e. not an inductive generalization) nor attainable 
by deduction from other propositions which are dependent on experience. 
Principles such as the Piagetian conservations are abductions: like the 
conservation principles of classical physics and chemistry (see Meyerson, 
1930t - an undoubted source of Piaget's interest and approach - for decisive 
historical analysis) they make the best possible sense of the phenomena in 
their domain; they are interpretations or construals of the world. This 
formal property of the phenomena studied was perhaps not Piaget's reason 
for st.udying them: his interest in the origins of scientific notions may have 
been the determining motive. However, it is a property that ensures that 
what the child is nQt doing in these tasks is detecting some manifest 
property of the material presented. Rather, the child's achievement is to 
invest the presented material with a property of his or her own devising. We 
shall argue that selection of tasks that can be characterized in this fashion 
is an essential methodological step in the study of thinking (of child or 
adult), if thinking is to be effectively distinguished from perception or 
attention. 
Why has there been this long effort after explanation of these phenomena 
studied by Piaget? What is wrong with Piaget's own explanations? To begin 
1 Published as Campbell and Olson, 1990. 
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with, his explanations look like descriptions, albeit perspicuous ones, with 
only unsatisfactory gestures in the direction of a causal account. The pattern 
of Piagetian analysis is a fairly constant one: in any specific domain of 
children's thought he sought first of all to establish a stage-like progression 
towards adult understanding - an essentially descriptive enterprise, and 
then, by way of explanation, he sought to relate the observed progression of 
stages to his general account of stages of cognitive development. Thirdly, to 
preserve this explanatory move from circularity, he would suppose that the 
transitions between stages were to be accounted for by domain-independent 
processes of functional reorganisation, involving coordination of established 
structures and somewhat mysterious regulatory processes known as 
equilibration and reflective abstraction. Explanation by assimilation to stages 
is often thought of as unsatisfactory, for much the same reasons as 
explanation in terms of powers (e.g. the dormitive power of opium explains 
its sleep-inducing property) is thought unsatisfactory? Equilibration, too, 
insofar as the process is described in a comprehensible way, has been 
criticized as logically unfounded (Fodor, 1975) and indistinguishable from 
nativism (Haroutounian, 1983). 
The pattern of Piagetian explanation is thus often seen as intrinsically 
weak. In the second place it fails to fit comfortably into the dominant modes of 
explanation in Anglo-American psychology. There have been two such 
dominant modes during Piaget's working life. Until around 1960, the infant 
2 This objection is hardly cogent. If a general sequence of stages can be characterized in 
such a way that individual developmental patterns from different domains can be related to 
it, and therefore to one another, then such a general sequence has clear explanatory force. 
The ordering of stages in the different patterns has thereby been attributed to a common 
cause. The most successful application of this techniques in Piaget's works is perhaps the 
sequence of sensori-motor stages, which has been applied to developmental patterns in such 
diverse domains as imitation, object representation, and tool use, with undeniable success, 
particularly in the field of comparative primate cognition (see Piaget, 1954 and Chevalier-
Skolnikoff, 1983). Of course, although a common cause is identified by this means, there 
remains obvious scope for further illumination! The situation may be compared with genetic 
explanation: patterns of inheritance of characters in diverse animal and plant species were 
seen to follow a common, Mendelian pattern long before the explanation of that pattern in 
terms of recombination of genes was formulated. 
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was generally seen as a tabula rasa and development was characterized as 
(a) the acquisition of new response functions and (b) the gradual elimination 
of error. The sole mechanism of development was the learning of new 
stimulus and response connections by variants of the conditioning processes 
isolated in experimental animals. When viewed against this reductive and 
empiricist backcloth Piaget was seen as a rationalist, since he attributed 
unwarranted mental structures to children, represented these structures as 
constructions and represented children as imposin~ their thought on the 
world. He was also accounted a nativist, since the emergence of these 
structures was either not explained at all, or explained by means of an appeal 
to complicated and mysterious inherited mechanisms. Thus, Wohlwill (1962, 
p.95) - by no means a firm adherent to the behaviourist hegemony - worried 
that: 
'the non-operational, and at times frankly mentalistic, terms used by 
Piaget ... may seem to leave his analysis devoid of empirical, and 
perhaps even of theoretical, significance ... his whole conceptual 
apparatus of schemata, operations, centrations, and so forth appears to 
lack direct empirical reference.' 
Since 1960 the behaviourist hegemony has gradually been displaced by a 
nativist hegemony. The infant is seen as a tabula omnifera, development is 
characterized as the unfolding of inherited flexible structures which are 
fixed by the phenomena which happen to be present in the child's world. The 
main mechanism of development is simply endogenous growth triggered or 
channelled by exposure to relevant phenomena.3 This spectacular 
intellectual convulsion will be of strong interest to future historians of 
science, no doubt. It must have amused Piaget, if it did not drive him to 
despair. Branded rationalist and nativist through the 1950s and 1960s, when 
Anglo-American psychology first took serious note of his work, he found the 
3 We exaggerate slightly: this process of revolution is still very much in progress. While 
pockets of 'resistance' survive, the main academic citadels have clearly fallen. 
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same set of ideas - he was not given to hasty changes of mind - condemned in 
the late 70s by the high priests of the new cognitive science as hopelessly 
empiricist (see Piattelli-Palmirini, 1980). 
Although the two extreme positions which we have just characterized 
could hardly be more different, there remains a unifying thread of similarity. 
In both accounts the child is pictured as passive : the course of his 
development is fixed by external forces. To be sure, under the present 
dominant view innate structure plays a paramount role in shaping 
development, but such structure is inherent and its establishment calls for 
no effort on the child's part. In contrast, Piaget's picture of the child was as 
an active agent of development, fabricating mental structures from the thin 
yarn of experience by the slow and difficult application of the instruments of 
understanding. Facile 'improved' performance, uncoupled from 
understanding and the 'grasp of consciousness' led nowhere. In this respect, 
as in many others, Piaget represented the ontogenesis of thinking as a 
process homologous to the history of thinking (see Kuhn, 1962 for a 
compelling account of this homology). 
Between the demise of the behaviourist picture of development and the 
establishment of the present innatism, cognitive development in Britain and 
North America enjoyed a brief period of harmony with Piagetian ideas, 
under the respective intellectual leadership of Margaret Donaldson at 
Edinburgh and Jerome Bruner at Harvard. In our view, the case for such 
harmony remains a strong one. 4 'Cognitive development' is a bland label for 
a desperate struggle and institutions such as schools and 20 years of parental 
care exist neither to install new response functions nor to provide 
appropriately-timed triggering experiences but to assist and encourage 
children in that struggle. In this present chapter, we put (part of) the case for 
4 For a review of research in children's thinking which is strongly sympathetic to 
Piaget's approach, see Mandler, 1983. This is an excellent and lengthy review, which covers 
some of the ground reviewed here. 
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restoration of that harmony. 
We will proceed in the following manner. We first discuss the nature of 
thinking in general and children's thinking in particular, emphasising the 
rarity of the phenomenon and the variousness of the forms of thought. Some 
problems of method and proposed solutions to them are discussed and 
compared with innatist remedies. Finally, we identify some differences 
between our view of children's thinking and Piaget's. 
2. What is Thinking? 
In our view, thinking is an effortful activity, involving mental 'work', in 
which the organism forsakes its normal outward orientation on the 
presented world and struggles instead with a world indexed only imperfectly 
by a shadowy inner structure of mental symbols. While we regard this form 
of thinking as central, we shall refer to it as internally-mediated thinkin~ 
(conceding the possibility of other forms of thinking), for reasons which will 
become clear below. 
Representations of thinking by artists reflect this view. Rodin's thinker 
crouches in a withdrawn fetal pose, with closed eyes and lowered head. 
Conan Doyle's detective Sherlock Holmes, when faced with some knotty 
problem, retires to consume a pound of shag tobacco, his mind sharpened by 
the drug and his senses dulled by the resulting fog. Rex Stout's Nero Wolfe 
leans back, closes his eyes and pushes his blubbery lips in and out in infantile 
fashion until the imagination delivers. For Stout's detective, as for most of us, 
thinking is a repugnant and - or so this cameo suggests - regressive activity, 
to be undertaken only as a last resort. He would rather groom his 10,000 
orchids, experiment with new sauces, or read, just as lesser mortals would 
rather attend some spectacle or entertainment. 
Of course there are doubtless individuals for whom thinking is a 
pleasurable activity. Fortunate universities and publishers have them on 
their payrolls. Similarly, it may be that from time to time all of us can 
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undertake this difficult activity with equanimity at worst, if the 
circumstances are sufficiently propitious. Perhaps these circumstances are 
most often propitious when we are young! At any rate, once the novelty of 
internally-mediated thinking has worn off, it seems patent that adults will 
take almost any pains to avoid it. 
A gripping presentation of this pessimistic view of consciousness and 
thinking is Eugene Marais' extraordinary essay (1969), in which the taking of 
such steps to avoid thinking is seen as diagnostic of consciousness in the 
animal world. Marais argued that internally-mediated thinking, or rather 
the aversion felt for it, led to a variety of depression which he called 
Hesperian depression, because of its association with the setting of the sun 
and subsequent attenuation of the presented world. He pointed to certain 
universal aspects of human culture which in his view constituted avoidance 
of internally-mediated thinking. There were two basic remedies for 
Hesperian depression: maintenance of the presented world by illumination of 
the dwelling or other devices (thus providing the active mind with its 
customary aliment), and rendering the mind inactive by the use of alcohol or 
narcotics. 
While the first of these remedies makes thinking of this sort unnecessary 
and the second remedy makes it impossible, it seems to us that many other 
human devices constitute a third remedy: they make thinking of this sort 
easier and less repugnant. What we have in mind are of course the 
innumerable means that we have developed to represent the world externally 
by means of maps, diagrams, tokens, linguistic and mathematical systems. 
This is the reading Vygotsky presumably favoured of Francis Bacon's 
aphorism, which he often quoted (cited in Wertsch, 1985): 
'Neither the bare hand nor the understanding left to itself can effect 
much: it is by means of instruments and helps that the work is done, 
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which are as much needed for the understanding as for the hand.'5 
Of course, Bacon's reading was certainly different: what he had in mind was 
a method of scientific discovery. 
A similarly restricted view of thinking was espoused by Edouard Claparede 
(1919), who proposed a Law of Awareness, often cited approvingly by Piaget, 
which took thinking to be a standby activity, invoked only when existing 
habits failed to deliver an adequate response. There are certain difficulties 
with this notion of Claparede's. For instance, one undeniable result of 
laboratory studies of human 'problem-solving' has been that problem-
directed thinking is itself governed by habit, like almost every other human 
activity - witness the many demonstrations of the potent effects of 
Einstellung or Set on problem-solving. However, this difficulty may well have 
been viewed as a virtue by Piaget, whose accounts of cognitive development, 
even in the sensori-motor stage, stressed the importance for diagnostic 
purposes of genuinely novel responses; that is, of thinking not governed by 
habit (e.g. 1953, Conclusions, Section 3). Claparede's Law may be saved by 
one of two additional assumptions: either habitual forms of thinking are not 
guided by awareness or habitual thinking is not really a species of thinking. 
We prefer the second assumption, on the grounds that the processes 
governing all highly-practiced and skilled activities differ radically from the 
consciously-guided processes in which they originate (see Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus, 1983 for some interesting discussion in the context of the claimed 
educational value of early programming experience). So a problem initially 
solved by internally-mediated conscious activity may be solved on future 
occasions by some stored heuristic, requiring little or no reflection. 
If these assumptions are correct, then true thinking is an activity 
undertaken rarely. Since by hypothesis solutions achieved by true thinking 
S from the Nouum Organum Book I, paragraph 2:'Nee manus nuda, nee intelleetus sibi 
permissus, multum valet; instrumentis et auxiliis res perfieitur; quibus opus est, non minus 
ad intelleetum, quam ad manum'. 
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are rapidly replaced by stored routines, it is then evident that we are 
concerned with an ephemeral and evanescent phenomenon and that the 
researcher will be faced constantly with the difficulty of distinguishing true 
thinking from a routine which has replaced it ontogenetically.6 Perhaps it is 
for these reasons that the study of children's thinking is of particular and 
special interest. For there are many sorts of problem which children fail to 
solve. By surveying these problems we may be able to build up a picture of the 
thinking powers that adults possess as the union of the various powers that 
children of different ages lack. This is perhaps one relatively straightforward 
sense in which the study of children's thinking constitutes a vital element in 
developing an adequate theory of epistemology, a project cherished by Piaget. 
The characterisation of thinking we have offered in the preceding sections 
is a particularly strict and conservative one, emphasising the central 
importance of internally-mediated conscious activity proceeding without the 
aliment of an outwardly present world or of external representations of such 
a world. Probably it is unduly conservative. Certainly it is common intuition 
that we often think about the presented world directly, or indirectly through 
the medium of external representations. However, there seems little reason 
to doubt that there is at least a gradient of difficulty applying to these three 
sorts of thinking. Moreover, we agree with Gibson (e.g. 1972) that there is no 
good reason to regard normal perceptual processes as involving inference or 
any other type of thinking and we suspect that the routine extensions of the 
presented world (a) in space - seeing parts as signs of wholes, automatic 
location and tracking of hidden objects - and (b) in time - limited automatic 
projection of the present to the past or future - should likewise be excluded. It 
may be, though, that the focusing of attention on some aspect of the presented 
6 Ryle (1949) argued forcefully for the rarity of thinking (in the sense of our definition). 
Unfortunately, he took the view that this rarity implied epiphenomenal irrelevance. In our 
view, the rarity of thought merely reflects the rarity of occasions when we are confronted by a 
genuinely novel set of circumstances (see Dennett, 1983 for useful discussion of these views 
of Ryle). 
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world (extended in this Gibsonian fashion) constitutes a kind of thinking, 
particularly when our attention is directed there rather than simply attracted 
as a natural consequence of the salience of the aspect in question. This kind 
of thinking about aspects of the presented world we shall call immediate 
thinking. So far as the case of thinking guided by external representations is 
concerned (henceforth externally-mediated thinking), it is at least the case 
that once grasp of the relation between sign and referent has been mastered, 
no mental effort is required to maintain that relation. We shall return to the 
question of generalizing our notion of thinking to these two less clear cases in 
a later section. 
3. Forms of Thinking 
Following the assumptions of the previous section, the study of children's 
thinking should provide us with information, of an indirect sort, about the 
varieties of adult thinking. Children solve different sorts of problems at 
different ages. These developmental separations suggest that different forms 
of thinking are required for the solution of these different sorts of problem. 
This was Piaget's fundamental assumption - that thought undergoes 
gualitative development - and if it falls then the whole structure of Piaget's 
theory collapses. 
Piaget's own ontology of forms of thought is very theory-dependent and 
makes only weak connections with lay intuitions. We shall adopt instead a 
provisional ontology which does make such strong connections and we 
attempt to relate it to Piaget's findings and to some contemporary research, 
modifying it where necessary in the course of the chapter. Our ontology is 
based on the idea that internally-mediated conscious connection with some 
entity is correlated with immediate conscious connection with that entity and 
that the essential step in thinking is to represent external subjects of 
consciousness internally. Our regulating metaphor is of thought as a 
grasping or holding in mind of some entity (we shall sometimes use the 
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locution 'being intentionally connected to some entity' with this sense, 
roughly following the notion of intentionality due to Brentano (1973) and 
recently much discussed (see, e.g. Dennett,1987; Searle,1983). These entities 
are arbitrarily various, but we assume tentatively that at least four different 
kinds of entity need to be distinguished: objects (individuals), properties 
(including relations), propositions and worlds. Some objects can be actually 
grasped, held, viewed, etc.; some properties are immanent in such objects; 
some propositions are facts, and some worlds are real. The power of thought 
is of course that we may think about non-existent or abstract objects and 
properties, about propositions which are false or of unknown value, and 
about imaginary worlds. It follows from this truism that the devices adopted 
for constructing mental symbols must be combinatorially productive, since 
actual entities constitute only a tiny subset of those which are conceivable. 
It might be objected at this point that the contemplation of an object is 
impossible without the simultaneous contemplation of some at least of its 
properties; that object and properties together determine certain facts and 
that these facts specify a world or class of worlds. So what sense does it make 
to speak of four kinds of thinking here, since no kind may be practised in 
isolation from the others? But if this objection were cogent, then a child who 
had attained the stage of object permanence - who could therefore 'hold an 
object in mind' - must also be able to 'hold its location (a relation) in mind', to 
grasp the fact that the object is located there (a proposition) and to locate that 
fact with respect to other facts known about the world confronting it. We will 
make the assumption - consistent with developmental findings - that this 
aprioristic argument is unsound, and that how these four kinds of thinking 
are ordered and related is an empirical question. After all, there is ample 
evidence that we can contemplate objects attentively without grasping (in the 
relevant manner) innumerable 'obvious' properties. For example, it is a 
familiar and diminishing experience to be at a loss to specify the eye-colour of 
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a close friend. Likewise, Gombrich (1982) points out that those who know a 
cow when they see one are unable to say how the horns are situated in 
relation to the ears. 
Since it is at least possible (see previous section) that the grasping or 
holding in mind of some entity is sometimes carried out in the presence of 
that entity or in the presence of some external representation of that entity, 
these two generalizations enlarge our ontology of forms of thinking to twelve 
basic kinds: immediate, externally- mediated and internally-mediated 
thinking about each of the four sorts of entity. 
4. Evidence of Thinking 
In this section we make extensive use of the notion of representation, 
intending by that term the symbol, mental or external, that enables the 
thinker to hold some entity in mind. An arbitrary entity may be externally 
present, internally represented by a mental symbol, or externally represented 
by a picture, drawing, imitation, check mark, referring expression or other 
public symbol. A fundamental developmental question, then, concerns the 
order of mastery of these two kinds of representation. Does the capacity to 
represent an entity by means of an external device depend upon the capacity 
to represent it by means of an internal device, or is the converse proposition 
true? As we will show, there is a reasonable case to be made for both sides of 
this argument, whether we are considering ontogenesis, phylogenesis or 
human cultural prehistory. 
To investigate this question it is necessary to have independent means of 
assessing each capacity. For externally-mediated representation we require 
evidence that the symbol is used as an aid in calling to mind the absent 
(possibly virtual or non-existent) entity. For internally-mediated 
representation we require exactly the same kind of evidence! On the face of it, 
it seems that evidence for externally-mediated representation should be 
easier to come by, since the resemblance between symbol and entity may be so 
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strong that the intentional connection cannot reasonably be denied. But if the 
entity is absent and resemblance is strong, what is the source of that 
resemblance? Surely it is likely that the production of the symbol has been 
guided by an internal representation of the absent entity! Considering the 
three developmental domains in reverse order, in human prehistory the 
capacity for external representation is first clearly signalled by the carvings 
and paintings of the Magdalenian culture, around 20 ,000 years ago. And 
since these highly naturalistic paintings were often produced to 'illuminate' 
the walls of caves, they can hardly have been drawn from life. Although we 
cannot examine these early men directly for evidence of use of internal 
representations, their tool-making is a reasonably secure indirect sign, since 
the separation of site of tool-manufacture from site of tool-use is also clearly 
established in this culture, implying contemplation of the use in its absence.7 
Considering the second case, the great apes show no clear or compelling sign 
of capacity to use external representations, but likewise tool-manufacture 
takes place only at the site of use and neither are tools retained for future use. 
These examples, and the preceding discussion, make it seem likely that 
the two capacities are rather closely bound up with one another. Vygotsky 
was probably the most forthright advocate of the priority of externally-
mediated representation in ontogenesis, with subsequent internalization. He 
argued in many places that thought was internalized social speech, for 
instance (1981 ,p.162), 
'It is necessary that everything internal in higher forms was external, 
that is, for others it was what it is now for oneself. Any higher mental 
function necessarily goes through an external stage in its development 
because it is initially a social function' 
Vygotsky's presentation of this idea in the context of the origins of thinking is 
7 In fact, neither of these arguments is particularly compelling, although the weakness 
that they exhibit is the same. Cave drawings may have been drawn 'from death' if not from 
life, or worked up from sketches made from life CSandars, 1968, p.56-58); equivalently, a tool 
may be made at the site of use and then used remotely as a guide for the manufacture of 
further tools. 
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well-known, but he applied the notion more widely. For instance, the infant's 
unsuccessful attempts to reach for an object are first taken by adults as a sign 
that he desires the object and requires help, later become attenuated as the 
infant comes to recognize this function, and finally come to be deliberately 
produced signs. However, even in Vygotsky's discussions, uncertainty 
intrudes. When discussing memory he writes (1978,p.51) 
'When a human being ties a knot in a handkerchief as a reminder, he 
is, in essence, constructing the process of memorizing by forcing an 
external object to remind him of something; he transforms 
remembering into an external activity ... . It has been remarked that the 
very essence of civilization consists of purposely building monuments so 
as not to forget. In both the knot and the monument we have 
manifestations of the most fundamental and characteristic feature 
distinguishing human from animal memory.' 
The phrase we have italicized shows that not even Vygotsky could resist the 
obvious move of taking the capacity for external representation as a sign of 
pre-existent internal representation, rather than the cause and source of it. 
But there are difficulties with this move, as noted above. In some cases the 
problem of deciding whether an external symbol truly represents an entity 
may be just as hard as deciding, independently of such evidence, whether the 
child who produced the debatable external symbol might be capable of 
mentally representing such an entity. This is notoriously the case with early 
child speech. Whether a simple one or two word utterance represents (i.e. 
expresses) a proposition is a problem which cannot be solved by examination 
of the form of the utterance alone (see Chapter 2). More fundamentally, to the 
degree that such speech is firmly rooted in the here and now, it is 
unnecessary to count the elements of this speech as representations 
mediating an intentional connection, since symbol and entity symbolized are 
present simultaneously. 
Given these difficulties and uncertainties in using evidence of externally-
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mediated representation as a criterion for attributing capacity for internally-
mediated representation, there are excellent reasons to search for 
independent criteria, such as remote tool-making, for use of internal 
representations. We may identify in Piaget's methods the use of the following 
criterion. Children are only credited with representational capacity if such 
capacity can be demonstrated, roughly, 'under difficult conditions': that is. 
where the actions or jud~ents produced are novel and where the entity 
represented is absent or non-manifest in some other way. We propose this 
vague criterion as definitive, providing necessary and sufficient conditions 
and will proceed to sharpen it. Notice that Piaget's use of the notion of 
representation (like ours) is thereby tied to thinking and to intentionality, and 
therefore different from the more common and broader notion in which 
anything that can be recognized or produced is said to be represented (see 
Dennett, 1983 for interesting, if inconclusive, discussion). This broader notion 
of representation is pandemic in Fodor's philosophy of mind and psychology 
(e.g. Fodor, 1981) and has been endorsed by many psychologists (e.g. 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1986; Leslie, 1987). However, it leads inevitably to premature 
talk of meta-representations, to the lethal confusion of thought and 
perception abhorred by Gibson and to needless disagreements (e.g. Piatelli-
Palmirini, 1980). According to our usage (and, we argue, according to 
Piaget's too), crediting a child with the capacity to represent some entity of 
given type is equivalent to crediting him or her with the capacity for 
(internally-mediated) thought about that type of entity, and conversely. 
5. Thinking about Objects 
Although the criterion we have identified is logically impeccable, its 
application is hardly straightforward. While it seems plain enough what is 
meant by the question - Can a child represent an object when it is absent? -
and while familiar tests of object permanence provide a diagnostic method, it 
is less clear what must be done to establish corresponding diagnoses for 
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mental symbols for properties, propositions and worlds, the other elements in 
our provisional ontology of mentally represented entities. However, a little 
reflection makes it evident that even for the case of objects, and assuming a 
simplified perceptual definition of object based on, say, spatio-temporal 
contiguity, what counts as being present or absent is open to argument. As 
noted above, there are grounds for regarding the immediately-presented 
world as going somewhat beyond those entities indexed directly through the 
senses. Surely the footbrake of a car is present (in all relevant senses) even if 
we cannot see it (we are looking at the road, of course), nor feel it with our 
foot. Certainly no mental effort is required to call it to mind: if such effort 
were required, then cars would be designed with the footbrake prominently 
displayed! Piaget's own method for assessing Stage 6 of object permanence 
(1954, Chapter 1, Section 5) requires the child to make a systematic search of 
the possible locations of the hidden object, rather than simply to keep track of 
an invisibly-displaced object. So perhaps the notion implied by Piaget's choice 
of diagnostic is that, lacking representational capacity, intentional 
connection with an object can be maintained by the Stage 5 child only so long 
as he or she knows where it is located in the presented world (appropriately 
extended). It is an interesting question, not much investigated (Huttenlocher, 
1974; Acredolo, 1979) whether the Stage 5 child maintains such connections 
with objects in permanent locations in familiar worlds other than the 
presented world, for instance in other rooms of the house, etc. Allowing for 
some developmental separation here, we can distinguish the following 
hierarchy of notions of 'presence' for objects: 
(1) indexed in the sensory array 
(2) in the 'field of immediate action'(cf. the footbrake) 
(3) in a known location in the presented (extended) world 
(4) in a known location in a familiar world 
(5) real, but of unknown or unspecified location 
Each of these notions of presence specifies a different corresponding sense of 
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absence. For Piaget, the objects which are present to the mind of the child 
who lacks representational capacity are at best those objects which are 
present in the sense of level 3. Once this new capacity is attained, at around 
18-24 months, objects at level 5 may be present to the mind, even ifnot 
physically present in any conventional sense. The ability to find such objects 
by means of an efficient search undergoes further development throughout 
the preschool period (Babska, 1965; Sophian, 1986). Of course, thinking about 
non-existent, abstract or otherwise unreal objects may depend on later 
evolutions of representational capacity. 
Turning now to externally-mediated representation, at around the same 
period of development, children begin to use one object as a substitute or 
surrogate for another in the context of pretend play (Piaget, 1951; Nicolich, 
1977). However, it is by no means clear that in such play episodes the child 
takes the play object as representing some definite absent (level 5) other. 
Rather, it may be that the play object is assimilated to the schemas associated 
with the represented kind. For discussion, see Piaget (1951), Huttenlocher 
and Higgins (1978); for the distinction drawn, see Goodman(1969). Whether a 
two-year-old's words constitute cases of externally-mediated representation is 
similarly unclear: the problem here is to be sure that reference is being made 
to (level 5) absent others. Recently DeLoache (1987) has reported remarkable 
discoveries in this field, namely that 2-year-olds can use a photograph and 2 
1/2-year-olds a scale model as a 'map' of a room in which objects are hidden 
and retrieved. Again, there is room for doubt about the status of these 
discoveries. Since DeLoache's successful subjects take the 'real thing' as 
representing the model just as readily as they take the model to represent the 
real thing, it may be that the capacity shown here is the same capacity 
needed to follow the famous story of the three bears with understanding; 
namely, the construction of parallel analogies - since this is the biggest bed, it 
must belong to the biggest bear, etc. It may be, then, that the emergence of 
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externally-mediated representation lags a little behind internally-mediated 
representation. 
6. Thinking about Properties 
We have argued that holding X in mind under difficult circumstances -
where this is a novel task - provides a necessary and sufficient (albeit vague) 
condition for ascribing the general capacity to form mental representations of 
X. In addition we have presented this condition as central to Piaget's notion 
of mental representation. In the preceding section we applied the condition to 
object representation. Of course, it is hardly surprising that it fits well here, 
since Piaget's discovery and analysis of object permanence strongly 
influenced the development of his theoretical views. What is perhaps slightly 
surprising is that in this hackneyed field of research so little attention has 
been paid to gradations of presence/absence or to familiarity and salience, 
factors which spring immediately to mind as soon as one thinks about what 
constitute 'difficult circumstances' in this context.B In this section we shall 
see that applying our condition to mental representation of properties is 
much harder work. This may be because of some difficulty in construing the 
idea of an 'absent property': however, we suspect it is because past 
developmental research has not pursued the natural construals of this 
notion. 
So what might make it difficult to hold a property in mind? We may begin 
by noting that if the property in question is manifested by some present object 
and salient, then there should be no difficulty and therefore no call for mental 
representation. Neither of these notions is easy to apply, however. The famous 
Paradox of the Ravens (Hempel, 1965) provides a clear illustration of the 
difficulties involved. Seeking evidence for the proposition P that 'all ravens 
6 But see now DeLoache and Brown (1983) and other work reviewed there. Although this 
work - a development of techniques first explored by Babska (1965) - is couched in terms of 
'memory', 'search' and 'delayed-response' and somewhat studiously ignores its connection 
and debt to Piaget's investigations, it may be assimilated without undue difficulty to the 
scheme proposed here. 
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are black', we stumble on a red wheelbarrow. Since this object is not black, we 
make a further inspection and discover that it is not a raven either. Our 
confidence in P should then be boosted by an amount equivalent to the boost 
provided by spotting a black raven, since 'all non-black objects are non-
ravens' is an equivalent proposition, logically speaking. So much the worse 
for logic! Yes, but the psychological lesson here is that it is almost 
inconceivable that we should notice that the wheelbarrow was not black and 
not a raven under these circumstances - such evidential propositions would 
hardly spring to mind! So deciding what properties are salient will in general 
depend on assumptions about the interests or expectations of the perceiver. 
N or can this difficulty be resolved by accounting all negative properties non-
salient (they are certainly non-manifest). So-called 'inalienably-possessed' 
attributes provide a critical antidote to this view. Surely anyone would notice 
the leglessness of a legless woman; but except under very special 
circumstances no-one would remark the possession of legs in a legged 
woman. Usage reflects this powerful constraint: hairless men are merely 
bald, but a hairy man is over-endowed; likewise to identify a woman as 'the 
one with the legs' draws attention not to legs but to some higher-order 
property. Indeed, many such adjectives are unipolar - headless, legless, etc., 
the other pole occurring only in combinations - two-headed, long-legged, etc. -
or in discussions like this one. 
This line of reasoning suggests that consideration of a perceiver's interests 
and expectations may permit a decision about whether a property is salient or 
not, if manifested by some present object. Roughly, it will be salient if an 
interest resonates to it or ifit violates an expectation. Notice that both object 
and property have to be considered: whereas an orange banana constitutes a 
salient presentation of the property 'orange', an orange orange may not. 
Likewise, the leglessness of a legless book may pass unnoticed. 
This still leaves us with the problem of deciding whether a given property 
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is manifested by a present object. An obvious necessary condition is that the 
corresponding proposition should be true. However, truth is not sufficient, as 
the previous examples show. It seems plain that what is needed is that the 
property should be available to direct perception, other things being equal, in 
objects that possess it. Notice that this criterion will exclude negative 
properties like leglessness and disjunctive properties. 
This has been a long preamble, and the excuse for it is poor. However, 
similar preambles might have been constructed for each of our four 
categories of objects of thought. We have included it in order to make the 
general point that a priori decisions about what will constitute difficult 
circumstances will always be awkward and will necessarily involve the 
researcher in metaphysical speculation and debate. We also hope that we 
have made the specific point that in this context 'manifestness' of a property 
is independent of its salience and is determined by quite different conditions. 
Returning to the general point, it is clear that any methodological decision 
about what constitutes 'difficult circumstances' here will have to be guided as 
much by the products of research as by aprioristic analysis, so we now turn to 
discuss these briefly. 
It is evident from the most cursory reading of Piaget that he considered 
certain properties - e.g. the logico-mathematical properties of quantity and 
measure - to be non-manifest in the sense we have described, to be 
constructed properties imposed on reality by the intelligence of the child. 
Moreover, he provided ample evidence that to hold such properties in mind 
constitutes a major difficulty for young children, a difficulty not surmounted 
until around 5-6 years. However, the conservations of quantity are by no 
means the most important or most obvious method adopted for investigating 
ability to think about properties. Researchers from Piaget and Vygotsky 
onwards have instead often favoured sorting tasks for that purpose. And 
these tasks typically involve straightforwardly manifest properties. Moreover, 
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the saliences of object properties - while undoubtedly variable - surely lie in 
moderate ranges. The tasks do present difficulties though, and these 
difficulties can be readily identified with features of the task. Roughly, in a 
conventional free sorting task the difficulty consists in holding fast to a 
particular property while other properties change. We tentatively offer the 
suggestion that this difficulty can be characterized as a difficulty of 'holding 
X in mind, when X is relatively low in salience with respect to other manifest 
properties', since the variation in other properties will in general ensure that 
the salience of the target property is occasionally less than that of other 
properties. The products of research in this field have burgeoned recently: 
Sugarman's (1983) investigations show that the rough age-level derivable 
from Inhelder and Piaget's studies (1964) is strongly dependent on techniques 
and materials used (i.e. on manifest properties). It seems now that children 
will meet this criterion at different ages for different properties and 
materials. If'sortaI' properties are manifest (e.g. 'being a doll') and such 
properties are not comprehensively 'multiplied' with salient intrinsic 
properties (e.g. colour properties), then 2-year-olds can hold them in mind. It 
seems plain that 'thinking about a property' as measured by this admittedly 
weak criterion is an achievement heavily dependent on circumstances, with 
the age of achievement ranging from 2 to 6 years, depending on the target 
property. 9 
This conclusion fits reasonably well with what can be gleaned from the 
study of language development about the external representation of 
properties. The acquisition of command of expressions denoting different 
sorts of property seems to follow a similarly staggered course, with sortal 
properties, locations and temporary, undesirable states (high salience) being 
represented very early (cf. Nelson, 1976) and intrinsic manifest 'qualities' of 
shape, colour, etc., appearing somewhat later (cf. Rice, 1979). Rice's work 
9 See Chapters 12 and especially 13 for further discussion of this task. 
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and other indications also presents a considerable puzzle; namely, that 
external means of representing colours are established later than external 
means of representing shapes, whereas internal means appear to develop in 
the opposite order (Bornstein, 1985).10 Other precise work (e.g. Levine and 
Carey, 1982; Halpern et aI, 1983) suggests fairly substantial decalage between 
the development of internal and external means. 
7. Thinking about Propositions 
This is an enormous topic. We have reviewed developmental evidence, from 
a theoretical standpoint similar to that adopted in this chapter, in Olson and 
Campbell, to appear (see also Olson and Astington, 1987) and will not attempt 
to review it here. Our notion is that the investigations of Heinz Wimmer and 
Josef Perner (e.g. Wimmer and Perner, 1983) form the most direct test of the 
relevant ability. In these studies children are presented with circumstances 
in which an adult would ascribe belief in a certain proposition to another, 
while counting that proposition false. Children younger than 4 years will not 
do this; instead they ascribe a true belief to the other, even when that other 
has no grounds for such a belief. Similar findings arise from studies of lying 
(Wimmer et al., 1984). Lying involves presenting a proposition as true, while 
believing it to be false, and so involves a similar dislocation between a 
proposition and relevant factual knowledge. So the analogue of absence for 
the case of a proposition will be falsity. Notice that this leads us - where 
Wimmer and Perner may not wish to follow - to the conclusion that children 
cannot hold a proposition in mind until around 4 years. Their conclusion is a 
milder one, that their findings show development in the young child's 'theory 
of mind', rather than a fundamental change in mental function (for 
discussion of this subtle difference in interpretation, in a different context, 
see the discussion of Jaynes, 1976 in Witelson and Kristofferson, 1986) 
8. Thinking about Worlds 
10 Chapter 10 pursues these questions further. 
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Again, we offer the briefest of comments on this ability here. It seems to us 
that deductive reasoning depends on this ability. A conclusion follows 
necessarily from certain facts or premises only if there is no world consistent 
with the premises in which the conclusion is false. The regulation of 
deduction therefore depends on consideration of worlds different from the 
presented world: this is the case whether or not the inference proceeds from 
facts or from suppositions or assumptions. While the investigation of 
deductive reasoning in children has hardly begun, there is every reason to 
suspect (as Piaget did) that it is a late achievement. Accordingly, it makes 
good sense to adopt as a provisional criterion 'holding a world in mind, when 
that world is inconsistent with the presented world'. There is of course a 
difficulty in distinguishing this criterion from that adopted in the previous 
section, but we assume that this can be met by an appropriate definition for 
world. 
The developmental 'stagger' suggested above for mental representation of 
properties of different types implies corresponding staggers for mental 
representation of propositions and worlds. It is noteworthy, for instance, that 
the propositions figuring in Wimmer and Perner's studies invariably involve 
locations - a property (relation) represented early - as predicates. Likewise, 
clear cases of early deductive inference such as Donaldson's (1978, p.53) case 
seem to involve logically simple properties (dead/alive in this case). If this 
view is correct, then we should not expect to find any simple stage-like 
progression, although the dependence of worlds on propositions and 
propositions on objects and properties will determine such progressions for 
fixed combinations of types. 
9. The Innatist Alternative 
Our proposals amount to a strong claim that cognitive development 
comprises, amongst other things, a sequence of added representational 
powers: children can think about increasingly complex kinds of thing as 
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claim, but chooses to regard the cognitive limitations of young children as 
merely apparent. Younger children, so the argument runs, have these 
representational powers, but initially can only exercise them in certain 
limited contexts, or with adult help and prompting. This is a perfectly 
natural and appealing move: presumably many learned skills begin life in 
this context-dependent way. Frequent application of the skill in varied 
contexts then leads to some release from such dependence. In fact, a similar 
claim was made long ago by Vygotsky, who argued (cf. Vygotsky, 1978, p.84) 
that children of apparently similar ability might differ in their 'zones of 
proximal development', meaning by that phrase that within such zones 
precocious powers could be exercised given careful choice of materials and 
adult or peer support. Much the same point is made in an exemplary passage 
from Babska (1965, p.118): 
'In Stage I performances giving evidence of the existence of the relevant 
ability did not occur. There are, relatively speaking, no circumstances 
or conditions to evoke the ability. Nothing can help the child. What we 
observe here may be termed lack of ability. 
In Stage III there are no conditions, relatively speaking, which can 
prevent the child from giving a correct performance. There are no 
circumstances that would prevent the child from solving the given 
problem. What we observe is presence of ability. 
Stage II is the middle one in which one may observe close relations 
between performance and conditions. In some conditions a high level of 
performance can be achieved, while in others the opposite is observed. 
An examination of the relations mentioned above can give us criteria 
for diagnosing the level that the child has achieved so far in developing 
the given ability.' 
In Donaldson (1978) a test of 'disembedded thinking' - i.e. what we have 
been calling thinking simpliciter - is often represented as an 'unfair' test of 
children's abilities, systematically under-representing their real competence. 
In recent developmental debate, however, here and in North America, this 
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sort of formulation has been extended and generalized towards an innatist 
position in which formal operational reasoning (or so it would seem to our 
jaundiced observation) lies within the 'zone of proximal development' of the 
neonate. A representative view is DeLoache and Brown's (1983, p. 888):-
' .. two tasks that are structurally similar may give very different 
estimates depending on a variety of superficial features. Stripping away 
non-essential features of a task, situating the task in a familiar setting, 
and making the task content familiar and meaningful are some of the 
steps that can transfonn a difficult task in which young children fail 
into an opportunity for them to display their fledgling competence. The 
objective of such careful task engineering is not simply to demonstrate 
that some ability is present earlier than has previously been shown, but 
to examine the precursors and rudimentary forms of the ability and the 
conditions of its emergence' 
Now Vygotsky's point in arguing for the existence of such a zone was not to 
legitimize extreme innateness claims but to suggest improvements in the 
peda~ogical assessment of children and in methods of pedagogy. He certainly 
did not see the perfonnance of the child in an assisted context as providing a 
truer measure of cognitive powers but rather as refining that measure for 
pedagogical purposes. Our assessment of Donaldson's position is similar. 
There is no hint in her writings that that she sees each episode in cognitive 
development as the spontaneous appearance of an ability present from early 
infancy. She argues merely that examining 'disembedded thinking' 
underestimates children's cognitive resources and that appropriate 
pedagogical techniques exist or can be created to promote the development of 
these powers in children who often fail to show command of them. We have 
no weighty objection to this view. However, we would insist that most of the 
published 'demonstrations' of precocious representational powers 'succeed' 
either by removing the elements of 'adverse or difficult circumstances' or 
novelty of task which we have taken as crucial to diagnosis, (see the last 
quotation) or, more commonly - alas - by straightforwardly tendentious 
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interpretation of weak and equivocal data. Classic cases of the latter sort are 
'demonstrations' (a) of number conservation in 3 year-olds, refuted in 
Donaldson (1971), and (b) of neonatal imitation (see, e.g. Jacobson, 1979; 
Hayes and Watson, 1981; Abravanel and Sigafoos, 1984 and Vinter, 1986 for 
corrective experiment and comment). Numerous cases of the former sort are 
reviewed (and dismissed) by Gold (1987). Our discussion of this issue should 
make it clear that those findings, or those that survive critical examination, 
do not in any way constitute a refutation of the methodology endorsed here. 
They may provide opportunities for a more effective pedagogy, as Vygotsky 
suggested, but will not capture thinking, as we have defined it. Naturally it is 
always possible that a particular tradition of diagnosis may change in the 
direction suggested by Donaldson. The criterion we have adopted for 
diagnosis is certainly vague enough to allow such movements to correct true 
under-estimations. 
10. Conclusion 
We have offered a framework for a theory of children's thinking and its 
development. This framework is based firmly on a Piagetian notion of mental 
representation of X in which that notion is linked to conscious, intentional 
connection with X. Moreover, our framework - again, like Piaget's -
represents cognitive development as the accretion and expansion of 
representational powers. However, we depart from Piaget in our assumption 
that development is configured by differences in the substantive 'contents' of 
thought, rather than by formal differences between distinct kinds of mental 
operation. 
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Chapter 9: Content and the Representation of Belief and Desire! 
1.Introduction 
In this chapter I apply some of the ideas about the importance of content 
developed in the previous chapter to some issues concerning children's ability 
to represent the beliefs and desires of others - or, in plainer language, to think 
about their thoughts. I want to start by expressing some general reservations 
about the theory of mind enterprise as a whole. One of the insights to come 
out of Europe in the 1920s and early 1930s was the idea that cognitive 
development involved increase in powers of representation; this was not only 
a feature of the well-known works of Piaget and Vygotsky but was also 
strongly implied by the comparative-psychological writings of Wolfgang 
Kohler. I incline strongly to the Piagetian position that children are initially 
devoid of representational powers. In short, that there is literally nothin2" 
that an infant can think about. According to Piaget, the first signs of such 
representational powers appear around the end of the second year with object 
permanence, deferred imitation, insightful solutions to detour problems and 
so forth. 
For Piaget, of course, perception did not imply representation: it was only 
when the infant could react to an object which was not present, or reproduce 
an action not recently performed, that it made sense to him to speak of 
representation. But the representational powers implied by these 
achievements of late infancy may be quite limited - perhaps only that children 
can now think about absent objects and anticipate the outcome of certain 
actions, etc. The central theory-of-mind claim, on the other hand, is that by 
age 4, children can represent and therefore - to my way of thinking - think 
about or hold in mind - the thoughts (beliefs, intentions, desires) of another 
1 This chapter is based closely on a paper delivered to the Canadian Psychological 
Association's Annual Conference in Halifax, 1988. It is currently under review with the 
Canadian Journal of Psychology. 
Chapter 9 Page 182 
actor. If one takes the Piagetian position, then, this sets a spectacularly heavy 
agenda for the 2 year period from around 2 to around 4: hard work for the 
child and even harder work for those who would explain the child. 
If one is uncomfortable about such a rapid advance in representational 
powers, then there are two moves that might be made. On the one hand, 
there is the idea that the powers of the infant might have been 
underestimated. On the other, there is the idea that the powers of the 4 year-
old may have been overestimated. Although my own mind remains more or 
less closed to the first possibility, it remains open to the second. After all,the 
key demonstrations of the new powers - the various Wimmer and Perner 
false belief tasks (see Astington and Gopnik, 1991a) - demonstrate only 
successful prediction of the actions of others in situations where the judging 
subject would act differently. We are accustomed to the idea since Vygotsky 
that young children may use language in a quite transparent way to control 
the behaviour of others, without explicit knowledge of the linguistic means by 
which this control is achieved. It may be that 4 year-olds develop practical 
means for efficient prediction without having any explicit knowledge of these 
means. In that case we might prefer not to say that the false belief tasks show 
that 4 year-olds can think about the thoughts of others, but only that they can 
think about the possible actions of others. However, this is a bleak and 
sceptical view. Moreover, it fails to do justice to the care taken by Wimmer and 
Perner in seeking to exclude alternative explanations to the one that they 
prefer. Perner, too, (e.g. 1991a) has strongly resisted the tendency - now 
commonplace in North American discussions - to assume that everything of 
substance in cognitive development is innate and so has accepted the difficult 
agenda of strong development of representational powers in the period 2 to 4 
years. 
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2. The Content of Beliefs 
If we are uneasy about this agenda of strong development of 
representational powers, but wish to save the general hypothesis that 18 
month-olds can't think about anything much and that 4 year-olds can think 
about the thoughts of others, then what can we do to quell the uneasiness? In 
Chapter 8 I proposed that development may be staggered for different 
representational content. Possibly thoughts of rather circumscribed content 
may be entertained by the 2 year-old, allowing us to maintain the view that 
there is not very much that they can think about while conceding that they 
may occasionally think about states of affairs other than the one that 
currently confronts them. Again, it may be that 4 year-olds can represent the 
thoughts of others only if these thoughts have a similarly circumscribed 
content. 
Oddly enough, there is already some immediate encouragement for this 
idea. Surely, if we were to allow that 2 year-olds could represent a certain 
class of thoughts, a likely candidate class would be thoughts about the 
location of hidden or absent objects, because of the strong development of 
object permanence and other searching skills. It may then be no coincidence 
that the false belief task employed by Wimmer and Perner involves attribution 
by the subject of beliefs about the location of a hidden object. 
There is another version of the false belief task in common use which does 
not require attribution of a false belief about the location of a hidden object. 
This is the so-called Unexpected Contents task (in which, say, an eggbox is 
found to contain marbles) and children succeed with it at roughly the same 
age2 (Hogrefe et aI., 1986, Experiments 1 & 2; Perner et al., 1987, Experiment 
2 The relative difficulty of these two tasks is hard to establish, because of variations in 
procedure, and since within-subject designs are generally avoided here on account of 
probable strong order effects. While Wimmer and Perner (1983) found D.Q success with 3 
year-olds on their Location task, later investigations (e.g. Hogrefe et ai., 1986, Experiment 
4) show about 20% success. Equally, Perner et ai., 1987 found 45% success with 3 year-olds on 
an Unexpected Contents task, but others (e.g. Wimmer and Hartl, 1991, Experiment 1) have 
reported only 25-30% success. On balance, the Unexpected Contents task seems to be slightly 
easier. 
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2; Wimmer and Hartl, 1991). However, the relative difficulty of constructing 
the target belief here - a belief about what kind of thing is in the box - and in 
the standard Location task may be obscured by other differences in 
procedure. In the Location task the subject (or informed puppet) knows that 
the chocolate is at B and her knowledge of this is carefully checked. When the 
owner of the chocolate returns, knowledge of its original hiding place, A, is 
checked and the subject is carefully informed that Maxi decides to get his 
chocolate. If Maxi wants his chocolate and thinks that it is hidden at A and is 
a rational being, he should therefore look at A. In the Unexpected Contents 
task the child is merely asked, 
'If I show this box to Y fa second child or puppet], all closed up like 
this, what will she say /think is in it?' 
Presumably the 4 year-old is supposed to say 'Eggs' because:-
(a) eggboxes usually contain eggs 
(b) this is an eggbox with contents concealed 
(c) Y is presumed rational 
But in fact no attempt is made to verify that the subject knows that Y would 
assent to (a) and (b). Perhaps if the subject were given the following 
instruction instead, the task would be somewhat easier:-
'Look, here comes Snoopy. I'm going to show him the box all closed 
up like this. Snoopy sees that it's an eggbox and he knows egg boxes 
usually have eggs in them. What will he say is in the box?' 
A second point of difference between the Unexpected Contents task and the 
Location task concerns the degree of commitment to the judgment made. 
When shown a closed eggbox and asked 'what do I think is in the box', I am 
certainly disposed to say 'Eggs' but whether it is right to say that I believe that 
there are eggs in the box is another matter. I am, we might say, making an 
educated guess, but I would not agree that I knew that there were eggs in the 
box nor commit myself to other claims implying representation of the hidden 
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eggs. So the task is very unbalanced: the subject has grounds - as good as they 
come - for her belief that there are marbles in the box (she just saw them), but 
Snoopy has rather poorer grounds for the target belief that it contains eggs. It 
follows that the subject has a correspondingly weak basis for belief ascription. 
So I am not dismayed by the coincidence that the two tasks are mastered at 
roughly the same age and in particular, I do not think that it shows that one 
type of false belief is as easily represented as another. 
Once we are alerted to the idea that different sorts of belief might be 
differently representable, other relevant distinctions between kinds of belief 
come to mind. The tasks just described both involve updateable, revisable 
beliefs or guesses. Presumably, it is just this sort of belief which we might 
first learn was empirically vulnerable. Accordingly, such false beliefs might 
be the first to be ascribed to other actors. But many of our beliefs, although 
still contingent beliefs, are not readily revisable, e.g., beliefs about the origins 
or causes of natural phenomena. Sticking with eggs, our subject might 
believe that eggs come from chickens. Suppose we established that our 
subject held this belief, and then introduced little John, whose mischievous 
father had misinformed him that eggs were laid by pigs. Little John goes on 
holiday to a farm and the farmer sends him out to collect some eggs. Where 
would he be predicted to look for eggs? In the chickenhouse or in the pigpen? 
Obviously, more examples could be produced but the point may be already 
clear enough. The sorts of thoughts that a 2 year-old can have may be quite 
restricted in content and, equally, it may be that the sorts of thoughts that a 4 
year-old can represent or think about may be similarly quite restricted. 
As a bridge to my next topic, we may note that all the beliefs so far 
discussed are readily construed in a referential manner, or de re as some 
would put it. They are beliefs about a certain bar of chocolate, or about 
eggboxes, or about one particular box, or about eggs. However, notoriously, 
some beliefs are not about any definite thing - in the sense that we don't have 
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anything in mind that the belief is about. So if I am nearly run over by a 
speeding car I might form the belief that the driver of the car - whoever ~ ~ 
- is a criminal lunatic. With such beliefs, truth-value changes when a co-
designative expression is substituted, so, supposing the driver was in fact my 
mother, it does not follow that I believe that my mother is a criminal lunatic. 
Beliefs construed in this fashion as being about who or whatever satisfies the 
description of the subject of the target proposition are sometimes described as 
de dicto beliefs. 
3. Desires and Beliefs 
There are many possible ways in which desires and beliefs might be 
distinguished, and recent discussions by Perner (1991b) and by Astington and 
Gopnik (1991b) have helped clarify some of these ways. For example, it may be 
that beliefs are typically shared - thus making the ascription of a different 
belief hard - but that desires are typically not shared, making the ascription 
of a different desire somewhat easier. Of course, there are problems here 
arising from uncertainty about what constitutes the same belief or the same 
desire. George and Henry each believe that they see a turnip, but George's 
beliefis about George and Henry's is about Henry, so from a third-person 
logical point of view the beliefs are different, but ordinary usage and 
commonsense encourage us to say that George and Henry share the belief 
that they see a turnip. George believes that Henry sees a turnip (Henry is in 
the garden, while George is indoors); Henry also believes he sees a turnip. 
Here third-person logic says they have the same belief (that Henry sees a 
turnip) but ordinary usage and commonsense dictate the conclusion that 
George and Henry do not share a belief that they see a turnip. If we set aside 
the peculiar view of logic regarding the individuation of beliefs (or desires), in 
which two people cannot have the same belief or desire about themselves, 
then it seems quite plausible that members of the same community, viewing 
the same world, might share very many beliefs, but not quite so many 
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Although beliefs and desires might well differ in the way just described, 
what I will attempt in this section is to discuss some possible ways of 
distinguishing beliefs from desires in terms of their typical contents, since I 
think that these have been ignored or underestimated. 
In the first place the content of a belief seems undeniably propositional and 
our usage reflects this. The verb believe takes a full clause as its complement 
specifying a subject - what the belief is about - and a predicate - whatever is 
thought to be true of that subject. Desires may have this form, but very many 
desires seem to have much simpler content. 
(i)X wants Y (ii) X wants to [Verb] Y 
are familiar formulae that fall short of the full propositional specification 
invariably found with believe. Of course such formulae may be treated as 
elliptical and expanded as follows:-
(i)' X wants that X has Y (ii)' X wants that X [Verb]s Y 
The notion that desires, like beliefs, have propositional objects is put 
forward by Searle (1983, p. 29), and, so far as I know, his remarks on the 
question have not, so far as I know, been countered by other philosophers or 
linguists, so it is worthwhile to consider them here. 
His argument is brief - barely a page - and is easily summarized. He 
begins by making clear that he is discussing a notion which is more general 
than that codified by individual English verbs like wish, want, desire and 
points out that whereas one can say of some previous act, 
(1) I wish I hadn't done it, 
it is 'bad English' to say 
(2) I want / desire I hadn't done it'. 
He considers that (1) expresses an intentional state of desire and that the 
absence of sentences like (2) is due to some arbitrary syntactic restriction 
associated with the verbs want and desire. Although this appears to be an 
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argument for abstraction, Searle has also slipped in the claim that we may 
desire past events to have had a different outcome. He then discusses and 
rejects the prima facie evidence that desires may have simple (non-
propositional) objects as their contents, namely the existence of sentences like 
(3), by means of the following argument. The 'surface structure' of 
(3) I want your house 
is said to be misleading. Searle considers the sentence:-
(4) I want your house next summer 
and argues that next summer cannot modify want since the sentence does 
not mean 
(5) I - next summer - want your house, 
since it is perfectly consistent to say 
(6) I now want your house next summer though by next summer I 
won't want your house. 
What the sentence (4) must mean, says Searle, is 
(7) I want (I have your house next summer). 
It is therefore evident that the content is the proposition expressed by the 
embedded sentence. He concludes that since all occurrences of sentences S 
desires / wants X can take such modifiers, they must all be considered as 
expressing attitudes to propositions. 
It seems to me that this argument is easily challenged. In the first place, 
surely we would normally say that what (1) expresses is not desire but re~et. 
Wishes regarding the outcome of past events rarely come true! Nor is the 
possibility that such past events were wrongly reported a presupposition of 
such a wish. There is little point in coveting, lusting after or seeking a 
different outcome. One might feel guilty, or sorrowful, or ashamed, etc., 
about the actual outcome, but could hardly plan to have acted otherwise! So 
there is a good case for rejecting the notion that the object of desire could be a 
past event. Could it be a present event? I think the answer is also no. While 
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one might enjoy some experience currently in progress (perhaps as we tuck 
into our caviar, desire lines up with the edge of the spoon!), enjoyable 
consumption is not desire. So it seems natural to represent desire as an 
intentional state which is aimed at some unfulfilled, but usually fulfillable, 
object. 
If this is accepted, then it follows that sentence (4) differs from (3) only in 
that the future time when the desire is to be fulfilled is specified in (4) but 
unspecified in (3). Since, by hypothesis, expressions of desire always imply a 
time of fulfilment (which mayor may not be specified) there is no need to 
invoke arguments about what constituent is modified as Searle does. In any 
case, the locus of adverbial modifiers is always hard to establish with any 
certainty: they may be said to modify the verb, the verb phrase, or the 
sentence as a whole, and deciding between these alternatives is never 
straightforward. In the case of (4), it may be that next summer cannot be 
taken as modifying the verb want but this is hardly a sufficient reason for 
abandoning the analysis S-V-O-Adv. Consider the following argument, 
which is analogous to Searle's. The sentence 
(8) I go to Paris next week, 
predicts a journey, perhaps due to some business obligation. This cannot 
mean, following Searle, 
(9) I - next week - go to Paris, 
since it is perfectly consistent to say 
(10) I now go to Paris next week but next week I may not go to Paris. 
Although the argument looks no worse than Searle's, few would be satisfied 
with it and none would want to propose an analysis for (8) other than S-V-
Loc-Adv. Sentences like (3), (4) and (8), which express states to be terminated 
by consummation at some future time admit both aspectual/temporal 
modification of the verb denoting the state and specification of the time of 
consummation. 
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Looking at Searle's argument from the other end, he proposes the analysis 
in (7) for sentence (4). But if there is an embedded sentence in such simple 
statements of desire, that sentence must be rather limited in the form it can 
take. Although the underlying structure of 
(12) [ want a pound of caviar, 
uttered at the delicatessen counter, might look as if it might be 
(13) [ want (l buy a pound of caviar), 
this cannot be, since such an analysis would allow the sentence 
(14) [ want a pound of caviar with my Mastercard 
to mean that you want to buy it with your Mastercard. Instrumental and 
Manner adverbials, which the verb have does not permit, are also not 
permitted as modifiers of the mode of consumption in simple desire 
statements. So if there is an embedded sentence in simple desire statements, 
its subject is always [ and the main verb is always have. Finally, if we look 
instead at desire statements with undeniable propositional objects, then we 
still find strong restrictions on the form of the verb. It cannot be finite (*[ 
want you leave today - cf. [ believe you leave today) and hence will not accept 
any modifications of tense. Although some similar verbs readily accept 
internal negation (e.g. [promise not to leave) and this may mean something 
quite different from external negation (I don't promise to leave), want and 
desire with internal negation are clumsy at best (?[ want not to leave), and - if 
they mean anything - mean the same as external negation (I don't want to 
leave). 
So there is a perfectly good case for treating desire as an intentional state 
which can have as its aim either an object (simple desires), or an event or 
state (complex desires, with propositions as complements). On the other 
hand, if for this reason or that it is decided to analyse simple desires as 
containing an embedded proposition, then that proposition has a very 
restricted form - in particular, much more restricted than is the case for 
Chapter 9 
beliefs. 
Page 191 
Returning to the expansions (i)' and (ii)', it is therefore by no means 
evident that expanding them in this way does any sort of justice to the content 
of X's desire. On the contrary, if I want an apple it seems simply absurd to 
say that I want some proposition to be made true. It is perfectly conceivable 
that (i) and (ii) correctly characterize the content of X's desire as respectively 
an object and an action rather than as a proposition. Even if we do translate 
simple desires in this way as:-
(iii) X wants that S(ubject V(erb O(bject 
it is plain that in the formula (iii) the default value of 8 is X and the default 
value for V is have. 
Accordingly, and against recent discussions by Perner in particular, there 
seems to be no good case for symmetry between belief and desire as 
psychological states. A desire may have a simple object as when X wants a 
new dress whereas a belief must have a propositional object. The content of 
the desire may simply be a representation of the desired object. Further, 
although occasionally it may make sense to speak of a de re desire, as when X 
desires not just any new dress but one particular dress on display in a 
particular high fashion shop, for example, in general desires are for any 
object that meets a certain vague specification. 80 the content of a typical 
desire is a non-referential specification and is therefore de dicto. If the 
content of such desires represent anything then they represent only a possible 
object satisfying some vague conjunction of properties. In Quine's famous 
example from Word and Object (1960, Chap. 4), the man who wants a sloop 
may be said merely to crave relief from slooplessness. 
In this respect, desires are like pretend play in that the child who pretends 
that a banana is a telephone most likely does not have any particular 
telephone in mind and so represents no telephone by means of the banana. 
Again, although to make the point effectively would involve another lengthy 
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excursion, I would argue - following Goodman's analysis in Languages of 
Art (1969) - that drawings do not represent in a straightforward manner 
either. If I draw a fish, there may be no fish that I have in mind. I draw a 
fish-picture, not a picture of some particular fish. So the recent flurry of 
studies of children's drawing often beg the representational question. We 
may put a cup in front of a child, give her pencil and paper and ask her to 
draw the cup. But unless the child accepts the task as given, as one of 
producing a representation of that cup, there is little point in pondering the 
differences between her cup - the cup drawn - and the cup before her. 
On the other hand, when we turn to desires in which S and V do not have 
the default values discussed above, the content may be just as referential and 
specific as that encountered in a typical belief, and that is because the desires 
are now about whatever fills the Subject slot in the formula. 
4. Some Conclusions regarding Methodology 
I will try now to relate some of the distinctions discussed above to current 
studies of knowledge of belief and desire. There are a number of studies now 
published, in which children's ability to represent beliefs and desires are 
compared, with mixed results (Astington and Gopnik, 1991b). Sometimes it 
seems as though 3 year-olds can represent (think about) the desires of 
another or their own previous desires; sometimes the desire seems as hard to 
represent as the usual false belief. My suggestion is that in the first place 
these studies have all employed rather untypical desires and that it would be 
premature to draw any firm conclusion from them. I will not comment on 
Astington's studies in any detail; however, it does seem to me that the desires 
investigated in them are all of the referential de re variety - desires for some 
specific thing. As I have suggested, such desires are perhaps not the 
simplest sort of desires and, besides, involve a referential element. In 
Astington's studies, clear developmental separations between representation 
of belief and desire seem rather elusive. Possibly such separations would be 
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clearer for de dicto desires. 
I will conclude the chapter by discussing two studies conducted by 
Perner's students, Nicola Yuill (Yuill, 1984) and Julie Hadwin (Hadwin and 
Perner, 1991). In Yuill's study subjects are presented with the information 
that a child has a highly specific desire, namely that a specific child should 
catch a specified thrown ball - 'This boy wants that boy to catch this ball'. 
There is another possible catcher, a girl. The story is presented with pictures 
and the thrower's desire is illustrated by means of a 'think-bubble' 
illustrating the desired outcome. Subjects have to judge whether the thrower 
will be pleased or sad, given this or that outcome. It turns out that 3 year-olds 
judge as we would that the thrower is more pleased if the intended catcher 
does in fact catch it. 
This study has many weaknesses and it is hard to know why Perner 
(1991b) sets such store by it. To begin with, there is no reason why the subject 
should not share the desire of the story character and so we can have no 
confidence that the judgments reflect the represented thoughts of the story 
character rather than the wishes of the subject herself. In the second place, 
the story character's desire is represented by a drawn 'think-bubble' and - as 
I have argued above - there is some question about how a 3 year-old takes 
such drawings - even when they are not think-bubbles! Thirdly, that the girl 
should catch the ball instead of the intended boy hardly seems a dismaying 
outcome. This criticism works in the opposite direction from the previous 
two, since it makes it the more surprising that 3 year-olds should consider 
this outcome unsatisfactory and a source of sadness for the thrower. 
In Hadwin and Perner's study the think-bubbles are presented as 
representing the thrower's beliefs about the outcome of his throw. In the 
picture story there is a wall between thrower and catcher so that until he 
looks over the wall the thrower does not know whether his belief is correct or 
not. Subjects had to judge whether the thrower would be surprised or not, 
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given the actual outcome. Hadwin and Perner found that even 5 year-olds 
had difficulty in making appropriate judgments of surprise. Aside from the 
difficulties raised in discussion of Yuill's task, this study introduces a 
further difficulty, for the thrower is apparently represented as having a 
certain belief, but without any grounds for holding it. Why should he think 
that the other boy had caught the ball? Or is this merely wishful thinkin~, 
equivalent to desire? 
Surely we would only predict that the thrower would be surprised if the 
thrower had some grounds for his wrong belief. Wimmer, Hogrefe and 
Sodian (1988) and Sodian and Wimmer (1988) have investigated the child's 
developing knowledge of the grounding of beliefs in perception, inference and 
so forth. On the face of it, desires are often similarly grounded. My desire for 
a new dress may be a simple consequence of my perception of the shabby and 
unfashionable nature of the one that I am wearing now. Or it may arise 
because my best friend tells me that it's time for a change. Or I may infer 
from the expressions of contempt on the faces of my peers that something is 
amiss, etc, etc. So desires may be grounded in just the same range of ways as 
beliefs. So far as I know, no-one has investigated children's ability to 
represent desires grounded in these or other specific ways. Notice that in the 
example just given, the desire for a new dress is clearly to be taken de dicta. 
On the other hand, when the desire is de re, for a particular toy, or 
sweetmeat, or - as in Yuill's study - a desire that a particular person should 
catch a ball then rather different grounds may have to be adduced. As 
Astington has argued in recent papers, the intrinsic desirability of certain 
objects may be a ground for a desire or - as in Yuill's study - the de re desire 
may be left quite ungrounded as a whimsical urge of the child. 
Once again I have, I believe, identified good reasons for thinking harder 
about desires from the point of view of content. 
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Chapter 10: Contextual Salience and Colour Adjectives 
I. Introduction 
In general it may be said that children find adjectives more difficult to 
learn than the other major lexical classes, nouns and verbs. In her survey of 
1-2 year-old productive vocabulary Nelson (1976) found few adjectives in use, 
and those few denoted temporary, often undesirable, extrinsic properties of 
objects - hot, wet, dirty, broken, etc. Adjectives denoting intrinsic properties 
of objects such as shape, colour or texture, etc. were rare. Although the 
contrast between 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' may be given many meanings, 
here we intend only that extrinsic properties are subject to change, whereas 
intrinsic properties are fixed, or change only very slowly. 
An obvious characteristic of the extrinsic properties denoted by hot, dirty, 
etc. is that they are contextually salient when referred to. That is, the hotness 
or dirtiness of some object which is normally cool or clean is being remarked 
upon. It may be that it is because of this contextual salience that such 
properties come to the attention of young children and thus facilitate their 
learning of the corresponding adjectives. Therefore, so far as extrinsic 
properties are concerned contextual salience is more or less guaranteed, 
since - by definition - the extrinsic properties of objects change from time to 
time. But what about intrinsic properties, which do not change? Can the 
slower learning of colour or shape adjectives be explained by the low salience 
of the properties they denote? 
In Chapter 8 an explanation of this sort was proposed, suggesting that 
young children may encounter a general difficulty in attending to intrinsic 
properties and in thinking about them. It was argued there that this 
difficulty can only be overcome by making the property in question salient. 
Some intrinsic properties may be salient in an absolute sense, such as 
particularly bright colours or possession of an uncommonly large nose, etc., 
but in general most intrinsic properties will be salient only contextually. That 
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is, such a property will be salient only if it violates an expectation or answers 
to some present need of the subject. As has often been noted, the latter state of 
affairs is uncommon with colours: it is seldom the case that colour matters 
much, and it is never easy to contrive experimental situations in which it 
does matter. However, many kinds of things - some natural kinds, some 
artefacts - have a characteristic or typical colour, so it is relatively easy to to 
present colours in such a way that an expectation is violated, most simply by 
presenting an object or replica object in an uncharacteristic colour, such as a 
bar of green chocolate, or a pink sugar lump, etc. If the argument of Chapter 
8 is correct, such presentations should attract attention to colour, should 
facilitate elicitation of colour vocabulary and should provide an efficient 
context for the teaching of new colour terms. 
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Figure 1. Colour naming from 2;6 to 4;5 (data from Johnson, 1977) 
There have been only a handful of studies of the development of colour 
vocabulary: e.g. - with materials used for naming noted in brackets - Heider, 
1971 [colour chips]; Cruse, 1977 [cardboard squares]; Johnson, 1977 
[cardboard squares]; Bartlett, 1978 [paper strips]; Rice, 1980 [common 
household artefacts in a range of colours, e.g. combs]; Campbell, Bowe-
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Macdonald and Dockrell, 1982 [wooden dolls]; Andrick and Tager-Flusberg, 
1986 [colour samples]. Efficient use of basic colour vocabulary (the core 
adjectives white, black, red, yellow, green, blue, brown, purple, orange 
and grey - see Berlin and Kay, 1969) does not seem to be established until 
children are approximately 4 years old. There appears to be a moderate sex 
difference, favouring girls. Normative data supporting these two claims are 
presented in Johnson, 1977, and reproduced in Figure 1 above. 
Moreover, it is extremely difficult to teach new colour vocabulary (g. 
Campbell et al. , 1982 and especially Rice, 1980) or to establish word-colour 
associations (Bornstein, 1985a). For example, Rice's subjects required 
between 283 and 1004 trials to reach criterion on a simple red-green 
discriminative naming task. As Bornstein (1985b, p. 73) noted, reviewing this 
material, there is no reason to suspect that this late development has any 
perceptual cause. Perception and discrimination of colours is an 
achievement of infancy. Further, (p. 74), acquisition and use of colour 
nomenclature is 'tardy and problematic'. Bornstein went on to propose a 
neurological explanation of these difficulties (late maturation and integration 
of callosal structures and cortical association areas), but - whatever the 
merits of this explanation - in our view he too rapidly discounted cognitive 
explanations based on lack of saliency. Bornstein assumes that colours are 
salient to young children, but the evidence from matching and sorting 
studies which he cites in support of this opinion (p. 79) does not appear to 
support it strongly, ifindeed at all. The experiment reported below takes as its 
starting point the possibility that colours are not salient to young children in 
any absolute sense and investigates the effect of manipulating contextual 
salience on elicitation of colour names. Three year-old boys and girls were 
studied, since previous work (e.g. Bartlett, 1978) suggests that children of this 
age typically know a few colour adjectives, but not all, and understand 
requests to name colours. 
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Subjects:A sample of 48 normally-sighted children, aged 2;10 to 3;9, and 
comprising 24 boys and 24 girls, was drawn from local playgroups. These 
were randomly assigned to two groups, A and B, preserving the balance of 
the sexes. Group A consisted of 12 boys and 12 girls, mean age 3;3, range 2;11 
to 3;10. Group B consisted of 12 boys and 12 girls, mean age 3;4, range 2;10 to 
3;9. 
Materials: Two sets of replica objects were constructed for colour naming. 
All objects were constructed from FIMO modelling material, a widely-
available non-toxic material which hardens satisfactorily and which is 
manufactured in an extensive colour range. Nine objects were chosen for 
modelling, each having a characteristic colour. The 9 FIMO colours used 
were chosen to match as far as possible the characteristic colours of these 
objects. Two replicas of each object were constructed, one using the 
characteristic colour and the other using an uncharacteristic colour to form 
2 sets of objects for naming. In the list of objects that follows, the colour used 
in Set 1 is shown along with its FIMO designation and code. The same 9 
colours were used in constructing Set 2:-
Object Set 1 FIMO code Set 2 
banana yellow 'yellow HM80 l' red 
beetroot (with green top) purple 'purple HM8059' yellow 
sprig of 3 blackberries black 'black HM809' green 
4x2 chocolate bar brown 'terracotta brown HM8077' purple 
cucumber green 'green HM805' orange 
orange orange 'orange HM804' brown 
sugar-lump white 'white HM800' pink 
sticking-plaster pink 'flesh pink HM8045' black 
tomato (with green stalk) red 'red HM801' white 
Neither a blue nor a grey object was included, since we were unable to think 
of suitable small objects known to children with these characteristic colours. 
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Procedure: Each child participated in two naming tasks. Both groups 
initially named the colours of the objects in Set 1. Group B then named the 
colours of the uncharacteristically-coloured Set 2, while Group A repeated 
the original task (Set 1). Within each task, objects were presented to the 
children in a different random sequence. Children were allowed to handle 
and to examine each object and were asked 'What colour is this?'. The objects 
were not named for the children, nor was any feedback given. 
3. Results 
The results for numbers of colours named correctly in the various 
conditions are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Means and standard deviations of numbers of colours named 
correctly (max=9) 
Naming Task 1 Naming Task 2 
N Mean SD Mean SD 
Group A 
Boys 12 4.58 2.61 4.58 2.61 
Girls 12 5.33 2.67 5.33 2.77 
GroupB 
Boys 12 3.92 2.71 5.50 2.02 
Girls 12 6.33 1.07 7.91 1.24 
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-model Analysis of Variance examined the effects of Sex, 
Task and Condition on numbers of correctly-named colours, with Sex and 
Condition as between-subject factors and Task as a within-subject factor. 
There were significant main effects of Sex (F[I,44]=5.81, p<.05) and of Task, 
with the Task effect entirely due to the significant Task by Condition 
interaction (F[I,44]=51.24, p<.OOI). The nature of these effects is apparent in 
Figure 2: girls produce more correct colour names than boys, and Group B 
(uncharacteristic colours) produce more correct colour names than Group A 
_ although, naturally enough, only in the second naming task. Since no 
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difference between the performance of the Groups on Task 1 was found, these 
results are combined below, where appropriate. 
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Figure 2. Colours named correctly in repeated naming tasks 
The distribution of vocabulary sizes in the first naming task (combined 
data), and in the second naming task (Group B) are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Distributions of numbers of colours correctly named. 
The mean number of colours correctly named in Task 1 (n=48) was 5.04, 
whereas in Task 2 (n=24) it was 6.71. While Group A subjects hardly varied 
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in the second task, of the 24 subjects in Group B, 5 named 3 more colours 
correctly in Task 2, 8 produced 2 more correct names, 7 produced 1 more and 
4 subjects showed no change. These distributions have a bimodal 
appearance, suggesting that basic colour vocabulary is acquired in two 
phases. Bartlett (1978) presented similarly bimodal distributions. 
Figure 4 shows the proportion of subjects naming each of the 9 colours 
correctly in Task 1 (combined data) and Task 2 (Group B only), together with 
Johnson's results for a sample of comparable age. Comparing our Task 1 
findings with Johnson's, inspection of the confidence intervals shows that 
only the values for brown, pink and purple differ significantly. There is 
noticeable improvement for all 9 colours in Task 2: comparisons with Group 
B's performance on Task 1 using McNemar's Test for correlated proportions 
shows that significant improvement (one-tailed) occurred with white, red, 
brown and pink. 
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Figure 4. Object Colour and Naming Success 
Since some colours are clearly better known than others and since 
vocabulary size is not evenly distributed, the data were examined for evidence 
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bearing on the question of order of acquisition. However, no consistency in 
order of acquisition was found. 
4. Discussion 
The improvement in naming resulting from use of uncharacteristically-
coloured objects shows that conventional methods of colour-term elicitation 
may underestimate word knowledge. Comparison with Johnson's norms, 
whose subjects named cardboard squares, suggests that naming objects with 
no characteristic colour is a similar task to naming characteristically-
coloured objects. Other studies of early colour naming, as noted earlier, have 
invariably used neutral stimuli similar to Johnson's. 
The degree of improvement obtained (about 2 colour terms, representing 6 
months of normal development) may be considered modest, but is 
encouraging when compared with the poor return of training found by Rice 
(1980). Moreover, 8 of the 24 subjects in Group B produced 7 or more correct 
terms in Task 1, and could therefore only show limited improvement, so that 
our estimate of improvement is probably an underestimate. Clearly this 
method needs to be investigated with younger children and perhaps with 
children with learning difficulties. 
On the face of it, our result is a surprising one, since the opposite prediction 
follows from two plausible arguments. Firstly, it is evident that the colours of 
types of object with a characteristic colour, or of familiar individual objects, 
can be learned by rote: a blind person may know that bananas are yellow, that 
grass is green, and that his dog is black and white. Very young children may 
acquire their first colour terms in this fashion, ignorant of their meaning, 
but knowledgeable about their application. For example, Cruse (1977) 
reported that his son could name the colours of familiar objects at a stage 
when his colour-naming was otherwise random. Accordingly, we might well 
have expected subjects to perform better with the characteristically-coloured 
objects, since such rote-learned knowledge is useful in this task, but useless 
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with uncharacteristically-coloured objects. However, this was evidently not 
the case. Secondly, the manipulation resembles that producing the well-
known Stroop effect (for review, see McLeod, 1991), in which the print colours 
of incongruently-coloured colour adjectives are named only with great 
difficulty. While the Stroop test can only be applied to children able to read, 
Cramer (1967) reported a variant using drawings of uncharacteristically-
coloured objects with 5 year-olds. Subjects took longer to name the colours of 
these drawings than the colours of coloured squares, and latencies for 
naming the colours were slower than for naming the objects drawn, thus 
replicating the Stroop result. It should be noted that a replication by Arochova 
(1971) was less encouraging, and that both studies used very crude measures 
of latency. On the other hand, Menard-Buteau and Cavanagh (1984) obtained 
consistent effects of the Stroop type with adult subjects in a similar task. 
Following the Stroop result, then, we might have expected the sight of, say, a 
chocolate bar to incline our subjects to say 'brown' - which response would 
then compete strongly with the visually-specified response of purple, 
producing error or confusion. 
The result draws attention to the need to seek out effective elicitation 
procedures in language research. Campbell and Wales (1970:250ff.) made 
this point strongly many years ago and similar prescriptions have been 
offered more recently by Crain (e.g. 1991:602). These prescriptions apply 
equally to psychologists - who are apt to favour studying comprehension over 
production - and to linguists - who are apt to favour observation of production 
over experimentation. 
Our hypothesis is that uncharacteristically-coloured objects elicit more 
colour names because these colours - being contextually salient - are forced 
on the child's attention. On the other hand, to name the colour of a neutral or 
characteristically-coloured object requires an effort of attention, which effort, 
we surmise - following the arguments of Chapter 8 - exceeds the mental 
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resources of very young children. It is perhaps worth considering the 
stronger hypothesis that contextually-salient presentations are necessary for 
the acquisition of new colour terms by such children (other than by means of 
the sort of rote learning discussed above). It is obvious that so far as types of 
objects are concerned, such contextually-salient presentations must be 
vanishingly rare - brown oranges, etc., do not occur outside laboratories. 
However, it may be that with individual objects something rather similar 
happens when, for instance, a familiar pink toothbrush is suddenly and 
mysteriously substituted by a blue one. 
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Chapter 11: Two year-old Learning of an Extrinsic Adjective 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter extrinsic and intrinsic qualities were 
distinguished and it was suggested on the basis of work by Nelson (1976) that 
extrinsic adjectives should be learnable by one and two year-olds. As usual in 
early language learning, it is not to be expected that any deliberate process of 
teaching by parents is responsible for such learning. Rather, the common 
supposition is that simple ostension is sufficient. However, for ostension to 
work with any degree of efficiency, the child must have in mind the same 
object (proper name learning), or kind of object (common noun learning), or 
object quality (adjective learning) as has the ostending parent. Because of the 
preponderance of common-noun-like words in one year-old speech, it is 
generally assumed that, other things being equal, when a parent points at an 
object and says 'That's a <novel word>', success of the ostension is 
guaranteed, since the child will automatically take it as designating the 
basic-level kind to which the object belongs: in other words, other things 
being equal, one year-olds tend to have basic-level kinds in mind. Success in 
such cases, though impressive, is not perfect, as the phenomena of early 
overgeneralization show. Often, (Wales, Colman and Patterson, 1983; Adams 
and Bullock, 1986) parental naming is based on slightly lower-level kinds. 
Thinking of 'flower', the child is informed 'This is a rose' and thus learns to 
call all flowers 'rose'. 
Although this account explains the relatively effortless one-trial learning 
of common nouns designating basic-level kinds, it immediately raises the 
question of how children might learn other sorts of word. So far as proper 
names are concerned, Katz, Baker and Macnamara (1974) showed that young 
children were able to make use of both syntactic and pragmatic cues in 
appropriate fashion: the ostensive frame 'This is <novel word>' led to proper 
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name learning more often than the frame 'This is a <novel word>', and did 
so more readily for the kinds of object which 'merit' a personal name, such 
as dolls, rather than for building blocks. This result was confirmed using 
more careful procedures by Gelman and Taylor (1984). Subsequent research 
by Hall (1991) has shown that if the ostended object belongs to an unfamiliar 
kind, for which the child has learned no common noun, then proper name 
frames are less effective. In other words, provided parents first introduce 
nouns denoting kinds, proper name ostension will succeed with objects 
belonging to these kinds, so long as the kind in question is the sort of thing 
that merits a proper name. 
So far as adjective learning is concerned, little is known. However, the 
ostensive frame used to introduce proper names - 'This is <novel word>' -
serves equally well to introduce adjectives, and indeed mass nouns (though 
nothing more will be said of these here). While it might be thought that the 
children in the experiments referred to above did not make adjective 
interpretations (since they seemed to understand the novel words as proper 
or common nouns), this option is more or less denied to them by the 
procedures adopted. Moreover, these procedures are subject to criticism on 
other, more general grounds. The method adopted in these experiments has 
the following steps. First, the child is shown two objects which differ 
minimally in identity, but belong to the same kind, for example two dolls of 
different appearance, and then the novel term is introduced by ostension 
applied to one of these objects. This naming phase is followed by a test phase 
in which the child is shown the same two objects, together with other objects 
of different kinds. In the test phase the child is given a variety of simple 
instructions employing syntactic frames appropriate for the intended word 
category, for example (proper name learning), 'Dress zav, Put zav in the 
basket, Show me zav', etc. In other words, the child is exposed not just to one 
ostensive encounter, but to several encounters (ranging from 7 to 10 in the 
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experiments mentioned), and - taken together - these encounters are 
syntactically very specific to the intended word category. So adjective 
interpretations are rather unlikely, and besides, unlikely to be recognized 
even if made. Moreover, there is a fundamental weakness in this procedure. 
In the proper name case, a child may very well wrongly understand the novel 
word as denoting the kind to which the object belongs (thus learning it as a 
common noun), but nevertheless prefer to pick the previously ostended object 
in the test phase - after all, why should she not? In that event, she would be 
misdiagnosed as having learned a proper name, so this condition is liable to 
overestimate the amount of proper name learning. Conversely, in the 
common noun case, a child must distribute her responses in the test phase 
across the available members of the relevant kind in order to be counted as 
having learned the novel word as a common noun; again, why should she? 
But if she does not do this, she may be misdiagnosed as having learned a 
proper name. Again, proper name learning is apt to be overestimated. So the 
procedure adopted, although adequate for demonstrating differences between 
ostensive conditions, does not lead to sure diagnoses of what the children 
have learned. In fact, from the point of view of diagnosis, one would do as 
well or better to consider only the response to the first instruction, and to 
follow this up by removing the selected object and asking 'Is there another 
one here that is / is-a zav?'. A resolute 'No!' (in proper name conditions) 
would be convincing evidence. However, the fact that such a question is asked 
at all may lead a young child to abandon a proper name hypothesis. We may 
conclude that this method of investigation is demonstrative at best. 
In view of the observations of the preceding paragraph, there seems to be 
no difficulty in supposing that (with appropriate objects) the ostensive frame 
'This is <novel word>' could lead to adjective learning. In the present 
experiment, we compared word-learning using this constant ostensive 
frame, but varying the kind of object to which it is applied. In the test phase, 
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we employed the restricted method outlined in the previous paragraph, using 
as a first 'instruction' the simple question 'Which one is <novel word>?' , 
which is syntactically neutral between proper name and adjective 
interpretations. Familiar objects were used, so as to inhibit kind 
interpretations, namely toy bears and chairs, and these objects differed in an 
extrinsic quality (they were intact, or had a missing leg/arm), and in an 
intrinsic quality (colour). The extrinsic quality chosen is unbalanced in 
salience, like all such qualities. That is, while the leglessness of a legless 
bear is salient and worthy of comment, the undamaged state of an 
undamaged bear is unlikely to be noticed (see Chapter 8 for discussion). In a 
previous unpublished experiment along similar lines, Campbell, Daley and 
Smith found that a more drastic extrinsic state - headlessness - was 
unusable, since children (who had heard a novel word applied to an 
undamaged doll) would never apply this word to that doll once its head had 
been removed. Presumably, removing the head deprived the doll of the kind of 
status which merits a personal name! 
Bearing in mind the results of previous research and the suppositions 
made about the salience of extrinsic and intrinsic qualities, we should expect 
to find proper name learning with bears but not with chairs, and extrinsic 
adjective learning with damaged objects but not with intact objects. The only 
condition in which intrinsic adjective learning seems at all likely is the intact 
chair condition, since this object neither merits a proper name, nor does it 
exhibit any salient extrinsic quality. 
2. Method 
Subjects: Sixty children took part in the experiment (mean age 2;3, range 20-
34 months). There were 30 boys and 30 girls. All subjects attended Mother 
and Toddler groups in central Scotland. Subjects were randomly assigned to 8 
experimental conditions (N =6) and one control condition (N = 12). There were 
equal numbers of boys and girls within each condition, and these 
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assignments were carried out in each Mother and Toddler group visited, 
ensuring a rough equalisation of differences in catchment, etc. 
Materials: Six brightly-coloured toy bears were used ('Bitsy Bears'), three 
pink and three blue. These creatures were left with the vestigial 'clothing' 
with which they were supplied, blue ribbons and sashes on the pink bears, 
and vice-versa. The colours of these favours were much less bright than the 
dominating 'fur' colour of the bears. In each subset of three bears, one was 
left intact, while one had an arm removed and the other had a leg removed. 
Six miniature plastic rocking chairs (normally occupied by 'Sylvanian 
Family' members) were also used. The backs, seats, arms and rockers of 
three of these chairs were painted in a bright pink (matching the pink bear 
fur) and three were painted in a bright blue (matching the blue bear fur). The 
thin rod-like supports of these components were painted in a darker version 
of the opposite colour. In each subset of three chairs, one was left intact, 
while one had an arm removed and the other had a rocker removed. An 
additional object, a silver and yellow yo-yo, was used as a distractor item. Sets 
of 5 objects used in testing were assembled from these objects and stored in an 
opaque bag when not in use. Each set contained one pink and one blue bear, 
one pink and one blue chair, and the distractor object 
Design: Each experimental condition consisted of a training phase, in which 
the subject learned to apply a novel word to a bear or a chair, and a test phase, 
in which the subject's understanding of the novel word was investigated. 
Nine novel words were randomly assigned to subjects in these naming tasks: 
cohosh, carvi, saffron, pygmy, tansy, hyssop, malva, comfrey and orris. The 
choice of real disyllabic unfamiliar words varies from usual practice, which 
is to use nonsense monosyllables - mef, zav, etc. This practice may be 
criticised, since children who already know many monosyllables may find it 
odd to be presented with a novel monosyllable, and since some nonsense 
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monosyllables conform rather poorly to English word structure. Training 
objects were either bears or chairs, pink or blue, intact or damaged, 
establishing 8 training conditions. The nature of the damage was partially 
balanced, as follows: the pink damaged bear and blue damaged chair had 
missing arms; the blue damaged bear and pink damaged chair had a 
missing leg/rocker. Following previous practice, training included a contrast 
object to which none of the target interpretations applied. Thus in bear 
conditions, this was a different bear (proper name), which was in the 
opposite state (state adjective), and of the opposite colour (colour adjective). So, 
if training was carried out with a legless blue bear, the contrast object was an 
intact pink bear, etc. If training was conducted with an intact object, the 
nature of the damage exhibited by the contrast object was again only partially 
balanced, as follows: the pink intact bear and pink intact chair had contrast 
objects which were armless; the blue intact bear and blue intact chair had 
contrast objects which lacked a leg/rocker. 
Following training, the objects were returned to the bag and this was put in 
the care of the subject's mother while a short filler task of about 3 minutes 
duration was administered. The purpose of this task was to make it plausible 
that the training object might have changed its state (become repaired or 
broken) in the interval. 
In the test phase a set of 5 objects was used. These test sets were assembled 
in the following manner: an object consistent with proper name 
interpretation, but differing in state; an object of the same kind and state as 
the training object but differing in colour and therefore inconsistent with 
proper name interpretation; two objects of the opposite kind - one pink, one 
blue, one intact, one damaged; the distractor object. Damaged objects 
exhibited the same state as the training or comparison object in the training 
phase. To illustrate these various contingencies, the training objects, contrast 
objects and test sets used in two of these conditions are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Objects used in training and testing for two conditions. Following 
each object description, the relation with the training object is 
indicated, and the target interpretation with which choice of that 
object is associated is also indicated. The following symbolic keys are 
used: for relations, C - same colour, K - same kind, S - same state; 
for interpretations, PN - proper name, SA - state adjective, CA -
colour adjective. 
Training Phase 
'This is cohosh' 
Training Object 
Blue intact bear 
Contrast Object 
Pink legless bear 
Training Object 
Blue armless chair 
Contrast Object 
Pink intact chair 
Testing Phase 
'Which one is cohosh?' 
BI ue legless bear CK PN 
Pink intact bear SK SA 
Blue legless chair C CA 
Pink intact chair S SA 
Silver and yellow yo-yo, Distractor 
Blue intact chair CK PN 
Pink armless chair SK SA 
BI ue intact bear C C A 
Pink armless bear S SA 
Silver and yellow yo-yo, Distractor 
As well as the 8 experimental conditions, there was a control condition in 
which no training phase occurred. The sets used in the test phase of this 
condition were randomly selected from those used in experimental 
conditions, subject to the condition that equal numbers of 'armless' and 
'legless' sets be used. 
Procedure: Testing was conducted only after at least one previous visit to the 
Mother and Toddler group. Mothers were present but were asked not to 
intervene. Testing occupied about 10 minutes, including a 3-minute filler task 
between training and test phases. Test sessions were recorded on videotape. 
In the training phase, the training object was introduced with the remark 
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"This is cohosh" (or other unfamiliar word from the 9 used). The contrast 
object was then introduced with the remark "Look at this!". The experimenter 
then pointed to the training object, and asked "What did I call this one?". The 
subject's response was noted and the objects returned to the bag. If the 
subject's response was inaccurate, the experimenter repeated "This is 
cohosh" and asked the subject to say the unfamiliar word. This procedure 
was repeated four times. The bag was then handed to the subject's mother 
and the filler task administered. In the test phase, which followed 
immediately, the 5 test objects were shown to the subject and placed on the 
table. When the broken/repaired training object was shown, the 
experimenter commented, "Oh, look what's happened! This one's got a bit 
missing/ put back on". When all 5 objects had been shown, the child was 
asked "Which one of these is cohosh?", and then, "Is there another one that is 
cohosh?", and any responses were noted. 
3. Results 
Training phase: Subjects' success in producing the target novel word was 
measured by submitting the number of successful productions to ANOVA 
with 3 between-subject factors, each with 2 levels (object colour, object state 
and object type). There was only one significant effect: a main effect of object 
type, with more successes for bears than chairs (F(I,40)=8.28, p< .01). Mean 
success in naming bears was 2.71 and for chairs 1.38. Since subject's ages 
covered a fair range (20-34 months), the correlation with age was examined: 
it was found to be negative (r=-.189) and non-significant. 
Test Phase: First choices Control Condition: The 12 subjects in this condition 
distributed their choices as follows, with two-tailed binomial probabilities 
indicated: Pink objects - 2, Blue objects - 8 (p=.II); Intact objects - 7, Damaged 
objects - 3 (p=.34); Bears - 7, Chairs - 3 (p=.34). Two subjects selected the 
distractor object. These tendencies, though not significant individually, are 
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confirmed by the modal choice of this group, which was the blue intact bear. 
This was available for selection on 7 occasions, and selected on 5 of these 
(p=.0047, one-tailed, assuming probability of .2 for random selection). No 
other unique type of object was selected more than once. 
Experimental Conditions: The 48 subjects in these 8 conditions distributed 
their choices as shown in Figure 1. In this figure, training object colour is 
ignored, since inspection showed that it had no effect. Distractor choices are 
also ignored, since there very few of these (3 in experimental conditions, 2 in 
control). 
10 
9 
8 
7 
Intact B Broken B Intact C Broken C Control 
Chairs 
Bears 
1 
04-~~~~~~~~~--~~~~--+L~~~~~~~ 
int dam - int dam - int dam - int dam - int dam 
Objects selected in Test Phase 
Figure 1: Frequencies of types of first choice for different training conditions. 
Key: 'int' - intact objects; 'dam' - damaged objects; 'ck' - objects of 
same colour and kind as training object (same object); 'sk' - objects 
of same state (intact/damaged) and kind as training object; 'c' -
objects matching training object on colour only; 's' - objects 
matching in state only. 
The most obvious feature of these data is that whereas there is a tendency 
to choose intact objects in the control condition, the opposite tendency is 
observed in every experimental condition. Comparing each condition with 
controls using 
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x2, the associated probabilites are: Intact Bears, p=.05; Damaged Bears, 
p=.05; Intact Chairs, p=.02; Damaged Chairs, p=.04. A second obvious feature 
is the tendency to choose bears rather than chairs in the Bear conditions, 
whereas in the Chair conditions choices are more evenly distributed (X2=7.51, 
p<.OI). Choices marked CK on Figure 1 are consistent with proper name 
interpretations of the novel word, and with colour adjective interpretations. 
Choices marked C are consistent only with colour adjective interpretations. 
Choices marked SK or S are consistent only with state adjective 
interpretations. Since proper name interpretations have been highlighted in 
previous research using similar methods, it makes sense to distinguish 
these from C choices. The frequency data are recast from this perspective of 
the relation between object chosen and training object in Figure 2. 
10 IntactB 
9 
8 
7-1 ........... 
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BrokenB IntactC BrokenC 
1 
O~~~~4-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
id sta col - id sta col - id sta col - id sta col 
Objects Selected in Test Phase Related to Training Object 
Figure 2: Key: 'id' - object selected has same identity as training object; 'sta' -
object selected is in same state (intact/damaged) as training object; 
'col' - object selected has same colour (pinklhlue) as training object. 
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Recast in this way the distributions seem quite different. The overall (4 x 3) 
X2=lB.7, with df=6 and p<.Ol. Comparing one condition with another, Intact 
Bears is significantly different from Broken Bears (p<.05), and from Broken 
Chairs (p<.05), PN choices being dominant in the former condition and SA 
choices dominant in the latter two; Broken Bears is significantly different 
from Intact Chairs (p<.05), SA choices being dominant in the former 
condition with choices randomly distributed in the latter; Intact Chairs is 
significantly different from Broken Chairs (p<.05), for the same reason. 
These results should be accepted only tentatively, since expected values are 
low. If the data from both Intact and both Broken conditions are combined, so 
as to obtain satisfactory expected values, these combined distributions differ 
significantly (p<.Ol). Plainly SA interpretations are more likely in the Broken 
conditions, as expected. While the Broken conditions themselves differ from 
chance (assuming random choice of the 5 objects available), the Intact 
conditions do not. Since, by hypothesis, PN interpretations should occur only 
in Bear conditions, distributions from the two Bear conditions were combined 
and compared with the combined Chair conditions. These combined 
distributions do not differ significantly. The distribution of choices in Bear 
conditions is different from chance (p<.05), due to the low frequency of CA 
choices, but the distribution in Chair conditions is not. So although PN 
interpretations are more frequent in the Bear conditions, and CA 
interpretations more frequent in the Chair conditions, this tendency is 
unreliable. 
Test Phase: First and second choices. Control condition: The two subjects who 
selected the distractor object selected a bear and a chair as their second 
choices. The two subjects who refused to nominate a second choice had 
selected a bear and a chair for their first choice. The remaining 8 subjects 
chose the other object of the same kind as their first choice. Because of the 
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way in which test sets were assembled, this was always an object of different 
colour and state from the first-selected object. That is, no control child made 
choices consistent with SA or CA interpretation of the novel word. While two 
children's choices were consistent with PN interpretation (those who 
refused), one had previously selected a chair, for which this is surely not a 
candidate interpretation. This result seems to show that, despite the 
familiarity of the objects named, kind interpretations are still the favoured 
hypothesis. 
Experimental conditions: The only response consistent with PN 
interpretation is to refuse to nominate a second object, having selected the 
damaged/repaired training object as first choice. Of the 16 subjects whose 
first choices were consistent with PN interpretation, only one child 
conformed to this pattern of second-choice refusal (Intact Bear condition). In 
all, 4 children refused to nominate a second choice, and a further 4 chose the 
distractor object. Twenty-two subjects made first choices consistent with SA 
interpretation (17 in Broken conditions); 7 of these made S or SK second 
choices, all in Broken conditions. Seven subjects made first choices consistent 
with CA interpretation (discounting those subjects counted under PN 
interpretation); none of these made CK second choices. If those who made CK 
first choices are included, then of 23 subjects whose first choices are 
consistent with CA interpretation, 4 made C or CK second choices, all in 
Intact conditions. 
In view of the result obtained with the Control group, the numbers of 
children whose first and second choices are consistent with kind 
interpretation (= common noun interpretation, CN) were examined. There 
were 31 children whose first choices were consistent with CN interpretation; 
16 of these children made second choices of this sort, distributed as follows:-
Intact Bears - 7; Broken Bears - 3; Intact Chairs - 2; Broken Chairs - 4. 
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In view of the preceding observations, the interesting relationships 
between first and second choices and the training object seem to be same 
kind, same state and same colour. The distributions of these choice patterns 
across conditions is shown in Figure 3, together with residual patterns. This 
latter category is much larger when both choices are considered, not only 
because 8 subjects either refused or chose the distractor object on the second 
trial, but because the patterns of choice S-C and C-S cannot be related 
consistently to the training object. There were 9 subjects whose patterns were 
of this inconsistent sort, all in Chair conditions. 
12 IntactB BrokenB IntactC BrokenC 
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O~~~~~~~~~~~~¥-~~~~~~-¥~ 
~~~~-~~~~-~~~~-~~~~ 
Relation of Test Objects to Training Object 
Figure 3: Frequency of types of relation between selections and the training 
object. Key: 'Kind' - selections both same kind as training object; 
'Sta' - both same state (intact/damaged); 'Col' - both same colour. 
Inspection of Figure 3 makes it apparent that the only comparison worth 
making is Intact conditions vs. Broken conditions. Here X2=11.3 (p<.05), but it 
should be noted that expected values for state and colour cells (where the 
difference is located) are low. 
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4. Discussion 
The results obtained in this experiment are puzzling. Despite conditions 
being propitious for proper name learning in the Bear conditions (bear dolls 
being a thoroughly familiar object for which not only the common nouns 
bear and doll are presumably known to the subjects, but also the specific 
teddy or teddy bear), there is actually very little convincing evidence of proper 
name interpretation. Not only is the proportion of CK choices rather low in 
the Bear conditions, it is unexpectedly high in the Chair conditions, where 
proper name interpretation seems absolutely unlikely. Moreover, only one 
child who selected the training bear on the first test trial replied with no to 
the question 'Is there another one which is <novel word>?'. If we were obliged 
to choose between proper and common noun hypotheses for these results, 
common noun learning seems much more likely: in the bear conditions, the 
19 first choices of bears were equally distributed between CK and SK, and 10 of 
these children selected the other bear on the second test trial. 
However, it must be borne in mind that we have introduced a difference 
between the training bear and that same bear in the test phase, namely 
removal/restoration of a limb. Perhaps individual concepts are defined so 
tightly for these young subjects that the bear's identity cannot survive this 
small alteration, or perhaps our procedures were so unconvincing that the 
children did not consider the modified bear to be the same bear. In connection 
with the first of these hypotheses, Carey and Diamond (1977) reported a 75% 
error rate from 6 year-olds in a task of person recognition by means of the face 
(often miscalled a 'face recognition' task), in which the person was presented 
first with and then without 'paraphernalia' - a hat, sunglasses, etc., whereas 
the alternative person (forced choices were made from a pair) had matching 
paraphernalia. In addition, as noted in our Introduction, the fact that we ask 
whether there is another object bearing the novel name may be sufficient to 
shake a rather tentative hypothesis loose. 
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So far as the other interpretations are concerned, the evidence that 
children will make state adjective interpretations in Broken Bear or Chair 
conditions is reasonably strong: 17 of the 24 subjects in these conditions 
selected broken objects (12 objects of the same kind as the training object, and 
5 of the other kind) on the first test trial, and 7 of these 17 persisted with such 
choices on the second trial. So the ostensive frame 'This is <novel word>' will 
result in extrinsic-state adjective learning, under appropriate 
circumstances. As expected, there is very little evidence of any colour 
adjective interpretation: although the Intact Chair condition produced a fair 
proportion of first choices fitting this interpretation (5 of the 12 subjects), none 
of these subjects selected the other object of that colour as their second choice. 
The most straightforward explanation of the results obtained therefore 
seems to be that subjects made common noun interpretations of the novel 
word, except in the Broken Bear and Chair conditions, where they showed a 
tendency to make extrinsic-state adjective interpretations. 
While we have demonstrated what we sought to demonstrate, namely that 
extrinsic adjective learning from ostensive episodes is possible for two year-
olds, the weaknesses of this methodology are very apparent. As we noted in 
the Introduction, it is apt to overestimate proper name learning, and our 
results reinforce this doubt by showing so little evidence of such learning. 
Hall (1991) also sheds doubt on the original results of Katz et al (1974) and 
Gelman and Taylor (1984), since his subjects ignored the proper name 
syntactic cue except when faced with a creature of a familiar kind. If there is 
anything in the idea that loss of a limb (or some other small alteration) 
destroys the identity of the object, then it may be that proper name learning 
will only occur for familiar individuals. It seems likely, given the difficulties 
of conducting experiments of this kind, and the evident problems of 
interpreting their outcomes, that methods based on production of the novel 
word must be developed if substantial progress is to made. 
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Chapter 12: Two year-old Matching to Visible and Hidden Targets 
1. Introduction 
Among the properties that objects possess, only a very small number are of 
psychological interest. For example, the previous sentence did not begin with 
the word wheelbarrow, but this property - on account of its extraordinarily 
low salience - is hardly of any psychological interest. So negative properties, 
except in extraordinary circumstances, are of little importance. Likewise, 
while it is true that the first sentence began either with the word among or 
with the word wheelbarrow it is almost inconceivable that this true property 
could matter to anyone. This argument disposes of disjunctive properties. 
Similar arguments might reduce the number of psychologically interesting 
properties to manageable types of infinity, perhaps! Among those which 
survive, it is customary to make two further distinctions at least. First, some 
properties define sets which are countable, while others do not. For instance, 
this is one sentence, composed of ten words. It is usual to call these countable 
sets kinds, so we may distinguish the relevant properties as properties 
specifying kind-membership. This sort of property is commonly called a 
sortal property. Many kinds are of fundamental psychological importance. 
Other properties do not define countable sets: e.g., every part of a red thing is 
red, so red is not a sortal; cf. no part of a bird is a bird, etc. This makes it 
possible to count the birds in some defined location, but not the red things. Of 
those properties which do not define countable sets, some - like the materials 
from which an object is made, or the colours of these materials, are inherent 
in the object in the sense that rapid change in these properties is uncommon. 
We shall refer to these as qualities or, for emphasis, as intrinsic qualities. 
Others - like the temperature of the object, whether it is clean or dirty, wet or 
dry, etc. are readily changed without affecting the object's identity. We shall 
refer to these as states or, for emphasis, extrinsic states. Qualities or states 
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will be of psychological importance, depending on object, organism and other 
circumstances, to this or that degree. 
In Chapter 8 it is suggested that young children may have difficulty in 
holding the intrinsic qualities of objects in mind, unless these qualities are 
salient. It is further suggested that while some intrinsic qualities may be 
naturally salient, such as particularly bright colours, others will be salient 
only if they violate an expectation of the subject or answer to some present 
need of the subject. Typically, in experiments with young children neither of 
these enabling conditions apply. It should therefore be anticipated that, in 
tasks requiring some mental effort of attention or memory directed on an 
intrinsic quality of an object, failure should result. One result that fits with 
this hypothesis is the absence of adjectives denoting intrinsic qualities from 
one year-old speech (Nelson, 1976), at a time when nouns denoting 
particulars and kinds, and adjectives denoting intrinsic states, are readily 
acquired. Another is the difficulty that young children have in free 
classification, a task in which objects sharing various qualities are sorted 
into small groups bound by internal similarity (e.g. Inhelder and Piaget, 
1964). With the usual materials and methods, children do not show much 
competence in this task until they are around 4 years old. While some have 
made claims for earlier competence (Sugarman, 1983), radical 
simplifications of both materials and method have had to be introduced to 
demonstrate such early competence. 
Even if the evidence from early naming and free classification is accepted 
as it stands, it may be objected that these are rather indirect and cumbersome 
ways of demonstrating a difficulty in directing the mind at intrinsic qualities. 
Moreover, in the case of free classification it is not obvious that any real 
mental effort need be involved. Would the redness, roundness and smallness 
of a small red counter not be immediately apparent? There is, of course, an 
argument that in order to sort such materials according to their colour, 
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shape and size it is necessary to abstract the relevant qualities from the global 
mixture embodied in each object, and to hold them in mind while searching 
the set of unsorted objects (which may be large and situated well away from 
the sorted array) for a suitable companion: however, this argument is by no 
means beyond dispute, despite the promising results of Smith and Kemler 
(e.g. 1977). Furthermore, success in free classification is usually measured 
by the amount of consistent sorting, so that a child who puts together some 
red objects is then supposed to put together blue objects, etc., rather than to 
shift to, say, round objects for the next sorted group. So the difficulty in 
achieving this sort of success may be due not to the difficulty in attending to 
(abstracting) certain qualities, but to the difficulty of understanding that 
different qualities (red, blue, etc.) belong to the same quality type (colour). 
Verbally-directed matching, though a less commonly used technique, is 
considerably simpler than the free classification task (Campbell, Donaldson 
and Young, 1976; Daehler, Lonardo and Butatko ,1979; Fenson, Cameron and 
Kennedy, 1988; Fenson, Vella and Kennedy, 1989): these matching tasks 
simply require the child to select an object from a set to match ('be the same 
as' or 'be like') a target object. There is no difficulty in arranging that target 
and set lie in the same field of view, nor is there any need for the subject to 
think about higher-order qualities of qualities such as colour, shape, etc. So 
such a task constitutes a very much more direct test of children's ability to 
attend to the qualities of an object. That is, if they cannot complete such a 
simple task, it hard to see what the cause of their difficulty might be other 
than a difficulty in directing attention to the relevant qualities of the objects. 
One obvious alternative source of explanation, however, is that they do not 
understand the words used. Short of using non-verbal methods, it is difficult 
to exclude this alternative completely. What we have done in the present 
experiment is to use identically-shaped objects belonging to familiar kind 
categories (balls and lamps). Since, by hypothesis, there is no difficulty in 
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attending to such simple quality-specified kinds, the children's success in 
matching according to kind should provide a good indication of the level of 
their understanding of the task as presented to them. To reduce the role of 
searching skills, the size of the object set was limited to four. 
Daehler et al., (1979) studied subjects aged 20 to 32 months, using a range 
of matching tasks. Selection was always from a set of four alternatives. In a 
picture-picture exact matching task proportions correct were .58 (mean age 
26 months) and .85 (mean age 30 months). Object-object exact matching 
proved considerably easier with .87 of the sample responding correctly (mean 
age 23 months). A final experiment contrasted object-object exact matching 
with 'basic-level' object-object matching - in our terms this is kind-matching 
with variation in colour, size and some other unspecified qualities. At 22 
months mean age, proportions correct were. 70 (exact matching) and .62 
(basic-level matching). None of the matching tasks explored matching based 
on an intrinsic quality such as colour. It is notable in these findings that even 
exact matching of replica to target is not entirely straightforward for children 
approaching three years old. Fenson et al., (1988), using similar methods 
with two year-old subjects, discovered that the prepotent factor in 
determining matching success was 'perceptual' similarity - quality 
similarity in the terms of the present paper - rather than whether target and 
match belonged to basic-level or to higher-order categories. Thus (p.904), 'it 
was no easier to match a golfball with a football or a poodle with a collie (basic 
matches) than to match a sheep with a squirrel or a hammer with a saw 
(superordinate matches)'. The highest levels of matching performance 
observed in their study - .79 - were comparable to Daehler et al. 's results, and 
occurred when matching very similar-looking birds, animals, etc. There is 
ample evidence from this study, then, that two year-olds match objects from 
quality-specified kinds without much difficulty. 
In addition to a straightforward matching task, and following it, subjects 
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in our study also carried out a matching task where the target object was 
hidden from view. In this task there is plainly mental effort involved in 
recalling the characteristics of the hidden object. This task was included in 
order to see whether this would affect kind-matching and intrinsic-quality 
matching differently and also because, so far as we have been able to 
determine, no study of matching to a hidden target has hitherto been 
published. There have been, however, studies of non-verbal delayed matching 
to sample (see Overman, 1990, for review). In such tasks the target is 
presented and a reward recovered from a food well below it; the target is then 
removed and, following a 10-second delay, replaced by two objects, one of 
which matches. The subject then chooses one or other of the two objects, and 
is rewarded or not. This procedure is then repeated, in the most popular 
version using a novel target object (the so-called trial-unigue method), until 
some criterion of success is achieved. Perhaps surprisingly, children find 
this task very difficult: Overman reports that around 300 trials were needed to 
reach criterion with subjects almost three years old! Although, on the face of 
it, this task could be said to involve a hidden object, in some ways this poor 
result calls the method in question. Since what is involved here is not strictly 
speaking matching but merely recognition of an object seen 10 seconds before, 
it seems very likely that the difficulties are caused by failure to understand 
the task, rather than by any cognitive difficulty in carrying it out. This 
possibility is raised in the interesting conference discussion that follows 
Overman's paper. 
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Subjects: Thirty-eight children took part in the experiment (mean age 2;3, 
range 1;8 to 2;10). There were 21 boys and 17 girls. All subjects attended 
Mother and Toddler groups in Central Scotland. 
Materials: Two cylindrical covers were used to enclose the sample to be 
matched, one transparent and one opaque. Objects used were four one-inch 
diameter balls (hollow practice golf balls), two blue and two green, and four 
miniature table lamps, two-inches tall, two blue and two green. The balls and 
lamps were painted with the same blue and green paints. 
Procedure: Subjects were tested in a room or area set aside for the purpose. 
All subjects had met the experimenter on at least one previous occasion. 
Mothers were present during the experiment but were asked not to intervene. 
Each child carried out two matching tasks of three trials each, which were 
video-recorded for later analysis. Subjects first matched objects to a visible 
target object, then to a hidden target object. In the first task one of the four 
types of object was randomly selected as a target for matching (green ball, 
blue ball, green lamp or blue lamp). The object was shown to the child ('Look 
at this!') and the target object was then placed under the transparent cover 
('Look! l' m going to hide this under here'). Then four objects, comprising 
one of each type, were presented to the child. Thus one was exactly the same 
as the target object, one was the same colour but a different type of object, one 
was the same type of object but a different colour and one object differed in 
both colour and type. The child was then asked 'Can you show me which one 
of these (pointing to the four choice objects) is the same as the one hiding 
under here (pointing to the target object under the transparent cover)'. The 
child was then encouraged to place the chosen object on top of the cover. On 
the two subsequent trials the child was asked 'Can you show me which one of 
these (pointing to the remaining objects) is like this one hiding under here 
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(pointing to the target object under the transparent cover)'. In the second 
matching task, the target object was of the other type and colour. Thus if a 
blue ball was the target in the first task, a green lamp was used in the 
second, etc. The procedure followed was identical except that the target object 
was placed under the opaque cover. At the conclusion of this task the child 
was asked to say what was under the cover. 
Scoring As a rough measure of success the number of attributes shared by 
match and target was counted for each trial. Three measures were used in 
analysis: the scores for trial 1 (81, range 0-2), for trials 1 and 2 combined (812, 
range 1-3), and for all three trials (8123, range 2-4). 8cores for visible and 
hidden target trials are further distinguished as VI, HI, etc. 
3. Results 
Sex: Inspection of the data showed that subject sex had no effect on any 
measure, so results are reported without distinction of sex. 
Visible us. Hidden Targets: The cumulated scores for Trials 1-3 are shown in 
Table 1, together with tests of the null hypothesis that subjects are choosing 
objects randomly. It is evident that performance with a visible target is better 
than chance, while performance with a hidden target is not significantly 
different from chance selection. Performance with a visible target is also 
significantly better than with a hidden target through the 3 trials. 
Age: Although age was not manipulated in this experiment, the ages of 
children used covered a fair range. Age correlations were therefore 
inspected, but none proved to be significant. 
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Table 1: Cumulated scores on successive matching trials where target object 
is visible or hidden. One-sample t-tests of J1=expected chance score 
(two-tailed), * -p<.05, ** -p<.Ol. 
Mean 8tDev t, df=37 Chance score 
81 
Visible Target (VI) 1.47 0.56 5.24** 1 
Hidden Target (HI) 1.16 0.72 1.36ns 1 
812 
Visible Target (VI2) 2.71 0.61 7.17** 2 
Hidden Target (H12) 1.97 0.85 -0.19ns 2 
8123 
Visible Target (VI23) 3.53 0.60 5.38** 3 
Hidden Target (HI23) 2.89 0.76 -0.85ns 3 
VI-HI 0.32 0.90 2.15* 0 
V12-H12 0.74 1.13 4.01** 0 
V123-H123 0.63 1.03 3.80** 0 
Attributes: On the first trial the object selected could match the target object 
with respect to colour (C), type (T), both (B) or neither (N). On subsequent 
trials choices were restricted by previous choices, since objects chosen were 
removed. The distribution of choices across the 3 trials is therefore shown in 
the form of a tree for Visible Target (Figure 1) and Hidden Target (Figure 2). 
In the trees, thickness of line represents the frequency of a particular 
selection and these frequencies are given by the number adjoining each node. 
While Figure 1 is complete, Figure 2 presents only the selections in the first 
two trials, since the absence of structure is already obvious. 
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Figure 1: Selections over 3 trials in Visible Target condition. Key: B - selection 
matches both attributes; K - matches kind of object only; C -
matches colour of object only; N - matches neither attribute. 
Figure 2: Selections over 2 trials in Hidden Target condition. Key: as Figure 1. 
The distribution of selections below each node of Figure 1 were examined, 
using Chi -square or binomial tests, for significant difference from chance 
(even) distributions. Those which survive these tests are shown in Figure 3. 
None of the corresponding distributions in the Hidden Target condition 
survive such tests. 
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1 
Figure 3: Selection patterns significantly different from chance on Visible 
Target task. Key as Figure 1. 
Verbal Judgments:Twenty-two subjects replied to the question 'What's under 
here?', while 16 said they didn't know. Of the 22 who responded, 17 were 
correct: this proportion is significantly different from the chance expectation 
of 11 (two-tailed binomial test, p =.017). Only one child mentioned the colour of 
the hidden target while 21 mentioned the type of object. No child mentioned 
both. The distributions of scores on HI, H12 and H123 were compared with 
the distribution of verbal responses using the Chi-square test for association. 
No evidence of association was found for any measure. 
4. Discussion 
The results show very plainly that when the target is visible, children in 
the age-range studied choose objects of the same kind as the target object 
without much difficulty (32/38 - .85 - on Trial 1, 27/38 - .71 - on Trial 2). These 
results are broadly comparable with those obtained by Daehler et al. (1979) 
and Fenson et al. (1988). However, there is no evidence that object colour is 
used as a base for matching. Subjects might just as well have been colour-
blind. When the target object is hidden, there is no evidence for matchin~ of 
any sort, not even exact replica - target matching. While memory for the 
qualities of the hidden object is undoubtedly a potential factor here, the 
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distribution of choices was perfectly flat even on Trial 1, which immediately 
followed the hiding of the object without any delay or interruption of attention. 
So even if memory is one cause of difficulty, it is certainly not the only one. It 
certainly came as a moderate surprise that children could not match on the 
basis of kind-membership in the hidden-target condition, since most of the 
indirect evidence relating to attention to kinds (naming, sorting, etc.) 
suggests that it should not be much more difficult to recall what a hidden 
object is than where it is. 
Children's verbal judgments regarding the hidden object are hard to 
evaluate, because of the large proportion of 'don't know' responses, but 
perhaps the preponderance of (partially) correct judgments amongst those 
who did respond raises a doubt about whether subjects really understood the 
task. On the other hand, it may be simply that subjects could better recall the 
hidden object when not confronted with other objects of different type. 
Although not a matching task, the task reported by Sugarman (1987) has 
some strong affinities with matching. Using 18 to 42 month-old subjects, 
Sugarman studied search patterns among the objects of a scrambled array, 
some of which had been provided with attractive concealed stickers. 
According to Sugarman, subjects younger than 42 months showed a 
pronounced tendency only to examine objects of the same type as those 
already found to have stickers. However, there are grounds for taking this as 
a minor over-simplification. Arguably, younger subjects show such a 
tendency only when the other, stickerless objects do not share kind-
membership with those which do have stickers. For example, when stickers 
occurred only under green brushes and yellow (solid) triangles, younger 
subjects showed a comparable level of interest in yellow brushes but next to 
no interest in green triangles: in the 18-month group proportions of choices 
in these 4 categories were .48, .22, .25 and .03 respectively (Figure IB, p.176). 
Older groups show a similar ordering of choices, although the absolute 
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differences decrease, reaching approximate equality around 42 months. This 
may be an indication that a shared intrinsic quality of shape is not sufficient 
on its own to establish a class of objects as a kind. In terms of the distinctions 
of the opening paragraph of our Introduction, a quality of shape, such as 
triangularity, is not necessarily sortal. While every part of a red thing is red, 
and no part of a bird is a bird, some parts of a solid square are square (i.e., it 
could be divided into squares). Sugarman's task, therefore, where the 
material is 'overlapping' - that is, shares intrinsic qualities of shape, colour, 
etc. - can be used to draw conclusions about matching abilities, e.g., in the 
case just discussed, that shape matching presents similar difficulties to 
colour matching to very young subjects. 
In conclusion, we think it is evident that verbally-directed matching is a 
promising method for exploring young children's ability to attend to the 
qualities of objects. It is also evident that nothing in the present study injures 
the hypothesis that they find it hard to attend to intrinsic qualities. Only one 
intrinsic quality, colour, is investigated here and, although there was no sign 
that two year olds could attend to this quality, further research is needed 
before succumbing to generalisation. The surprising results obtained in the 
hidden target condition show that young children's fluent naming of basic-
level kind categories may be misleading so far as their grasp of the 
corresponding concepts is concerned. A very strong hypothesis consistent 
with these results would be that two year-olds have a problem with kind 
permanence, just as one year-olds have a problem with object permanence. 
No doubt this is too strong, but it might provide a starting point for further 
research. 
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Cha pter 13: Analyzing Free Classifications 
1. Introduction 
The free classification task has been mentioned in several places in this 
dissertation. As the discussion of it in the previous chapter showed, success 
in this task seems to require something more than the ability to focus 
attention on some quality of the objects sorted. For after sorting, say, all of the 
nill. objects available, it is necessary to switch to another quality of the same 
kind, say blue, if consistent sorting is to be achieved. So success in the task, 
which is taken by Vygotsky (1962) as evidence of formation of the relevant 
quality concepts\ and by Inhelder and Piaget (1964) as evidence of 
coordination of the intension and extension of the relevant classes, may 
nevertheless underestimate children's abilities. 
This conclusion is also drawn by Ricciuti (1965) and by Sugarman (1983), 
whose research showed that the 'graphic' work involved in arranging objects 
on a table-top may constitute an extra difficulty. If the sequence in which 
children touch or handle objects is examined, then evidence of use of kind 
concepts is apparent in one year-olds (Ricciuti) and of quality concepts in 
slightly older children (Sugarman). A similar conclusion was reached by 
Markman et al.,19Bl, who found that sorting into transparent bags improved 
performance. 
The task has other weaknesses, apart from those just mentioned. When I 
have talked about it, I have frequently encountered the comment that 'it's just 
an Art Class', or more precisely, that no demand is placed on the children to 
sort in this or that way, and so it underestimates for that reason too. Lastly, in 
this catalogue of methodological frailties, there is the fact that the child's 
performance is difficult to measure. What counts as 'a consistent sort' or 'a 
graphic collection', etc. is often left to judgments which are easily discounted 
or disputed. Moreover, even when the materials invite such comparisons, 
1 Actually, only of 'pseudo-concepts'; 'true' concepts require further demonstrations 
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there has been little attempt made to assess the relative importance of the 
available sorting criteria (usually shape, colour, and size) in determination of 
the child's performance. 
So far as this last point is concerned, the oversight is to some extent 
excusable. In a sort of 20-30 objects (the usual amount) structured by three 
attributes, the sorter may have employed one or more of at least 7 different 
matching criteria in arranging the objects, for objects may match each other 
on all three attributes (one case), on any combination of two attributes (three 
cases), or on anyone attribute (three cases). So assessment of the relative 
importance of these criteria will involve examining each sorted array seven 
times. Further, the research referred to above shows that children find it 
easier to sort objects together (or to match them, as the preceding chapter 
showed) when the objects share values on several attributes, and easiest of all 
when the objects grouped are identical. Kemler and Smith (e.g. 1979) have 
demonstrated across a range of tasks that young children are much more 
sensitive to global similarity than to particulate similarity. It follows that, 
when materials of the kind described in this paragraph are sorted, a child 
who sorts on the basis of a higher matching criterion, say all three attributes, 
will necessarily compose groups that match on all lower criteria in the 
lattice. It is therefore hard to be sure whether a certain amount of, say, colour 
grouping is really indicative of attention focussed on colour, or whether it is 
just a by-product of attention focussed on some more global matching 
criterion. 
Faced with these various difficulties, it is hardly surprising that the free 
classification task has won few followers in the research community. 
However, it ~ popular with pre-school children, who sort happily and 
spontaneously, regardless of instruction. And it is, potentially at least, a rich 
'response', capable of providing more and surer information about the 
concepts of young children than the yes/no answers or reaction times 
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typically collected. Moreover, while the latter sorts of measure may be 
preferred when a researcher wishes to investigate differences between 
conditions, or age effects, or even to draw diagnostic conclusions about a 
population on the basis of aggregate data, they are next to useless for 
purposes of individual diagnosis. 
In the present chapter I present a set of computer-based methods for 
analysis of performance in the free classification task in the hope that these 
methods are superior to previous techniques, and that their use may lead to 
more disciplined and focussed use of this task with pre-school children. I 
also demonstrate their application with respect to two different data sets: one 
of these (Gray, 1986) is used to investigate age differences in consistency of 
sorting and in the use of different matching criteria in sorting; the other 
(Kontos, 1989) is used to investigate the causal relationship between the order 
of handling to-be-sorted objects and the spatial order present in the sorted 
array. 
2. Analysis of sequential and spatial structure 
2.1 Grouping structures and measures 
The order in which the sorted objects are handled specifies a seguence of 
objects. Endpoints of such a sequence have just one neighbour, while other 
objects have two. Neighbouring objects match or not, and whether they match 
depends on the matching criterion. For example, if a blue square is followed 
by a red square then these objects match if similarity of shape is the 
matching criterion, but not if the matching criterion is similarity of colour; if 
the matching criterion is similarity of both shape and colour, then they do not 
match either. Suppose they do match. Then the two objects constitute a 
seguential group under the specified matching criterion. Other objects may 
be added to this group, provided that they match a member of it. Proceeding 
in this way, we determine a grouping structure for the sequence, for each 
possible matching criterion. If there are two bases of matching - such as 
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shape and colour in the case discussed above - there will be three matching 
criteria. In general, for N bases of matching, we have 2?t\ matching criteria. 
These grouping structures may be represented as vectors {nl ,n2,n3 ••••••••• n k } 
in which n l is the number of groups of size 1, ~ of size 2, etc., where the 
largest possible group is of size k. Groups of size 1 are not groups at all, of 
course, but isolated objects. From these vectors two plausible summary 
measures of grouping structure are:-
(1) Gse = mean group size - 1 where mean group size is L iNi 
maximum group size - 1 L Ni 
The subtraction of 1 from numerator and denominator in (1) adjusts for the 
fact that the smallest possible real group is 2, so that Gse = ° when all objects 
are isolates. Thus Gse is a quantity varying between ° and 1. 
(2) Pse = number of objects in groups of size> 2 
total number of objects in sequence 
For example, for vector {9,3,4,0,0}, Gse = 27/16 - 1 = .085, and Pse=.l8 = .667. 
9-1 27 
For vector {9,0,1,0,3), Pse=.667 as before; however, mean group size has 
increased, so Gse=.135. Plainly, these measures respond to different aspects 
of structure. Gse measures the consistency with which the sorter has 
adhered to the grouping principle corresponding to the current matching 
criterion. Pse measures completeness of grouping, but is insensitive to the 
size of groups achieved in sorting: sorting a set of objects into matching pairs 
will yield a Pse of 1.0, even though much of the potential for grouping has 
been ignored. 
Spatial arrangement of a set of objects on a table top specifies a 2-
dimensional plot of the objects. Unlike the sequential case, calculation of two 
neighbours for an object is here to some degree arbitrary. There are three 
difficult cases:-
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a) An object may be so isolated that it seems bizarre to count it as having any 
neighbours 
b) An object may be equidistant from more than two nearest objects, so that it 
is unclear which two to count as neighbours 
c) Three or more objects may lie in a line. Consider the end object: obviously 
the next object is a neighbour, but should the next but one object be counted 
as a neighbour, supposing that it is next nearest? If the sorter wished to 
mark a connection between the third object and the first, should s/he not 
have placed it below, above or on the other side of the first object? 
In the analyses reported below, these cases are dealt with in the following 
way:-
(a) Isolated objects are counted as having only one neighbour, the nearest 
object. An object is considered isolated if the distance to the nearest object 
is more than half the distance to the furthest object. 
(b) Coins are tossed to determine two neighbours from those available. 
(c) Neighbours are selected from those objects accessible from the current 
object by an uninterrupted straight-line path. So in the case of three or 
more objects in a line, the end objects are never counted as neighbours. 
These decisions are uncomfortable, but necessary if comparability of 
sequential and spatial structures is to be achieved. Since sequence elements 
always have two neighbours (apart from the two endpoints), so should 
spatial-array elements. The decision with respect to (c) is a liberal one. That 
is, it leads to the attribution of more structure, since end-objects in linear 
groups must find a second neighbour elsewhere. It may therefore favour 
spatial structure over sequential structure. Once the determination of 
neighbours is complete, analysis of spatial structure proceeds exactly as for 
sequential structure, and Gsp and Psp may be calculated. 
Of the two measures computed, only Gse and Gsp are novel. While 
previous research has rarely examined the structure implied by order of 
handling, counting the number of objects sorted (which is the basis of Psp) is 
commonly done, particularly with younger subjects. However, even with this 
simple measure, it is an innovation to evaluate structure separately for 
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different matching criteria. 
The free sorting task typically involves moving objects from an unsorted 
'heap' onto a sorting board or table. So the order in which objects are moved 
defines a sequential structure and the arrangement on the board defines a 
spatial structure. Three measures of discrepancy have been examined to 
compare these structures:-
(a) dscrp - root mean square of differences between the vectors 
(b) Gsp - Gse 
(c) Psp - Pse 
In general, we should expect to find positive discrepancies: much more 
structure can be achieved in a spatial arrangement, and this is not just 
because of the liberal rule adopted for counting spatial neighbours. To see 
this, consider the task of sorting the set of material shown in Figure 1. We 
might begin by setting out the squares in a line of successive red, yellow and 
blue colour groups, then set out the circles in a line immediately below, again 
in successive red, yellow and blue groups. Finally, we repeat this process 
with the triangles. Such an arrangement will have Gsp=1.O for all three 
matching criteria. However, Gse (assuming the objects are moved in the 
most advantageous way) will be 1.0 for shape and for shape+colour, but only 
.36 for colour. 
To achieve these analyses, the objects in each sort are represented as lists 
of qualities (ordered by dimensions thought relevant for matching), 
numbered according to order of handling, and listed in that order, together 
with up to two spatial neighbours (identified by list order) specified for each 
object. These data structures are screened for errors and then the various 
grouping vectors and summary measures are computed. Since becoming 
interested in this problem six years ago, I have developed a fairly 
comprehensive set of computer programs to carry out these tasks, and a 
further stage of analysis to be described below. Some details of these 
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programs are described below. The procedures followed in this analysis are 
illustrated for the example sort shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Twenty-seven objects varying in shape and colour. Order of 
handling is signified by the number above each icon. Spatial 
neighbours, where not obvious are indicated by linking lines. 
In the analysis below R is red, T is triangle, etc. 
Data structure: BT,2,7; BT,1,3; .... BS,5,12; RC,1,8; ... YC,14,22 
RT,9,17; ... YT,21,15;YS,17,24; .... YT,26,21 
Grouping vectors. 
Criterion SHAPE sequential {O,3,4,O,O,O,O,O,1} 
spatial{O,1,4,1,O,O,O,O,1} 
Note that the match 27-21 combines objects 26-27-21-22 into a single spatial 
group of size 4. 
Criterion COLOUR sequential {O,O,3,O,O,3,O,O,O} 
spatial {O,O,O,1,1,O,O,O,2} 
Note that the matches 6-12 and 16-9 create 2 large spatial groups; since 21 and 
27 do not match, the yellow objects form one spatial group of size 4 and one of 
size 5. 
Criterion SHAPE+COLOUR sequential {2,2,7} 
spatial {2,2,7} 
Note that 21 and 22 are isolates (no matching neighbours). Since no match 
occurs across any of the links between rows, the spatial and sequential 
vectors are identical. Summary measures are shown in Table 1. 
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Measure 
Criterion Gsp Gse Gsp - Gse Psp Pse Psp - Pse dscrp 
Shape .36 .30 .06 1.00 1.00 .02 .24 
Colour .72 .44 .28 1.00 1.00 .00 4.90 
Shape&Colour .73 .73 .00 .93 .93 .00 .00 
Table 1: Summary measures for the sort in Figure 1. 
These measures show that, for the sort in Figure 1, there is more 
consistent grouping in the spatial arrangement than there is in the handling 
sequence, particularly where colour is concerned. 
2.1 Computer Programs 
These exist at present as a menu-driven package ofBBC-Basic programs 
running on an Acorn Archimedes. Since the programs are pure Basic and 
make no special operating system calls, they can be adapted without difficulty 
to run on any machine. The programs take a textfile of sorting data and 
convert it to a textfile of grouping vectors and/or summary measures, 
suitable for input to standard packages such as Minitab, BMDP, etc., where 
further analysis may be carried out. The following programs are provided:-
Data Description This program collects from the user information about the 
material to be sorted, and any subject or condition variables which are 
included in the input data file. This information is saved and used by other 
programs. 
Raw Data Checker This program uses the information in the descriptor file 
to check the raw data file (text) for consistency: input errors are easily made 
when entering the voluminous and repetitive raw data required. 
Datafile Maker This program converts the raw data file into a Basic data 
file. 
Analyzer This program calculates grouping vectors and summary 
measures as described above, and displays, prints or saves this information. 
Information selected for saving may be saved either as a Basic data file or as 
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an ASCII textfile for analysis by statistical packages. The core algorithm for 
computing grouping vectors operates within a loop which cycles through the 
~\ matching criteria. This algorithm is straightforward for the case of 
sequential structure. When spatial structure is computed, the algorithm has 
the following form:-
1. Point to start of object list 
Clear group list 
2. If object list is empty 
compute grouping vectors 
exit 
3. Pop current object 0 from object list 
Clear neighbour list 
Push O's matching neighbours onto neighbour list 
4. If 0 belongs (has already been assigned) to a group G 
make G the current group 
go to 5 
Else push new group G onto group list 
assign 0 to G 
make G the current group 
5. If neighbour list is empty 
go to 2 
Else pop current neighbour N from neighbour list 
6. [0 belongs to G] 
If N belongs to no group 
assign N to G 
goto 5 
7. If 0 and N belong to G 
got05 
8. [0 and N belong to different groups G' and G"] 
If G' precedes G" on group list 
reassign all existing members of G" to G' 
remove G" from group list 
make G' the current group G 
Else reassign all existing members of G' to G" 
remove G' from group list 
make G" the current group G 
9. Go to 5 
When sequential structure is computed, one or other of the conditions of 5,6 
and 7 is always true, so rule 8 is never needed. 
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Simulator The probability distributions of these measures, particularly the 
spatial measures, is hard to assess. In the case of sequential measures, work 
in the theory of runs (e.g. David and Barton, 1962) should provide solutions. 
Obviously the distributions of Gsp and Gse are sharply skewed towards zero, 
since values are sparse in the upper range. For the material of Figure 1 a 
perfect sort yields a G=l, but the next highest value (with, say, shape as 
criterion) involves 4 groups and a G=5.75/8, which is .72. Because of the 
resulting uncertainties regarding random expectations, a simulator was 
constructed. This program generates a random sequence of N objects, drops 
them randomly into an N x N grid, and works out spatial neighbours 
according to the rules given above. 
The only modest difficulty here is in organizing the search for a second 
neighbour, which is achieved by reducing the list of potentially blocking 
objects: a first list consists of the first neighbour together with other close 
objects rejected in previous cycles because of blocking; this is then reduced to 
only those objects inside the circle based on the line between the current object 
and the current candidate neighbour as diameter. Surviving objects are 
tested for clearance from this line. If any fail to clear, then the candidate 
neighbour is pushed onto the blocker list, and the loop is re-entered with the 
next candidate. 
Using this simulator, 1000 random sorts of the Figure 1 material were 
analyzed (running time about 2 hours). Some of the resulting distributions 
are shown in Figure 2, overleaf. 
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Figure 2: Cumulated frequency distributions for 1000 simulated random sorts 
of the material shown in Figure 1. 
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2.2 Derived simiJarity extraction 
A second stage of analysis which has proved useful is based on the 
observation made in the Introduction that matching based on higher criteria 
entails matching according to all lower criteria. Thus if two neighbouring 
objects match with respect to Shape & Colour, it follows that they match with 
respect to Shape and also with respect to Colour. So a sort might exhibit a 
certain amount of consistency on some low-level criterion such as colour, not 
because the sorter had paid any attention to colour, but simply because, in 
putting together objects which looked like each other in some more global 
way, s/he necessarily puts together objects of the same colour. As described in 
the Introduction, the question of interest in free sorting studies is usually 
whether and to what degree the subject is capable of forming groups 
consistently according to some lower matching criterion. Clearly this 
assessment can only be made confidently after extraction of any derived 
similarity engendered by more global matching according to a higher 
criterion. 
Once understood, this process of criterion extraction is fairly simply 
carried out. If a set of objects is fully sorted according to some higher 
criterion, and no other neighbour relations exist between the objects, then the 
derived consistencies (G measures) on all lower criteria are easily calculated. 
For example, if the set of Figure 1 is sorted completely into 9 groups of three 
identical objects, and each object finds its two spatial neighbours within the 
group of 3 to which it belongs, then Gsp(shape & colour) is course 1.0, and 
Gsp(shape) and Gsp(colour) are both (3-1)/(9-1) = .25. It follows that in an 
actual sort of this type, the minimum value for Gsp(shape/colour) will be .25, 
and the residual Gsp may be obtained by subtracting this value from 
measured Gsp. I have assumed that this may be generalised to the case 
where Gsp(higher criterion) is < 1.0 in the obvious way. So, in general, where 
maxO represents maximum group sizeO, 
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Residual G(level i) = G(level i) - max(level j>i) - 1 . G(level j) 
max(level i) - 1 
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In application of this method it is necessary to proceed cyclically, first 
calculating residuals after extracting the similarity due to matching 
according to the highest criterion, then reducing these residuals further by 
successively extracting the similarity due to the several criteria at the next 
lower level, etc. There are, of course, no 'upward' or 'sideways' effects, since 
there is always a way of rearranging a lower-order group so that higher-
order or same-order groupings disappear. By the same token, 'downward' 
effects are confined to those criteria which are included in the higher 
criterion. 
3. Application of these methods 
3.1 Gray (1986)Data 
Gray collected free sorts of 30 objects varying in colour (10 red, 10 yellow, 10 
blue), shape (10 rectangles, 10 cylinders, 10 triangles) and size (15 large, 15 
small). Colours, shapes and sizes were only partially balanced. There were 
either 5 or no objects for each combination of two values (e.g., 5 large blue 
objects, but no blue triangles, etc.) and either 2, 3 or no objects for each 
combination of three values (e.g. 2 large red triangles, 3 small red triangles, 
no blue triangles). Her subjects were 20 children in each of three age-groups, 
mean ages 3;5, 4;2 and 5;2. 
These data were analyzed according to the procedures just described. The 
results for measures Gsp and Gse are shown in Figure 3. The most obvious 
feature of these results is the strong similarity between spatial and sequential 
measures. Correlations between these measures range from. 74 to .87 (3 
years), from .71 to .93 (4 years) and from .45 to .82 (5 years). So the order in 
which the objects are handled (at least so far as younger subjects are 
concerned) is strongly associated with the manner in which they are placed 
on the board. 
Chapter 13 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
J ~:: 
"" 0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
Gsp - 5 year-olds (N=20) 
0.0 ~=~~;i;I.,I:i;,i;i;i;i;;;;;a.&;;;;;';;;;;';;;U,.I~~~~,L:;l~ 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
j ~:: 
"" 0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
Shape Colour S ize ShA:C ShA:S CA:S All 
CritErion 
Gsp - 4 year-olds (N=20) 
0.1 
O.O~=.:.I.,I;i;=;i;I.,I:i~~;,i;i;i;i;;;i:.U"I~u..~;;;;;,;a~~ 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
j ~:: 
"" 0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
Shape Colour Size ShA:C ShA:S CA:S All 
Criterion 
Gsp - 3 year-ohls (N=20) 
0.0 ~~;J,.Li;i;i;i;i;lU.,.ti~i;i;iI.,I~;i;i;iI.,I~~~~~~ 
Shape Colour Size ShA:C ShA:S CA:S All 
Criterion 
! 
! 
::E 
a 
::E 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
J ~:: 
"" 0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
Page 245 
Gse - 5 year-olds (N=20) 
0.0 ~""".a,.&M=;;a".ti;O~;;;a..t;;;;;;';;;;;';;;;a.&l~;:;;,u~;;;;jJ~~ 
Colour Size ShA:C ShA:S C A:S All 
Criterion 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 Gse - 4 year-olds (N=20) 
0.6 
0.6 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
Shape Colour Size ShA:C ShA:S C A:S All 
Criterion 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 Gse - 3 year-olds (N=20) 
0.6 
0.6 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
Shape Colour Size Sh A:C ShA:S C A:S All 
Criterion 
Figure 3: Mean values for G(spatial) and G(sequential) for all matching 
criteria (Data from Gray, 1985)_ Error bars are Standard Errors. 
The other obvious features are the improvement in performance with age, 
which is hardly surprising, and the apparent cross-over from colour-based 
sorting - which is dominant in the 3 year-old group, to shape- based sorting. 
Analysis of variance confirms these observations. 2 For example, a 3 (age-
2 In this analysis 6 subjects who sorted fewer than 11 of the 30 objects were discarded, 
since the expected G scores for random sorts climb rapidly with falling numbers of objects . 
Five of these subjects were 3 year-olds, and one a 4 year-old . Of the remaining 54 subjects, 
only one sorted fewer than 20 objects (18). 
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groups) x 7 (criteria: shape, colour, size, etc.) x 2 (modes: spatial, sequential) 
mixed-model ANOVA, with Age as between-subject factor and Criterion and 
Mode as within- subject factors, shows main effects of Age (F[2,51]=4.30, 
p<.05), Mode (F[1,51]=17.38, p<.OOl), and Criterion (F[6,306]=12.72, p<.OOl). 
The interaction effect of Age and Criterion is also significant (F[12,306]=2.39, 
p<.Ol). This complicated interaction effect shows (as is apparent from 
inspection of Figure 3) that focussing attention on one particular variety of 
consistency may be misleading. For instance, spatial consistency with 
respect to Shape & Colour & Size exhibits a pronounced U-shape 
developmentally, with a dip at 4 years, while consistency with respect to 
Colour shows the opposite U-shape. Examination of residual values of G 
(following the procedures described in section 2.3) shows that all mean values 
of residual G for criteria Shape & Size, Colour & Size and Size alone are in 
the range .04 - .08, which is consistent with simulated random sorting. Other 
mean values of residual G are inconsistent with random values. It seems 
clear that Size is barely considered by children of this age, either in selection 
or in sorting. 
The nature of the relation between spatial and sequential measures was 
further investigated by examining overall correlations with age and 
comparing partial correlations with Gsp(Psp) and Gse(Pse) partialled out. 
The resulting correlations are shown in Table 2 below. Evidently these 
correlations suggest strongly that the children impose more structure on 
their sorts at the stage of selection of objects from the unsorted heap than at 
the stage of spatial arrangement. 
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Criterion 
Size Colour Shape S&C S&Sh C&Sh All 
r Age x Gsp .21 .10 .45* .33* .41* .29* .38* 
rAge x Gse .32* .13 .40* .45* .50* .37* .51* 
rAge x Psp .45* .35* .45* .39* .47* .41* .42* 
rAge x Pse .49* .41* .52* .51* .60* .51* .55* 
rAge x Gsp.Gse .00 .01 .14 -.07 -.05 .02 -.11 
rAge x Gse.Gsp .24 .08 .16 .33* .32* .24 .38* 
r Age x Psp.Pse .01 -.14 -.10 -.20 -.16 -.17 -.21 
r Age x Pse.Psp .21 .27* .31* .41* .44* .38* .44* 
Table 2: Correlations and Partial Correlations between Age and measures of 
Spatial (sp) and Sequential (se) Consistency- G and Completeness- P 
(N=60, age-range 3;1 to 5;3). 
3.2 Kontos (1989) Data 
Kontos collected free sorts of 27 objects varying in colour (9 red, 9 yellow, 9 
blue) and shape (9 squares, 9 circles, 9 triangles). Colour and shape were 
completely balanced, so there were 3 identical objects for each combination of 
values. Kontos' material is shown in Figure l.Her subjects were 14 children 
at each of two age groups, mean ages 3;9 and 4;7. Subjects were assigned to 
two sorting conditions. In Condition 1 (Closed), the unsorted objects were 
contained in an opaque bag, while in Condition 2 (Open) the unsorted objects 
were placed in a disorderly heap beside the sorting board, as usual. The point 
of this manipulation was to see whether forcing random selection of the 
objects would produce deterioration of sorting performance. Of course, the 
Gray results suggest strongly that this should be the case. Results for Gsp 
and Gse in the 8 combinations of Age, Matching Criterion and Condition are 
shown in Table 3 below. 
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3 year-olds 
(Closed) 
(Open) 
4 year-olds 
(Closed) 
(Open) 
• 
Shape 
Gsp R Gse R 
.12 L09} .OB L06} 
(.09) (.03) 
.39 L32} .23 {.17} 
(.35) (.24) 
.17 {.15} .11 {.09} 
(.25) (.11) 
.54 {.40} .50 {.37} 
(.37) (.40) 
Page 248 
Criterion 
Colour Shape & Colour 
Gsp R Gse R Gsp Gse 
.10 {.07} .06 L04} .12 .07 
(.05) (.02) (.10) (.04) 
.26 {.19} .17 {.11} .2B .22 
(.35) (.lB) (.23) (.lB) 
.05 {.04} .05 {.04} .06 .07 
(.03) (.03) (.06) (.OB) 
.33 {.19} .29 {.17} .56 .47 
(.32) (.33) (.37) (.37) 
Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations (in brackets) for Spatial (Gsp) and 
Sequential (Gse) Measures of Sorting Consistency. Residual Means 
after Derived Similarity Extraction are shown in curly brackets. 
Evidently the manipulation was effective. Values for Gse in the Closed 
Condition lie comfortably in the ranges determined by simulation (see Figure 
2). However, so too do most values for Gsp, showing that successful sorting at 
these ages depends critically on the imposition of structure at the selection 
stage. These observations were explored by a 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-model 
ANOVA, with Criterion (shape, colour or shape & colour) and Mode (spatial 
or sequential) as within-subject factors and Age and Condition as between-
subject factors. The only significant effects were main effects of Condition 
(F[1,24]=24.0, p<.OOl) and Mode (F[1,24]=B.54, p<.Ol). As Table 3 shows, values 
of Gsp and Gse were consistently higher for Shape than for Colour except, 
perhaps, in the 3 year-old, Closed Condition data. However, neither the 
Criterion effect nor the interaction effect implied by this exception was 
significant. Since numbers of subjects were small, and standard deviations 
large, in this experiment, it might well be worth investigating further with 
larger numbers, since it is possible that subjects could use felt shape in the 
Closed Condition to determine order of selection, and likely that older 
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children would exploit this possibility more effectively. 
3.3 Sugarman's Material (1983) 
Some of Sugarman's results suggested precocious sorting ability in late 
two year-old subjects. These results were obtained using a set of 8 objects 
varying in 2 colours and 2 shapes, with 2 examples of each object type. The 
distributions of G obtained by simulation of 1000 random sorts show that 
perfect sorts are not uncommon with this small set. For example, Gsp(Shape 
or Colour) was 1.00 for .07 of the sorts, while Gse was 1.00 for .04. 
Accordingly, Sugarman's findings merit examination with larger sets of 
objects. 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
The techniques of analysis presented here seem well suited to effective 
exploration of free sorting data. It is clear also from the two datasets 
investigated above that, if the investigator's interest is confined to using the 
task as evidence for grasp of concepts, it is unnecessary to record and 
painstakingly transcribe the spatial arrangements produced, since these 
simply reflect the order in which objects are taken from the unsorted heap 
and since that order is much more easily observed and recorded. In fact, it 
could be recorded in real time. It follows that the various sources of 
underestimation mentioned in the Introduction, which mostly arise from the 
activity of sorting itself, do not constitute a sufficient reason for avoiding the 
task as a measure of conceptual organization. 
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Chapter 14: Categorization, Early Concepts and Language 
Acquisition! 
To characterize the structure of language adequately, linguists require a 
considerable array of concepts, many of them quite abstract, corresponding to 
classes of the clause, the phrase, the word, etc. To characterize the content of 
linguistic expressions a further array of concepts is required, corresponding 
to the types of objects and properties denoted, of propositions expressed, of 
modes of expression and so forth. Thus, in order to give an adequate account 
of how any utterance functions, it is necessary to deploy this army of 
concepts. Yet young children, 4 or 5 years of age, use and understand the 
simpler structures of their native language fluently, without benefit of any 
special instruction and often despite quite unhelpful-looking regimes of child-
rearing. In order to do so, it seems as if children must employ mental 
structures homologous to the linguists' concepts. But it is known from other 
work that children's ability to construct concepts of arbitrary categories is 
initially very weak and develops slowly. 
1. Approaches to the Problem 
This paradoxical observation has one well-known resolution, namely that 
the necessary concepts do not have to be constructed by children; instead, they 
are innately specified. In addition it is often proposed that the mental 
apparatus needed to speak and understand language is encapsulated and 
isolated from other cognitive resources, that it constitutes a mental module 
(Chomsky, 1984; Fodor, 1981). This module has several parameters, initially 
set to default values. In the course of development exposure to the language 
around them 'triggers' the values of these parameters to appropriate 
settings, perhaps according to some maturational schedule also regulated by 
inherited material (see Chapter 6 for elaboration). 
Another route towards a resolution involves a number of linked ideas: that 
1 To be published as Campbell, in press. 
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to characterize children's early language adequately a much reduced and 
simpler set of concepts is required; that children are more adept at 
constructing concepts than hitherto supposed; that to employ a concept 
explicitly, as a linguist does, is a very different thing from employing it 
tacitly, as a speaker does; that the contribution of genetic material to the 
process of acquisition is much more general, thus not encapsulated, or 
perhaps confined to some specific aspect of language, for instance to 
production and reception of speech. The general theory of acquisition 
attempting this sort of resolution is known as semantic bootstrappine-. It was 
first clearly outlined by Macnamara (1972) and has been recently explored by 
Pinker (1984). 
So knowledge of children's categorization abilities, of the sorts of concept 
they are able to construct and of the innate resources that these abilities 
imply, is needed in order to make an adequate assessment of the plausibility 
of the program just outlined. Also, whatever theory of first language 
acquisition is proposed, such knowledge is needed in order to set upper limits 
to the possible content of children's utterances. The thought expressed ('what 
is said') may only partially reflect the thought that prompted expression 
('what was meant'), but it is surely absurd to propose that the former exceeds 
the latter in complexity of content. These relationships are very 
programmatic and it cannot be claimed that much progress has been made 
with them. Thus far the most profitable relationship between children's 
categorization and first language has been the converse one; namely, that 
study of early language can reveal facts about early categorization (Vygotsky, 
1962), although here - by the same reasoning - conclusions about the content 
of early language can only set lower limits to categorization abilities. 
It is evident that there is no clear consensus amongst scholars about either 
cognitive or linguistic development during this period of childhood: in both 
fields a range of well-supported views is encountered spanning the two 
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Palmirini (1980) records a famous and instructive dispute). As noted above, 
there are even those who deny that the two fields of development are in any 
way connected. 
2. Categorization 
From a psychological perspective, categorization is involved whenever an 
individual treats distinct phenomena as if they were the same recurrent 
phenomenon. This arises in at least three different ways: 
(a) because the individual is biologically disposed to treat the phenomena in 
this way - these may be called constitutional cate~ories; or 
(b) because the phenomena form a natural cluster, isolated from other such 
clusters - environmental cate~ories; or 
(c) because, arising from some purpose of the individual, it makes sense to 
treat the phenomena in this way - constructed cate~ories. 
Examples of constitutional categories might be certain regions of the color 
solid (Kay and McDaniel, 1978) or certain classes of auditory event (Kuhl and 
Miller, 1975); a case has been made that some natural kinds such as lions 
and zebras are environmental categories (Mervis and Rosch, 1981), although 
not all natural kinds are (Dupre, 1981). It may be that artefactual kinds like 
fork or spoon provide purer cases of isolated clusters then do natural kinds. 
The best examples of categories that are clearly constructed are perhaps 
those categories of number, quantity, relation, etc. whose development was 
investigated by Piaget and Szeminska (1952). The term 'kind' is used as short-
hand for what are sometimes called sortal categories. Sortal categories are 
categories whose members are readily individuated and, say, counted. Thus, 
'dog' denotes a sortal category. 'How many dogs are here?' deserves an 
answer, and gets one. But 'How many red things are here?' does not. For 
example, if there is a red handkerchief, should we count each thread, or 
molecule, etc.? The categories defined by qualities such as colors, shapes, etc. 
are thus clearly not kinds. 
Chapter 14 Page 253 
Mervis and Rosch's influential review presented evidence that a particular 
level within natural kind hierarchies was psychologically privileged. 
Categories at this level, called basic level categories, are environmental 
categories inasmuch as within-category similarity is maximal relative to 
between-category similarity at this level. They argued that this level is the 
point of entry to the hierarchy for children, pursuing an older insight of 
Brown (1958), and the level of category most easily manipulated by adults in a 
range of experimental tasks. For biological hierarchies, this level falls 
roughly at the level of the genus (e.g. tiger, as opposed to Felid, or Siberian 
tiger). 
Whereas constitutional categorization is presumably automatic, and 
environmental categorization may come about as the outcome of simple 
perceptual processes that detect some invariant property that distinguishes 
the isolated clusters with reasonable reliability or by other simple methods, 
constructive categorization is presumed to involve mental effort, at least in 
early stages of the categorization process. The operation of these processes by 
no means always takes us from the particular to the general, nor does it 
follow the same pathways in different communities. To illustrate, initial stop 
consonants may be allocated to numerically distinguished constructed 
categories of voice onset time (with the aid of suitable instruments). These 
categories are of course finer-grained than the categories detected by unaided 
listeners, and these latter environmental categories are different in different 
speech communities, say Spanish and English. Moreover, although it is 
unclear whether children form relevant constitutional categories, their 
discrimination of stops varying in voice onset time is certainly sharpest 
around environmental category boundaries (Burnham, Earnshaw and 
Clark, 1991). So we may say that the environmental categories formed have 
an established constitutional basis, at least. 
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3. Conoopts 
It is essential to distinguish between the mental structure which 
represents a category and the category itself. Within psychological 
discussions these mental structures corresponding to and representing 
categories have been called concepts. (This usage is different from that found 
in most philosophical discussions, following Fregean practice, in which 
concepts are taken to be abstract entities specifying the intension of a 
category.) Two important varieties of concept are, or ought to be, 
distinguished: individual concepts and ~ concepts. Concepts may 
represent categories in different psychological functions. Perhaps the 
simplest such function is recognition. Preliminary definitions would then be: 
Definition (1): An individual concept is a mental structure that enables 
recognition of the same individual, encountered at different 
times and places; 
Definition (2): A type-concept is a mental structure enabling recognition of 
different individuals as being of the same type (i.e. 
belonging to the same category). 
Now most psychologists outside the behaviorist and some present-day 
cognitive-science traditions have insisted on rather more by way of definition 
than what is offered above. The definitions given above are minimal in 
several senses. For instance, recognition can be based on a very partial 
specification of the recognized individual or type, provided individuals and 
types are well-separated in the world in question. To take an example from 
Dennett (1987, p. 290), in a particular country, a coin-operated device may 
distinguish the desired type of coin from others on the basis of a partial 
specification of weight and shape, ignoring, say, embossed or engraved 
marks and inscriptions. As an instantiated type-concept such a device is very 
defective, though it may work well enough, since the objects inserted form 
well-separated clusters. If the device were improved in conceivable ways, 
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then the danger would arise of its rejecting perfectly good coins because of 
surface imperfections, etc., so it may be seen that attainment of a fully 
effective instantiated type-concept is a difficult goal. In fact, it is an 
impossible requirement. A fully effective type-concept for a given coin 
specifies a history for the coin - that it was minted in a particular place by 
certain machines. Exactly the same conclusion follows for individual-
concepts: ideal individual-concepts will distinguish 'indiscernible' 
individuals (pennies, twins) and will not be diverted by 'disguise' changes. 
Ideal individual-concepts will therefore require the specification of a history 
as well. Though such ideal concepts perhaps cannot be attained, it is a 
common enough notion that concepts should not be ascribed to creatures or 
devices, unless they can pick out something like the correct category in most 
circumstances. This requirement of additional functionality may be 
characterized as a demand that concepts should be computationally effective. 
A second notion of desired functionality, additional to that specified in 
definitions (1) and (2), is that concepts should be representationally effective: 
they should allow their possessors to hold the target individual/type in mind 2 
when it is absent or competing for attention with other categories. This notion 
of concept coincides more or less with Piaget's. 
A third suggestion for additional functionality is that concepts should be 
susceptible to combination, so that novel properties, relations and relational 
properties may be constructed from familiar concepts. There is no doubt that 
this sort of additional functionality is highly desirable: our creative and 
imaginative capacities depend on our possessing such productively effective 
concepts. 
These three different characterizations of the additional functionality 
required need not lead to three different theories of concepts. Instead, it may 
be reasonable to attempt a theory of concepts that satisfies all three 
2 This is, of course, the proposal discussed extensively in Chapter 8. 
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requirements simultaneously. After all, the requirements answer to 
capacities that work together developmentally. We become creatures that 
(a) are not easily fooled (our concepts become computationally effective), 
(b) can think about remote objects, etc. (our concepts become 
representationally effective), and 
(c) show some capacity for representational novelty (our concepts become 
productively effective) 
In the present chapter, only the nature and origins of representationally 
effective concepts are discussed. However, as noted, it is hoped that 
attainment of such concepts is at least associated with the other two sorts of 
additional functionality. 
Our definitions (1) and (2) above clearly do not define concepts in any of the 
senses just described, but they are useful notions nonetheless. The structures 
defined there will be referred to instead as individual and ~-detectors. 
3.1 Formation of Early Concepts 
Traditionally, following Vygotsky (1962) and Inhelder and Piaget (1964), it 
has been assumed that the free sorting task, in which children form a large 
collection of diverse objects into groups that share a similar property, depends 
upon the ability to hold the shared property in mind across the several sorting 
operations and despite constant change in the other properties. Typically, 
these tasks involve objects characterized by variation in size, shape, colour or 
similar simple properties, usually denoted by adjectives - qualities, in a word. 
So, on the basis of the well-known studies mentioned above (cf. also Kemler, 
1983) we may identify the following research finding: 
Finding (1): Children in the age-range 3-6 years can hold a quality in 
mind so as to organise free sorting performance, but cannot readily 
switch to a different principle of organisation, nor coordinate two such 
principles in multiplicative fashion. 
Such children then, according to the criterion of representational 
effectiveness, possess concepts of these qualities, although there are still 
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some limitations to the flexibility with which they are employed. Younger 
children, although unable to form concepts of these properties, can execute 
simpler versions of the free sorting task. Ricciuti (1965) showed that if the set 
of objects to be sorted consists of subsets of objects belonging to different 
simple kinds, such as dolls and boats, and if one requires only that the 
subjects should touch or handle these subsets successively (rather than form 
them into spatial groups), then even l-year-olds show some ability and 2-year-
olds can carry out the task, thus redefined. These findings have been 
confirmed by Sugarman (1983), who also showed that 2-year-olds will treat 
locally well-separated categories (for example, a set of green cylinders and a 
set of red circles) as if they were kinds. So, taking Ricciuti's and Sugarman's 
results together we arrive at our second research finding: 
Findin~ (2): Children in the age-range 1-3 years can hold some sortal 
categories in mind so as to organise free sorting performance. 
Such children can therefore form concepts of some kinds, but cannot form 
concepts of qualities. These sortals cover roughly the same ontological 
ground as Mervis and Rosch's notion of basic level categ-ory. Also, the timing 
of this achievement, beginning around 18 months, coincides with Stage 6 of 
object permanence (Piaget, 1954). If this latter achievement is taken as 
marking the first construction of representationally effective individual 
concepts, then it would seem that the formation of concepts of simple 
individuals and concepts of basic level categories are developmentally 
simultaneous. This is perhaps not surprising, in view of the next finding, 
after Mervis and Rosch, that individuals play an important role in the 
formation of such concepts: 
Findin~ (3): basic level concepts are resemblance structures. For any 
such concept and the population that employs it, some objects 
(stereotypes or prototypes) are better examples of the target category than 
others. Judged membership of such categories depends on similarity to 
the prototypes rather than on some (set of) common attribute(s). 
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Readers with philosophical backgrounds will be reminded of similar 
discussions in traditional metaphysics, notably in connection with the 
problem of universals (see Armstrong, 1980). In that context (sometimes 
called first philosophy) the problem is to characterize the notions of object and 
property (by means of the metaphysical notions of particular and universal _ 
or not, as the case may be) so as to give a satisfactory account of what things 
there are. The psychological context is different: it is to characterize a variety 
of mental representations - concepts - so as to give a satisfactory account of 
how we come to know whatever things there are. However, as noted, there 
are many affinities between the two sorts of investigation. In metaphysical 
discussions, whether realist or nominalist in tendency, such resemblance 
structures have often been proposed as characterizations of properties. In 
realist analyses, beginning with Plato, there is a single external target 
against which resemblance is measured, a pure or Ideal Form: in 
nominalist analyses, e.g. the well-known discussion of games by 
Wittgenstein (1951), there is an endless chain of global resemblance. 
However, as has often been pointed out, we are left minimally with the 
universal properties (relations) of resemblance and with the task of 
characterizing these. Similarly, in the account of concepts given in finding 
(3), we are led to wonder on what fundamental capacities the judgment of 
similarity to prototype depends. Substantial help is provided here by study of 
the ranges of application of children's first names for basic level categories. 
Studies by Clark (1973) and especially Bowerman (1978) make it quite evident 
that judged similarity is by no means global, but rather sharply structured by 
attributes, features and qualities of shape, colour, texture, etc. Although the 
theory of the development of word meaning proposed by Clark has now been 
discarded, it is sometimes forgotten that the data persist, and that these data 
show clearly that children's apprehension of similarity is strongly structured 
by these qualities. So, we have the finding: 
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Findin~ (4): Children younger than 2 years form concepts with 
pronounced resemblance structure. However, similarity to prototype 
clearly depends on formation of concepts of attributes, features and 
qualities. 
4. Paradoxes of Early Conoopt Formation 
The findings (1) to (4) just described generate a formidable developmental 
paradox: 
Paradox (1): Whereas studies of object sorting and handling suggest 
that children younger than 3 cannot yet form concepts of qualities, the 
studies of early word use suggest that they must have done so. 
The distinction between minimal type-detectors (definition (2) above) and 
representationally effective type-concepts may be effective in resolving this 
puzzle. Or, conversely, this puzzle makes it evident that the distinction is 
necessary. Whereas findings (1) and (2) pertain to representationally effective 
quality concepts, the bases of similarity in findings (3) and (4) are not quality 
concepts but quality detectors. 
A closely similar puzzle arises when we consider how individuals are 
recognised. To be sure, an individual concept must be essentially historical. 
Stage 6 of object permanence is only attained when the infant can construct a 
history for an individual as it is moved from place to place invisibly. Likewise 
Piaget's story (1951, p. 225) of his daughter Jacqueline's mistaken recognition 
of the slug encountered when leaving the house and some hundreds of yards 
further off suggests a failure to construct such a history. However, it must be 
presumed that recognition of individuals is often merely heuristic and 
depends not upon construction of a space-time trajectory but on the detected 
recurrence of a particular cluster of attributes and qualities. At any rate, 
under this presumption individual detectors consist of just such cluster-
specifications. But this leads to: 
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Paradox (2): The formation of a type-detector depends on apprehension 
of the world as consisting of distinct individuals, rather than of a 
single recurring individual. This in turn depends upon the formation 
of individual-detectors which define unit categories. But such detectors 
can only be aggregates of perceived attributes, features and qualities, 
in other words of type-detectors, completing a vicious circle. 
Paradox (2) is surely sensibly resolved by supposing that certain type-
detectors of attributes, features and qualities are genetically transmitted. 
Even the parsimonious philosopher Quine (e.g. 1975) allows some such 
innate quality space as a cognitive given. These innate type-detectors will 
then bootstrap the process of acquisition of individual-detectors and then of 
novel type-detectors, breaking the vicious circle. 
5. First Language and First Concepts 
According to the previous section, eighteen month old children can form 
concepts of individuals and of certain environmental categories such as basic 
level categories. But they cannot yet form concepts of qualities such as shapes 
or colors. These early concepts are underpinned by individual and type 
detectors, some of which detect constitutional categories and are therefore 
innately specified. 
Studies of early vocabularly broadly confirm these conclusions. Eighteen 
month old vocabulary contains many proper names and pronominal 
expressions denoting individuals, and nominal expressions denoting basic 
level categories. Moreover, Katzet al. (1974) showed that very young children, 
presented with the contrasting ostensions 'This is X' and 'This is an X' are 
apt to take X to denote an individual in the former case and a basic level 
category in the latter.3 
Expressions denoting qualities are slow to appear in early language, with 
color adjectives, for example, not well established until the fourth year. Early 
adjectives appear to denote instead temporary, undesirable properties such as 
3 Perhaps only if the candidate individual is well-known to the child (see Chapter 11). 
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b2t, ~, dirty, and broken (Nelson, 1976). These extrinsic properties are 
psychologically salient and command attention, whereas intrinsic properties 
of shape, color, etc., are always in competition for attention. It may be that the 
psychological prominence of these extrinsic properties makes it easier for 
children to form concepts of them. 
The prospects for establishing alignments between the developing 
conceptual apparatus of children and the structures of early language are 
therefore reasonably promising and such alignments should assist the 
development of theory in both domains of development. Besides the obvious 
need for examination of other sorts of early concept than those so far 
explored, notably of concepts of actions, study of the issues considered here is 
badly hampered by the lack of suitable metalanguage for describing the 
content of expressions (meanings) and the content of the thoughts that 
prompt such expressions. In addition these two perfectly distinct notions are 
frequently confused or conflated. 
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Afterword 
One of the most awkward questions about the development of 
representational systems is how the various systems are related and whether 
there are any identifiable causal connections between them. So far as the 
latter question is concerned I have assumed, without much argument,1 that 
mental representation is causally prior to the other systems. But it may be 
that if we look beyond the period of the first few years of life considered here 
there are other causal relations to be considered, and of course, the language 
that we learn will undoubtedly influence what we think about, and from the 
earliest years (Choi and Bowerman, in press). 
I have presented evidence in Chapter 7 that representational drawing does 
not appear until late in the 4th year. Why should there be this evident 
decaZage between mental representation and language on the one hand 
(which seem to run fairly closely together) and drawing on the other? There 
are several hypotheses worth considering. It does not seem likely that it can 
explained by any perceptual or motor difficulty connected with drawing: as I 
observed in the Discussion of Chapter 7, children are also slow to use and 
understand maps and models, and Zaitchik (1990) has offered evidence that 
they have difficulties with the representational function of photographs, too. 
As a second try, perhaps the representational content of early language has 
been over-estimated. I argued in Chapter 2 that the content of one year-old 
speech is often over-estimated, and it may be that close examination of the 
content of two year-old talk might lead to similar doubts. Oddly enough, this 
is a task for the future: most diary studies peter out around age 2;0, when the 
quantity of speech becomes unrecordably large, and experimental work with 
2 - 3 year-old language is not common. A third suggestion is purely 
theoretical: mental representation is plainly an internal system, and 
representational drawings, etc., constitute an external system; but 
1 There is a brief discussion of the point in Chapter 8, Section 4. 
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representation through language lies somewhere between. Spoken language, 
though external in the sense of being observable, is very much a system 'of 
the body', unlike drawing for which a drawing tool and a medium is 
required. Perhaps we have a developmental cycle here rather like the 
sensori-motor cycle of primary and secondary circular reactions. Finally, it 
may be that there are differences in typical content that distinguish linguistic 
representations from graphic representations. Drawings, maps, 
photographs and models function in the main to assist us in extending our 
experience beyond the here and now. On the other hand, we represent (refer 
to) remote objects and events through language in order to extend our domain 
of action beyond the here and the now, through the recruitment of others; 
conversely, others may use the same system to give us new motives and 
purposes. In sum, there are several lines of investigation of this question 
which deserve further pursuit. 
Another very awkward question about representation is how exactly to 
characterize it. My answer, developed in the second half of this dissertation, 
is that representation is co-extensive with thinking. If a child cannot 
mentally represent some entity, then she cannot think about it; if she cannot 
think about it, she cannot mentally represent it. To be of use, such a 
characterization requires criteria to decide when a child is or is not able to 
think about this or that kind of entity: my own favoured criterion (developed 
in the later chapters, particularly 8 and 14) is the vague requirement that the 
child should be able to hold the represented entity in mind under difficult 
circumstances, where what counts as 'holding in mind' and as 'difficult 
circumstances' will vary from entity to entity and will depend as much on the 
outcome of research as on a priori analysis. In my Introduction and 
Overview I mentioned recent characterizations of representation by Millikan 
(1984) and Dretske (1988); there is also, of course, the characterization offered 
by Perner (1991), which closely follows Dretske. I will limit my remarks to 
Afterword Page 2&! 
Dretske's proposal, endorsed and adopted by Perner, which is that 
representational systems (of the type to which mental representation belongs) 
do not simply represent things, but represent them in a certain way. In 
short, the representations of such systems, like expressions in a language, 
have a meaning or sense as well as a reference, and, again like language, 
are capable of misrepresentation. But it seems to me that the apparatus of 
sense and reference developed by Frege (1952), derives its point from the role 
that it plays in explaining how statements may be true or false. There are 
many difficulties in assimilating mental representation and external 
systems such as the graphic systems to the linguistic statement-making 
model. For example, there is a brisk and effective refutation of the idea that 
representations such as images or pictures can make statements, in pp.174-
184 of Fodor (1975). And the attempts by Dretske and Perner to present 
concrete cases of misrepresentation seem clumsy and awkward (cf. Perner's 
example, p. 20, of a flash photograph 'misrepresenting your beautiful blue 
eyes as red': the photo represents your eyes perfectly well, and certainly 
makes no statement that' your eyes are red'; it doesn't seem to me to 
misrepresent your eyes at all, except in the uninteresting sense that it 
'misrepresents your face as flat and glossy'. Perner has surely confused the 
medium of the representation with its content). 
The idea that sometimes representation is representation 'in a certain 
way' or representation-as may be traced to a well-known passage in 
Goodman (1969, p.29), where Goodman is discussing pictorial 
representation. His general point is to draw a distinction between certain 
pictures which refer (portraits, landscapes) and therefore clearly represent 
something, and other pictures which do not; pictures of some particular fish 
as opposed to fish-pictures (see Chapter 10, Section 3). While the latter 
pictures denote something, the former do not. Sometimes we have objects 
which are both, such as the black-horse-picture of a certain black horse, 
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which both represents the black horse and represents it as black, etc. 
Goodman then discusses an event in which he claims to have a picture of a 
certain black horse, which he is about to show you: he then shows you a 
picture of his horse taken from such a distance that the horse appears only as 
a small speck in the photograph. But Goodman does not go so far as to say 
that the light-speck-picture mispresents the black horse. Nor should he. How 
does it misrepresent the black horse? Does it misrepresent it as a light speck? 
Certainly not: if it were a picture of a light speck (whatever that is) it would 
not be a picture of the black horse. Goodman uses the word 'mislead', but it is 
not the picture that is said to be misleading, but Goodman's statement that he 
has a picture of a certain black horse, which he is about to show you. This 
context makes such a statement tantamount to a promise to produce a black-
horse-picture. So even if we accept Goodman's claim that his picture 
represents his horse 'as a light speck', there is no need to speak of 
misrepresentation here. Further, it is not obvious that 'representation-as' 
can be generalized from these pictorial cases to other forms of representation. 
Perner (Chapter 2) and Dretske (Section 3.6) claim that representation is 
always representation-as. But Dretske's discussion, interesting though it is, 
seems very unconvincing to me, and Perner's (since he tries to extend 
Dretske's idea from representational systems to individual representations) 
even more so. Dretske begins by discussing Goodman's black horse story, 
saying that black-horse-pictures represent the black horses they are pictures 
of as black horses. He then proceeds to discuss an external representational 
system, namely a fuel tank/gauge. 'My fuel gauge [presumably indicating 
zero fuel - RNC] is not only a representation of an empty gasoline tank, it is 
also ... an empty-tank-representation (p. 71)'. This appears just like the black 
horse case, but it is not. His fuel gauge is a representation of an empty 
gasoline tank only ifit is an empty-tank-representation. By contrast, many 
different pictures may be pictures of a given black horse, even if they are not 
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all black-horse-pictures (far away, in a snow storm, in moonlight, etc.). 
Dretske's next remark makes matters worse, not better. 'That the tank is 
empty is what it indicates, the information it carries, the comment it makes 
about that topic'. What topic? Apparently, he means 'the tank', since his next 
remark is that 'My gas tank is also very rusty, but the gauge does not 
comment on this feature of its topic'. But surely Dretske has lost his bearings, 
since the fuel gauge doesn't represent the tank, but the current state of the 
tank, namely its being empty. But then what are we to make of the claim that 
the fuel gauge makes the comment 'the tank is empty' about the empty state 
of the tank?! There are reasons, then, for taking a cautious approach to the 
criterion proposed by Dretske, and augmented by Perner. I doubt whether it 
will stand up to scrutiny: moreover, it is hard to see, even if these objections 
could be met, how the criterion of misrepresentation might be applied 
concretely to determine the representational status of children's acts. 
My criterion for identifying 'true' representation (p. 263) has weaknesses 
too, notably its miscellaneous and a posteriori character. But it has the virtue 
of applicability, being rooted in established procedures for determining 
whether a child can represent an object (object permanence tasks) or a 
thought (false belief tasks), and the possibility of extending it to representing 
a quality is developed in Chapters 10-13. In these later chapters of my 
dissertation I have made no explicit reference to consciousness (prominent in 
my discussions of representation in Chapters 1-4), but the locution (borrowed 
from Piaget) used instead - 'holding X in mind' - is merely a bowdlerized 
version of' being consciously connected to X', so my claim that cognitive 
psychology must look to consciousness (or directed consciousness at least) to 
define its agenda persists. Claparede's Law of Awareness (discussed on p.20) 
may not characterize all forms of directed consciousness, but those which it 
does characterize perhaps constitute a satisfactory agenda for cognitive 
psychology, and for cognitive development in particular. 
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